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Articles

Passion's Progress:
Modern Law Reform and the
Provocation Defense
Victoria Nourset

How do we understand the death of loved ones at the hands of those with
whom they are most intimate? In life as well as law, we say that murders of
husbands, wives, and lovers are "crimes of passion." Thus we explain the
event in a way that bridges the gap between love and murder as it separates
them, that distances violence from our own homes as it bows to human frailty.
This intellectual juggling act yields a law full of ambivalence toward those
homicides it describes by the name of "passion." Doctrine condemns the
killings, but with sympathy for the defendant's situation; theory excuses and
justifies the killer, but only partially; verdicts do not acquit, but reduce the
sentence from murder to manslaughter. 1 This ambivalence has led to legal

t Visiting Assistant Professor Law, University of Maryland; Assistant Professor of Law, University
of Wisconsin. B.A., Stanford University; J.D., University of California (Boalt Hall). Many thanks to all
those who listened to the ideas presented in this Article during faculty workshops at the University of
Wisconsin and the University of Maryland. In particular, I would like to express my appreciation for the
comments of Ann Althouse, John Brumbaugh, Alice Brumbaugh, Donna Coker, Walter Dickey, Herman
Goldstein, Neil Komesar, David Luban, Jane Schacter, Jana Singer, Michael Smith, and Robert Suggs.
Special thanks to Alta Charo for reading an early draft of my research, to Howie Erlanger and Marcus
Peacock for helping me work through questions about my research technique, and to Stewart Macauley and
Peter Carstensen for unflagging faith in the project. My research assistants at Wisconsin, Leonila Vega,
Chris Taylor, Michele Bellia, and Raquel Engelke, read until they could read about murder no more; I am
ever indebted to them for their persistence and to Jen Devery at Maryland for perfecting their work. This
project would have been impossible without the generous support of the University of Wisconsin Law
School's Smongeski Fund and the University of Wisconsin Graduate School. Finally, if there is a ray of
hope in this Article, it belongs to my favorite writer, Rick Cudahy, who as my husband makes me believe
in the possibility of shared understandings.
I. See PETER W. LOW ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 884 (2d ed. 1990) ("Today,
every state employs some variation of the provocation formula to distinguish between two distinct grades
of non-capital criminal homicide."). In some jurisdictions, passion or provocation reduces an offense from
first to second degree murder rather than from murder to manslaughter. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. §§ 939.44(2),
940.01 (2)(a) ( 1996).
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reforms promtsmg greater humanity and consistency, promises that have
moved lawyers to reject the older talk of "heat of passion" in favor of the
more modern "emotional distress." However well-intentioned, these reforms
have led us to change our understandings of intimate homicide in ways that we
might never have expected. Our most modern and enlightened legal ideal of
"passion" reflects, and thus perpetuates, ideas about men, women, and their
relationships that society long ago abandoned.
Based on a systematic study of fifteen years of passion murder cases/ this
Article concludes that reform 3 challenges our conventional ideas of a "crime
of passion" and, in the process, leads to a murder law that is both illiberal and
often perverse. If life tells us that crimes of passion are the stuff of sordid
affairs and bed side confrontations, reform tells us that the law's passion may
be something quite different. A significant number of the reform cases I
studied involve no sexual infidelity whatsoever, but only the desire of the
killer's victim to leave a miserable relationship. 4 Reform has permitted juries
to return a manslaughter verdict5 in cases where the defendant claims passion
because the victim left, 6 moved the furniture out/ planned a divorce, 8 or
sought a protective order. 9 Even infidelity has been transformed under
reform's gaze into something quite different from the sexual betrayal we might

2. My study reviewed hundreds of provocation cases reported by trial and appellate courts between
1980 and 1995. This review led to a data set comprised of every intimate homicide case reporting a
provocation claim in jurisdictions that have adopted MODEL PENAL CODE (MPC) § 210.3 ( 1985) in whole
or part. That data set was then compared to samples from jurisdictions adopting traditional and moderate
reform regimes. A complete list of the 267 claims involved in this study appears in Appendices B and C.
3. By "reform," I refer here to those jurisdictions that have either adopted the MPC version of the
defense or have significantly liberalized the defense in ways similar to the MPC. As I indicate below, my
results regarding separation do not hold in those jurisdictions that have retained a more traditional approach
toward the defense. See infra Part I.
4. See id. (noting that over one-quarter of all cases in my MPC data set involved neither infidelity nor
physical violence but, instead, departure or separation prompting a passionate homicide). On separation
generally, see Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation,
90 MICH. L. REV. I (1991).
5. Under the MPC, a case may not be submitted to a jury unless a rational jury could find that there
was a "reasonable explanation or excuse" for the defendant's claim of "extreme emotional disturbance"
(EED). MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.31 (b); see also id. § 1.07(5) ("The Court shall not be obligated to
charge the jury with respect to an included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting
the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense.").
6. See State v. Little, 462 A.2d 117, 118 (N.H. 1983) (reporting that defendant was upset because his
wife "didn't love [him] anymore" and had rejected his attempts at reconciliation, and stating that jury was
instructed it could return EED manslaughter verdict).
7. See State v. Reams, 616 P.2d 498, 499 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (reporting that defendant was upset
because he had come home to find that his wife had moved and all furniture was gone, and stating that
defendant urged EED defense at trial), aff'd, 636 P.2d 913 (Or. 1981).
8. See People v. Guevara, 521 N.Y.S.2d 292, 293 (App. Div. 1987) (reporting that defendant was
enraged because his wife had filed divorce papers, and stating that jury was instructed it could return EED
manslaughter verdict).
9. See Perry v. Commonwealth, 839 S.W.2d 268, 269-70 (Ky. 1992) (reporting that defendant became
enraged when sheriff sought to execute protective order and that EED instruction was given); Matthews
v. Commonwealth, 709 S.W.2d 414,418 (Ky. 1985) (reporting that defendant sought to explain his mental
state at time of killing by reference to warrants sworn out against him for sexual abuse of his daughter and
burglary of his estranged wife's residence, and stating that defendant urged EED defense at trial).

1997]

Passion's Progress

1333

expect-it is the infidelity of a fiancee who danced with another, 10 of a
girlfriend who decided to date someone else, 11 and of the divorcee found
pursuing a new relationship months after the final decree. 12 In the end, reform
has transformed passion from the classical adultery to the modern dating and
moving and leaving. And because of that transformation, these killings, at least
in reform states, may no longer carry the law's name of murder. 13
Reform's understanding of the passion defense 14 reflects deeper roots in
modern theories of criminal culpability. Staunchly defended by traditional legal
scholarship, these theories center around the notion that defendants are less
culpable when they lose "self-control." 15 This sounds plausible and humane,
but leaves unanswered an important question: Which losses of self-control
merit the law's compassion? By systematically surveying how courts have
answered that question, this Article argues that adherence to the self-control
rationale masks a different, more pernicious, tendency. The law in practice
does something more than protect self-control. Courts and lawyers have not
measured claims of passion by "quickened heartbeats" or "shallow
breathing," 16 but by judgments about the equities of relationships, judgments

10. See Dixon v. State, 597 S.W.2d 77, 78-79 (Ark. 1980) (reporting that defendant became enraged
when his fiancee danced with another man and that jury was instructed it could return EED manslaughter
verdict).
II. See, e.g., Rodebaugh v. State, No. 436, 1990 WL 254365, at **2 (Del. Nov. 27, 1990) (reporting
that defendant argued provocation to jury in case in which he killed man who was dating woman defendant
had dated a year and a half earlier).
12. For instance, State v. Wood, reported a provocation case in which the defendant came upon his
ex-wife and her new boyfriend, approximately eight months after "they separated for good," and two
months after the divorce had become final. See Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 2, 13-14, State v. Wood,
545 A.2d 1026 (Conn. 1988) (No. 12734). Defendant received an EED instruction at trial. See Brief for
State of Connecticut-Appellee at B-1, State v. Wood, 545 A.2d 1026 (Conn. 1988) (No. 12734); see also
State v. Rivera, 612 A.2d 749, 750-51 (Conn. 1992) (reporting that defendant received EED instruction
in case in which he killed man he believed was having affair with his ex-common law wife three years
after she had left).
13. No reform jurisdiction has tried openly to enforce outdated norms of intimate relationships. Indeed,
there are appellate cases in reform jurisdictions that seem to cast doubt on whether "leaving" should be
considered a reasonable excuse for a passionate homicide. See, e.g., People v. Casassa, 404 N.E.2d 1310,
1314 (N.Y. 1980) (affirming bench trial's determination that defendant's emotional reaction to woman's
rejection was "peculiar" to him and not "reasonable"). On the other hand, no appellate court that I am
aware of in an MPC jurisdiction has ever squarely held that departure or separation is an insufficient basis,
as a matter of law, for an EED claim. In fact, as I argue later, juries in MPC jurisdictions (unlike their more
traditional counterparts) hear such cases quite often. See Appendix B (listing cases in which juries were
instructed on EED in cases involving separation or departure claims).
14. I use the term "passion defense" to refer to the provocation defense in general. Although it may
seem archaic, the plain language of many jurisdictions' statutes includes the term "passion." For examples
of such statutes, see WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTI, JR., CRIMINAL LAW§ 7.10 n.3 (1986). I
use the term "defense" here and throughout this Article in its generic sense as a claim that may reduce
punishment, partially or fully. The MPC's own defenses both mitigate and acquit. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL
CODE § 3.09 (1985) (stating that mistaken self-defense may lead to mitigation). Finally, I use the term
"provocation defense" to cover all forms of the defense, whether the traditional "heat of passion" defense
or the more modern MPC version known as "extreme emotional disturbance."
15. For a complete explanation of this theoretical approach and its variations, see infra Part II.
16. 2 WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 452 (New York, Henry Holt 1890)
(espousing behavioral view of emotion, to which reform is thought to aspire).
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disguised-and therefore rendered more powerful and resistant to change-by
a jurisprudence pretending to make no judgments at all.
Because reform's ideas about intimate loyalties do not lie on the surface,
they have survived in the face of obvious conflicts with well-accepted reform
movements. Elsewhere, reform has acknowledged, indeed encouraged,
women's freedom to divorce or separate. Reform of the passion defense,
however, has yielded precisely the opposite result, binding women to the
emotional claims of husbands and boyfriends long ago divorced or rejected.
Reform in other areas of the law has encouraged battered women to leave their
victimizers. Reform of the passion defense, however, discourages such
departures, allowing defendants to argue that a battered wife who leaves has,
by that very departure, supplied a reason to treat the killing with some
compassion. 17 In this upside-down world of gender relations, it should not be
surprising to learn that the common law approach toward the provocation
defense, deemed an antique by most legal scholars, provides greater protection
for women than do purportedly liberal versions of the defense.
Reform not only breeds conflict where gender is concerned; it also breeds
conflict within the criminal law itself. 18 Rarely, if ever, does the criminal law
embrace defendants who kill in response to a lawful act 19 or trivial slights, 20
and yet passion's reform seems to permit defendants to argue that acts such as
leaving or "dancing with another" 21 constitute a "reasonable" explanation
meriting our compassion. Rarely, if ever, does the criminal law embrace

17. See supra notes 6--9.
18. It is worth noting that such conflicts are not limited to murder cases but apply to other crimes,
such as assault, where provocation remains a defense or partial defense. A minority of states, for example,
apply the MPC's EED formula to assault crimes. See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 508.040 (BanksBaldwin 1994) (reducing some assaults based on "extreme emotional distress" to class D felonies or class
B misdemeanors); State v. Nunn, 646 S.W.2d 55, 58-59 (Mo. 1983) (reversing and remanding for retrial
for failure to instruct on EED in assault case).
19. For example, under the Model Penal Code, self-defense, defense of property and duress each
require a triggering act that is unlawful. See MODEL PENAL CODE§§ 3.04, 3.09 (1985) (providing that selfdefense requires actor's belief that force is necessary to protect against use of "unlawful" force); id. § 3.06
(providing that defense of property requires actor's belief that force is necessary to prevent "unlawful entry
or other trespass"); id. § 2.09(1) (providing that duress requires that actor be coerced by use or threat of
"unlawful" force). Under section 210.3, however, defendants need not show that they believed that the acts
provoking them were unlawful. A few MPC jurisdictions have adopted such a rule, by court decision or
by statute, but with uncertain effect on intimate homicide cases. See infra text accompanying notes 301-05
(discussing how such rule appears to have had little effect when defendant claimed failure to reconcile as
basis for EED claim in New Hampshire).
20. Under the Model Penal Code, self-defense, duress, and necessity require a showing of
proportionality between the acts triggering the defense and the defendant's actions. See MODEL PENAL
CODE §§ 3.02( I), 3.02(3)c, 3.04( I), 3.04(2)b (providing that use of deadly force to defend property or self
must be proportional to force defended against); id. § 2.09 (providing that duress defense is unavailable
when threat is insufficiently serious); id. § 3.02(1 )(a) (providing that necessity defense is unavailable when
evil sought to be avoided is of less seriousness than law broken in its name). Under section 210.3,
defendants need not show that the use of violence was proportionate to the provoking act.
21. See, e.g., State v. Martinez, 591 A.2d 155, 156 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991) (''Two weeks before the
victim's death, the defendant, the victim's former boyfriend, had seen the victim dancing with another
man.").

1997]

Passion's Progress

1335

defendants who are to blame for creating their own defense, 22 and yet some
trial courts applying reform's passion defense have found mitigating stress in
the defendants' own violent acts, even their own battering. 23 These conflicts
have gone largely unnoticed by scholars.Z4 Although students of the
provocation defense have noted the odd case in which the defense generates
absurd results, they have reserved their concern for the lawyer's unlikely
hypothetical rather than the real-life lovers' quarrel. 25 Scholarship has focused
on different questions, questions about the characteristics of those who kill in
these situations. 26 In its focus on identity, this scholarship has made rather
obvious normative conflicts within the criminal law all but impossible to see.
Reform's legacy affects both sexes, not one, and any effort to grapple with
the defense's weaknesses must acknowledge the complexity of its gender
effects. In the cases I have studied, men are by far the most frequent
victimizers, and women the most frequent victims. But that does not mean that
only women are killed; indeed, it is often the man helping the women
leave-the sheriff or the mover or the lover-who dies. Reform often seems
to tie women to relationships that they do not want, in effect, enforcing a rule
of "emotional unity." 27 But reform exacts a price from male defendants as

22. See Paul H. Robinson, Causing the Conditions of One's Own Defense: A Study in the Limits of
Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine, 71 VA. L. REv. I, 24 (1985) ("[E]very jurisdiction ... acknowledges
that such causing-one's-defense can be relevant to an actor's liability.") (noting application of this idea to
whole host of defenses). Recognizing that under section 210.3 defendants may base an EED claim on
conditions that they have created, two states have amended their statutes to prohibit it, but with uncertain
consequences in intimate homicide cases. See N.D. CENT. CODE§ 12.1-16-01 (1985 & Supp. 1995); OR.
REv. STAT.§ 163.135(1) (1995).
23. See, e.g., State v. Traficonda, 612 A.2d 45, 48-49 (Conn. 1992) (reporting that trial court gave
EED instruction in case in which appellate court found that "most" of evidence upon which defendant's
claim relied was based on his own battering); Newell v. Delaware, No. 269, 1992 WL 53433 (Del. Super.
Ct. Mar. 4, 1992) (reporting that defendant stipulated to his own prior bad acts of battering "to use that
same evidence to buttress his defense of extreme emotional distress").
24. See infra Part III. Reform's defenders might claim that my argument concerning inconsistency
depends upon transforming provocation from a partial excuse to a partial jurisdiction. Cf Joshua Dressler,
Comment, When "Heterosexual" Men Kill "Homosexual" Men: Reflections on Provocation Law, Sexual
Advances, and the "Reasonable Man" Standard, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 726, 749-51 (1995)
(dismissing argument that provocation defense is homophobic on grounds that argument transforms defense
into justification) [hereinafter Dressler, Reflections]. The parallelism that I seek to emphasize does not
depend upon comparing the provocation defense to defenses that are complete or partial justifications:
Imperfect self-defense and duress, for example, have both been classified as excuses and both require
triggering conduct that is unlawful or perceived as unlawful, unlike the EED defense. As Professor Dressler
has noted, the idea that provocation should be limited to cases in which the defendant is "not to blame for
his anger" is consistent with an excuse theory of provocation. See Joshua Dressler, Provocation: Partial
Justification or Partial Excuse?, 51 MOD. L. REv. 467, 475 (1988) [hereinafter Dressler, Provocation].
25. Although some scholars have been adamant about the defense's normative character, see, e.g.,
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 4.2.1, at 243 (1978), demonstrations of normative
conflict are typically reserved for bizarre cases in which defendants are hypothesized to have grown up in
terrorist enclaves, see, e.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL LAW 619 (1988).
26. Most MPC scholarship tends to see the important question as one that asks about the personal
characteristics of defendants in the situation. See infra Part III (discussing liberal focus on identity to
answer questions involving provocation defense).
27. To the extent that provocation honors "emotional realities" about relationships after those
relationships have ended, it actually extends the merger of women into relationships from the ancient rule
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well, albeit one of agency rather than blood. To obtain the law's compassion,
men must forsake a claim that they are acting as moral agents and, instead,
play the role of the helpless female: dependent, victimized by inarticulate
impulse, and utterly incapable of freely determining a proper course of
action. 28 One need not celebrate female "states of injury" 29 to see that
passion's reforms have imposed upon men and women a "veil of relationship"
that neither may have deliberately chosen. 30
I raise these issues in stark terms not to recommend abolition of the
provocation defense but to advocate reconstruction-reconstruction based on
a new theory of the law's ambivalence toward some passions. In the end, we
do not solve provocation's problems by giving up the law's compassion for
sincere emotion, 31 nor by endorsing an abolitionist "ethics of autonomy." 32
We must finally come to terms with the essential difficulties of the
defense-why the law partially excuses some, but not all, emotional defendants
and defines some, but not all, passions as rational. In Part I, I present my
empirical findings, focusing on the role of departure in the practice of the
provocation defense. In Part II, I consider the conventional arguments for the
defense, finding that each leaves us with the same question: Why are some
emotions worthy of protection (jealous rages), while others are not (till-inspired
greed)?33 In this Part, I try to show how a defense committed to the idea that
it protects the "choosing self' turns out to protect something quite different.
of marital unity into a modem one of emotional unity. Cf I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *430
("[T]he very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage .... ").
28. The "reward" granted here to men for a trait typically deemed "feminine" (emotion) is a doubleedged sword because it carries with it the associated judgment that the man lacks moral agency. See Anne
Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REv. I, 26-43 (1994) (explaining long tradition in criminal law
in which married women were deemed to lack moral agency).
29. See WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE MODERNITY (1995).
30. I do not mean to diminish the effect of these rules upon women. I think it important, however, to
remember that stereotypes take "two" to create and this can have important, and damaging, spillover effects
on men as well. See Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The
Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. I, 9 (1995); Mary Anne Case, Of
Richard Epstein and Other Radical Feminists, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 369, 370-71 (1995)
("[F]eminism is not simply about women. Feminism is about the sexes-there are two of them.")
[hereinafter Case, Of Richard Epstein].
31. I argue below that the law needs to increase its protection of emotion in some circumstances. See
infra notes 417-19 and accompanying text.
32. I do not seek to celebrate the end of intimacy or endorse a heartless independence. I do not believe
in an "ethics of autonomy," the claim that our morals depend on human beings who can be described
"without relationships." See THOMAS L. SHAFFER & MARY M. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEIR
COMMUNITIES 20-21 (1991) (rejecting this position). Relationships are relevant to our identities. See, e.g.,
Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thought and Possibilities, I YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
7, 35-36 (1989) (arguing that respect for autonomy must also recognize role of social relationships in
constituting individual). As I argue later, the law of provocation itself constructs and depends upon a
particular idea of loyalty within relationships. See infra text accompanying notes 277-305. The ultimate
question here is not whether we should replace loyalty with autonomy. The question is whether the law
imposes, rather than reflects, a preexisting ideal of loyalty, an ideal that is based on an image of gendered
relationships long ago abandoned.
33. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 33 (1968) (relying on "common sense
generalizations" about "human nature" for conclusion that men are "capable of self-control when confronted
with an open till but not when confronted with a wife in adultery").
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In the face of repeated efforts to banish normative decisionmaking from the
defense, liberal theorists have actually helped to entrench norms about
relationships. 34 The intellectual move here is one I call the "personification"
of the defense, a move that places all of the normative questions into the form
of questions about the qualities and attributes of persons35 and thus disguises
both the essential normativity of the inquiry 36 and the fact that the Model
Penal Code's concealed normative commitments are to relationships rather than
persons. 37 In Part III, I explain that move and investigate the theoretical
underpinnings of reform's approach, arguing that provocation's defenders and
its critics are doomed to talk past each other. As long as reform's defenders
start from the position that the freedom of individuals is measured in their
distance from relationships, they will find little common ground with those
who maintain that law must consider our relationships to each other.
Finally, in Part IV, I present a new, more limited, version of the defense
that seeks to honor equality as well as autonomy. The passion defense should
be retained as a partial excuse but only in the limited set of cases in which the
defendant and the victim stand on an equal emotional and normative plane.
When a man kills his wife's rapist, his emotional judgments 38 are inspired by

34. Even the best-intentioned efforts at refonn may, in the end, simply entrench status regimes. For
an extraordinarily insightful examination of the way in which challenges to status regimes sustain as they
transfonn, see Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating As Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE
L.J. 2117 (1996). See also infra Part III (noting that by "naturalizing" status relations within minds and
hearts of "reasonable men," reform actually entrenched nonns about relationship).
35. See 2 CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 15-32
(1985) (discussing this intellectual habit in social sciences generally). Lest there be any confusion at the
start, my thesis does not depend upon communitarian notions of the self or the communitarian's attempt
to place relationships of loyalty prior to the self. On the other hand, I do not seek to celebrate the victim's
autonomy interest as prior to the defendant's. I am asking whether the defendant's claim is really one of
autonomy (the right to "choose") or a claim that the defendant is entitled to impose his particular nonnative
view of relationships upon others (the right to "legislate").
36. My understanding of normativity is that it is inherently "relational." Nonns are not simply values,
they are commitments we make to one another to act in particular ways in the future. If this is correct, an
intellectual method that places all of the nonnative issues within individuals will, from the start, make
nonns in the image of the individual. I believe that this method, although quite common in the law, is
essentially hostile toward candid thinking about our normative commitments. It also makes for obvious
conflicts between liberals and feminists. See infra Part III.
37. My diagnosis of the defense's failures as well as my argument for its reconstruction apply to most
jurisdictions, not simply those adopting the MPC. The MPC practice is the logical, and most extreme,
example of intellectual habits found in many other jurisdictions that have focused on the emotions of
"reasonable persons."
38. Lest the idea of an "emotional judgment" seem outlandish from the start, I argue in Part IV that
this position is far more consistent with modern ideas of psychology-and even brain science-than the
position that emotions are purely behavioral. Nor is it particularly new; one can trace the idea of emotion
as essential to moral rationality to philosophers as ancient as Aristotle and Hume. See Annette C. Baier,
Hume, the Women's Moral Theorist?, in WOMEN AND MORAL THEORY 37 (Eva Feder Kittay & Diana T.
Meyers eds., 1987) (discussing Hume's ideas of "sympathetic" correspondence between persons essential
to moral judgments); Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal
Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 290--91 (1996) (discussing earlier Aristotelian ideal of emotion as reflection
of judgment).
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a belief in a "wrong" that is no different from the law's own: Ex ante, there
is no doubt that rape is wrong both for the defendant and the victim and that
the defendant's "outrage" is "understandable" from this perspective. When a
man kills his departing wife, claiming that her departure outraged him, this
normative equality disappears. There is no reason to suspect that the victim
would have agreed to a regime in which "leaving" was a wrong that the law
would punish. 39 To embrace the defendant's emotional judgments in these
latter circumstances not only allows the defendant to serve as judge and
executioner, but also as legislator. It allows the defendant to stand above the
victim and enforce at penalty of death a set of emotional judgments that are,
at best, partial.
My proposal for a "warranted excuse" 40 is likely to be controversial from
a variety of perspectives: It declines to recommend abolition as some feminists
have urged, rejects the traditional idea of emotion upon which current theories
of self-control depend, 41 and calls for a merger of excuse and justification
that may appear oxymoronic to some. 42 Moreover, it would change the
practice of the defense substantially, barring manslaughter verdicts in most
intimate homicide cases. The old scholarly questions may remain, but I offer
my own view as a beginning to a new debate. We punish those who stand in
emotional judgment not because of their character or their self-control, but
because they have replaced the state as the normative arbiter of violence, and
when we partially excuse, we excuse not because reasonable men kill but
because the law sees reason in the defendant's emotion, reason that mirrors the
law's own sense of retribution. In short, we partially excuse when coherence
demands it, when the defendant appeals to the very emotions to which the state
appeals to rationalize its own use of violence.

39. As I argue later, judgments of "wrongfulness" include both intellectual and emotional components.
See infra Part IV.
40. Scholarly consideration of the provocation defense has focused a good deal of energy on the
question of whether the defense is an excuse or a justification. See, e.g., A.J. Ashworth, The Doctrine of
Provocation, 35 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 292, 292-97 (1976); Dressler, Provocation, supra note 24, at 480 (arguing
that courts have been "insufficiently concerned about the justification-excuse distinctions" in provocation).
I argue in Part IV that the defense remains a partial excuse, but one that requires us to evaluate critically
the relationship between the defendant's claims of emotion, and the claims' implicit normative judgments,
to other norms the law expresses. I call this a "warranted excuse." See infra Part IV.
41. In this, my view is similar to that recently proposed by Dan Kahan and Martha Nussbaum,
although I disagree with their proposed solution to the problem. It is necessary, but not sufficient, in my
view, to replace a descriptive theory of emotion with an evaluative one. See infra Part IV; cf Kahan &
Nussbaum, supra note 38, at 364-65 (advocating evaluative understanding of emotion).
42. Traditionally, it is thought that excuses and justifications are mutually exclusive-that if action
is warranted (and therefore justified), it cannot be excused because, by definition, conduct that needs to be
excused is unwarranted. See Joshua Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a
Rationale, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 438 (1982). This understanding, however, assumes that
the proper focus of the inquiry is on the "act" itself; my claim is built upon the idea that we are evaluating
the defendant's emotional claims, not his acts. In this world, it is perfectly consistent to say that the act is
unjustified overall and, at the same time, that the emotion may be "warranted." See infra Part IV.

Passion's Progress

1997]

1339

I. PASSION, PROVOCATION, AND REAL LIFE

A. Legal Background
During the O.J. Simpson trial, Susan Estrich suggested in an editorial in
USA Today that legislatures should abolish the heat of passion defense. 43 In
this, she echoed Jeremy Horder's earlier call that the defense "ought to be
abolished" because it imposes significant disadvantages on women. 44 These
calls are but the culmination of a growing legal controversy about the
provocation defense-a legal controversy that has focused not only on results
(i.e., who gets the defense, who does not), but more importantly on what the
law would have us call "passion."
Modern theories of provocation assume that passion knows no specific
circumstances, but may arise in any situation. We partially excuse defendants
who kill in passion because they lacked self-control. In this focus on selfcontrol, the modern theory seeks to distinguish itself from earlier approaches
limiting the defense to cases in which the "passion" depended upon the
victim's wrong, in which the law assumed the victim partially deserved her
fate. The modern view is roughly associated with reform of the defense, which
envisions provocation as a partial excuse; the earlier view is roughly associated
with the common law and regards provocation as partial justification. 45
Although most jurisdictions today appear to borrow from both of these models,
the trend over the past century has been decidedly toward a model based on
excuse and a theory based on self-control. 46
The Model Penal Code (MPC) represents the height of the liberal reform
movement47 and the culmination of the law's move away from categorical
rules. 48 Inspired by the theory that the provocation defense exists to protect
free choice, the MPC drafters created a defense remarkably sensitive to context
43. See Susan Estrich, Don't Be Surprised If O.J. Gets Off Easy, USA TODAY, June 23, 1994, at lA.
44. See JEREMY HORDER, PROVOCATION AND REsPONSIBILITY 186-87 (1992) (presenting data from
English practice to support claim of abolition based on disparate impact on women). Both Horder and
Estrich rely upon a disparate impact argument, Estrich apparently relying upon sentencing data in
California, Horder on data from Britain as a whole. See id. at 187-88; Estrich, supra note 43; see also
Dressler, Reflections, supra note 24, at 735-37 (suggesting, albeit rejecting, argument that abolition is
plausible utilitarian position because of gender bias). My argument is not based on statistical impact nor
on utilitarian premises.
45. The classic statement of this controversy appears in Dressler, Provocation, supra note 24, at

467-72.
46. See id. at 467 ("[T]he trend in England and the United States of America is to treat the defense
as an excuse, focusing less on the decedent's wrongful conduct and more on the accused's lack of selfcontrol.").
47. The MPC aspired to be an "ideal penal code." See Herbert Wechsler, A Thoughtful Code of
Substantive Law, 45 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 524, 525 (1954-55), quoted in Herbert
Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the United States: The Model Penal Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV.

1425, 1427 (1968).
48. See Dressler, Reflections, supra note 24, at 733 ("The rigid common law categories of 'adequate
provocation' have largely given way to the view that the issue is one for the jury to decide.").
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and the defendant's peculiar perspective. They rejected a "reasonable man"
standard as too objective, precluding "any attention to the special situation of
the actor."49 Even something as basic as the idea of a "sudden passion" found
little support in the MPC's draft. Refusing to limit the defense to instantaneous
explosions of violence, drafters embraced a rule that allowed the defendant's
"passion" to arise slowly, "simmering," as one court put it, "in the unknowing
subconscious."50 By the beginning of the 1980s, a "substantial minority of
jurisdictions"51 had adopted the Model Code's formulation in whole or in
part. 52 Although some states balked at the Code's psychological emphasis, the
Code's reformist influence was widely praised. 53 Even as many legislatures
refused to adopt the MPC's draft, courts and scholars borrowed the Code's
commentary to support various reforms. 54 In the end, Herbert Wechsler's
MPC commentary helped to solidify and legitimize a theory of the defense
based on self-control that was far more influential than the draft itself. 55
Precisely because of the enormous influence of Wechsler's work, some
find it difficult to imagine that the provocation defense could be based on
anything other than self-control. As a historical matter, however, this is clearly
untrue. In early modern law, passion was defined by a set of categories derived
49. The drafters articulated their intent this way:
[T]hat the provocative circumstance must be sufficient to deprive a reasonable or an ordinary
man of self-control, leaves much to be desired since it totally excludes any attention to the
special situation of the actor.... [F]ormulation in the draft affords sufficient flexibility to
differentiate between those special factors in the actor's situation which should be deemed
material ... and those which properly should be ignored.
MODEL PENAL CODE§ 201.3 commentary at 47-48 (Tentative Draft 1959) [hereinafter Tentative Draft].
50. People v. Patterson, 347 N.E.2d 898,908 (N.Y. 1976), aff'd, Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197
( 1977).
51. LAFAVE & SCOTI, supra note 14, at 660.
52. Today, eleven states and two territories have adopted, in whole or in part, the MPC "extreme
emotional distress" formulation. For a list of the states and the relevant statutes, see infra note 88. For a
comprehensive analysis of the particular nuances and differing formulations of these statutes, see PAUL H.
ROBINSON, I CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES§ 102(a) (1984 & Supp. 1997).
53. Academic commentary during the 1970s and 1980s almost uniformly praised the MPC's
"subjectification" of the defense. See, e.g., Dolores A. Donovan & Stephanie M. Wildman, Is the
Reasonable Man Obsolete? A Critical Perspective on Self-Defense and Provocation, 14 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
435, 449-50, 462 ( 1981) (arguing for elimination of "reasonable excuse or explanation" limitation); Richard
Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: !-Provocation, Emotional Disturbance, and the Model Penal Code,
27 B.C. L. REv. 243, 317-22 (1986) (discussing legal commentary).
54. See, e.g., People v. Pouncey, 471 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Mich. 1991) (refusing to adopt common law's
"mere words" rule based on theory, found quite clearly in MPC commentary, that there are some
'"emotions so intense that they distort the very process of choosing"') (citation omitted); State v. Crisantos,
508 A.2d 167, 170 n.2, 172 (N.J. 1986) (noting that New Jersey rejected EED formula but relying upon
MPC commentary for approach that is flexible and nonformulaic); Commonwealth v. McCusker, 292 A.2d
286, 290 (Pa. 1972) (adopting "slow burn" rule in non-MPC jurisdiction similar to rule advocated in MPC
commentary).
55. Although the MPC's provocation formula did not prompt mass legislative conversion, its impact
within the academic community has far outstripped its legislative reality. Indeed, if casebooks are any
measure, the MPC's EED approach is taught in every criminal law classroom in America. See, e.g.,
GEORGE E. DIX & M. MICHAEL SHARLOT, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 430--42 (4th ed. 1996);
SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 416-37 (6th ed.
1995); JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 443-44, 447-49 (3d ed. 1996); LOW
ET AL., supra note I, at 896-903; ROBINSON, supra note 25, at 612-19.
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from an older social order, indeed, a code of honor. 56 The "nineteenth century
four" 57-adultery, mutual combat, false arrest, and a violent assault-defined
the outer reaches of adequate provocation, 58 just as "mere words" and
"trivial" provocation defined what was clearly inadequate provocation. 59
These categories were thought to isolate those cases in which the violation of
a social or relational norm led to righteous anger. 60 Adultery was at the center
of the categories, 61 the classic source of adequate provocation, 62 enforcing
rules of gender relations grounded in an older idea of property. 63
Today in the United States, the law of provocation stands at a crossroads.
No theory has ever convinced a majority of scholars,64 and recently there
have been substantial cries that the law reflects a biased order. 65 The doctrine
is in extraordinary disarray: Indeed, a case classified as manslaughter in one
jurisdiction is just as easily defined as murder in another, even though the
resulting penalties may differ substantially. 66 Although most jurisdictions have
56. See HORDER, supra note 44, at ch. 2.
57. See Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who Batter/Men Who Kill, 2 S. CAL.
REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 71, 80 (1992) (citing Note, Manslaughter and the Adequacy of Provocation:
The Reasonableness of the Reasonable Man, !06 U. PA. L. REv. 1021, 1023-24 (1958), on "nineteenth
century four").
58. See KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 55, at 413 ("[T]he long-standing common law rule ...
permits the jury to find adequate provocation only in a few narrowly defined circumstances."). For a
comprehensive understanding of the categories and limiting rules, see HORDER, supra note 44, at ch. 2;
Ashworth, supra note 40, at 293.
59. See HORDER, supra note 44, at 97-99.
60. See id.
61. Thus, a defendant who killed in response to adultery (a breach of a property relation between
husband and wife at common law) was entitled to claim the defense, while a defendant who observed the
infidelity of his fiancee, to whom there was no legal relationship, was not entitled to the defense. See
Dressler, Provocation, supra note 24, at 474. From the perspective of "self-control," of course, this
distinction makes little sense.
62. See Coker, supra note 57, at 72 ("[S]cholars repeatedly refer to adultery as the paradigm example
of provocation .... ").
63. The story of adultery's grounding in older property norms has been told elsewhere and need not
be repeated here. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 221-22
(1993) (discussing "unwritten" law that found 'Justifiable" killing of unfaithful wives' lovers); see also
KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 55, at 427-31; Laurie J. Taylor, Comment, Provoked Reason in Men and
Women: Heat-of-Passion Manslaughter and lmpeifect Self-Defense, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1679, 1694-95
(1986).
64. See Dressler, Provocation, supra note 24, at 480 ("Confusion surrounds the provocation defense.");
Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591, 636
(1981) ("[T]here exists no convincing interpretation of reasonable provocation."); Glanville Williams,
Provocation and the Reasonable Man, 1954 CRIM. L. REV. 740, 741-42 (raising fundamental questions
about theory of provocation).
65. See Coker, supra note 57, at 78 (arguing that provocation defense protects batterers); Robert B.
Mison, Comment, Homophobia in Manslaughter: The Homosexual Advance as Insufficient Provocation,
80 CAL. L. REV. 133, 135-36 (1992) (arguing that provocation defense is homophobic); Taylor, supra note
63, at 1689-92 (arguing that provocation defense applies male standard of reasonableness).
66. The offense of "manslaughter" is specifically defined by the MPC as something "other than" and
"lesser than" murder. See MODEL PENAL CODE§ 210.3 (1985) (manslaughter); id. § 210.2 (murder). The
Code's commentaries and its penalties support that view: While a murder verdict may yield a sentence of
life imprisonment, the maximum Code penalty for manslaughter is 10 years. See id. § 210.3; see also DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. II, §§ 632, 4205 (1995) (10-year maximum); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 707-702, 706-660
(1988) (same). Actual time served for most manslaughter offenses appears to have remained steady at
approximately five to eight years. See CRAIG PERKINS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, OFFICE OF JUSTICE
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adopted what appears to be a similar "reasonable man" standard, that standard
has been applied in dramatically different ways, with jurisdictions borrowing
from both liberal and traditional theories. Some states require a "sudden"
passion, others allow emotion to build up over time; 67 some reject claims
based on "mere words," others embrace them. 68 Today, we are only safe in
saying that in the law of passion, there lie two poles-one exemplified by the
most liberal MPC reforms and the other by the most traditional categorical
view of the common law. In between these poles, a majority of states borrow
liberally from both traditions.
Given this state of affairs in doctrine and theory, it is appropriate that we
turn to the law of passion in practice. In what follows, I offer a summary of
my research. I first explain the methodology of my survey, a more complete
version of which appears in Appendix A. After taking a closer look at the
results, I ask how "reform" cases differ from "traditional" approaches and
whether these results diverge substantially from results in "mixed"
jurisdictions. At the outset, let me say that I recognize the arguments for the
reform approach, arguments I address at length in Part II. Here, I present a
picture of reform's practice rather than its theory.
B. Summary of Research and Methodology

By February 1982, "Karen left the defendant and moved into the ... home
of her brother .... She returned to the defendant for about six days but left
for the final time when he threatened to kill her if she or her brother tried to
contact the police. " 69 He did not seek to contact her for about three months.
After the defendant made "several telephone calls ... to speak to his wife,"
calls which prompted Karen s brother to 'jile[] a complaint ... with the state
police, " Karen instituted divorce proceedings and her parents complained to
the state police. 70 The defendant then drove to Karen s new home,
disconnected the telephone wires, and shot Karen's father. 71 The jury was
PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL CORRECTIONS REPORTING PROGRAM, 1992, at 46 tb1.2-12
(1994) (reporting 61 months mean time served based on mean sentence of 136 months for nonnegligent
manslaughter); see also PATRICK A. LANGAN & JOHN M. DAWSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SPOUSE MURDER DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES at iv (Sept. 1995) (showing
average time served of six to eight years in spousal murder cases yielding nonnegligent manslaughter
disposition). However, legislatively prescribed maximums for manslaughter sentences have been gradually
rising in MPC and other states. See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN.§§ 507.030,532.060 (Banks-Baldwin 1994)
(20-year maximum); OR. REv. STAT.§§ 163.118, 161.605 (1995) (20-year maximum).
67. Compare Commonwealth v. McCusker, 292 A.2d 286 (Pa. 1972) (adopting cumulative provocation
rule), with State v. Gadson, 442 S.E.2d 594 (S.C. 1994) (holding that passage of time negates heat of
passion).
68. Compare People v. Pouncey, 471 N.W.2d 346 (Mich. 1991) (refusing to adopt rule that words may
never be adequate provocation), with Metheney v. State, 538 N.E.2d 1202 (Ind. 1992) ("(M]ere words alone
cannot constitute sufficient provocation.").
69. State v. Utz, 513 A.2d 1191, 1192 (Conn. 1986).
70. See id.
71. See id. at 1192-93.
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instructed that it could return a manslaughter verdict based on "extreme
emotional disturbance. " 72
"Defendant was very upset that his wife had filed for dissolution. She was
living with her mother and had obtained a temporary restraining order
preventing him from entering her residence. After she filed the dissolution
action, defendant told a number of people that he wanted to kill her. " 73 The
defendant called his wife, who refused to talk to him and hung up. "He
returned to work and, from there, called a friend and said that he wanted to
go kill his wife. Defendant left work about 9:00p.m. and went to his wife's
residence. He kicked the door in, went in and said, 'this is it. '" 74 The jury
was instructed that it could return a verdict of manslaughter based on
"extreme emotional disturbance. •>75
"Smith grew despondent over news that his girlfriend was leaving him.
Becky Church, the 17-year-old mother of the infant Amanda, had decided
to ... move to Ohio to live with her mother. "76 Within ten days, "Smith
arrived at the home of Becky s family. After a brief argument with Becky,
Smith retrieved his 30130 hunting rifle from the hedge where he had hidden
it. " 77 He shot through the door, killing Beckys half-sister, then went into the
house and killed Becky's mother. Some time later, as the ambulance attendants
administered to the victims, Smith killed Becky and the daughter she was
holding in her arms. 78 The jury was instructed that it could return a
manslaughter verdict based on "extreme emotional disturbance. "79
Contemporary life, gender, and culture tell us that cases of mtlmate
homicide are the stuff of love triangles and sordid affairs. But look again at the
cases summarized above-there is no infidelity, no rival, no affair, no triangle.
They tell a different story, a story of separation and departure. My research
suggests that separation is neither an idiosyncratic nor an isolated phenomenon
in intimate homicide cases raising the provocation defense. Indeed, in the
reform jurisdictions that I studied, my data reveals that one is as likely, if not
more likely, to find a relationship that has ended, was ending, or in which the
victim sought to leave, as one is to find an affair or sexual infidelity alone. 80
72. See id. at 1194.
73. State v. Wille, 858 P.2d 128, 130 (Or. 1993).
74. /d.
75. See id. at 130-31 ("The trial court advised the jury that the EED defense could reduce the crime
of intentional murder to manslaughter, [but was not a defense to felony murder].").
76. Smith v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 437, 440 (Ky. 1987).
77. /d.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 449.
80. This conclusion holds true for MPC states and the "mixed" jurisdictions that I studied. Sixty-five
percent of all MPC claims (86/133) in my data set involved a "separated couple" as compared to 47% of
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These findings suggest quite strongly that the conventional image of
passionate homicide-sexual betrayal, love triangles, sordid affairs-represents
a flawed view. We might have been forewarned that the picture was more
complex. In a groundbreaking article written in 1991, Martha Mahoney argued
that many cases we see as "domestic violence" amount, in fact, to what she
termed "separation assaults," 81 attacks committed in response to a woman's
attempt to leave a relationship. In the homicide context, recent empirical
research tends to corroborate Mahoney's theoretical insights: Studies suggest
that between forty-five and fifty-six percent of all intimate homicides men
commit82 involve some element of separation. 83 In the most comprehensive
claims (63/133) involving infidelity. See supra note 454 (defining "separated couple"). Seventy percent
(37/53) of all claims in "mixed" jurisdictions involved a "separated couple" as compared to 47% (25/53)
involving infidelity. This also holds true for claims that reached juries. See infra Table A (reporting that
in MPC states 67% (66/99) of claims reaching juries involved element of separation as compared to 54%
(53/99) that involved infidelity); see id. (reporting in mixed jurisdictions that 66% (23/35) of claims
reaching juries involved separation as compared to 49% (17/35) involving infidelity). But cf id (reporting
that in traditional jurisdictions, separation appears in only 39% ( 15/38) of cases reaching juries as compared
to infidelity, which was involved in 45% (17/38) of cases). Often, of course, these factors go hand in hand:
One sees claims that an ex-spouse or ex-partner had begun a new sexual relationship that inspired the
violence. That these cases involve "infidelity" does not diminish the fact that they also involve separation.
81. See Mahoney, supra note 4, at 71-79.
82. It is important not to confuse the sex ratio of homicides involving separated couples with the sex
ratio in homicide generally or intimate homicide itself. Relative to all homicides, females are more than
nine times as likely to be killed by a husband, ex-husband, or boyfriend as are men to be killed by a wife,
ex-wife, or girlfriend. See RONET BACHMAN & LINDA E. SALTZMAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN: ESTIMATES FROM THE REDESIGNED SURVEY 4 (1995) (reporting that 28% of female
homicide victims versus 3% of male victims were killed by opposite-sex partners). Within the universe of
intimate homicide, however, the precise sex distribution of perpetrators is a subject of some controversy.
In Anglo-Saxon countries generally, men are far more likely to kill their married female partners than the
reverse (in Canada, the ratio is 3 to I; in England, the ratio is 4 to I; in Scotland, the ratio is 2.5 to I).
Data for the United States is based on studies of selected cities showing rates as low as I to I. See Margo
I. Wilson & Martin Daly, Who Kills Whom in Spouse Killings?: On the Exceptional Sex Ratio of Spousal
Homicides in the United States, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 189, 191 tbl.l (1992); see also Franklin Zimring et al.,
Intimate Violence: A Study of Intersexual Homicide in Chicago, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 910, 914 (1983)
(reporting that "the war between the sexes takes its casualties in almost equal measure [in Chicago in
1981]"). This discrepancy may reflect the peculiar demographics of urban-based studies; in any event, such
comparisons should not be read to imply symmetry in the circumstances of the killings. Existing studies
tend to suggest, for example, that women often kill in self-defense, a factor that might well exclude them
from cases in which provocation is claimed. See LANGAN & DAWSON, supra note 66, at iv (noting that in
44% of cases studied in which wives kill husbands, killing occurred at or about time of physical assault
upon wife by husband as opposed to 10% of husband defendants); see also Angela Browne & Kirk R.
Williams, Exploring the Effect of Resource Availability and the Likelihood of Female-Perpetrated
Homicides, 23 L. & Soc'Y REV. 75, 76 (1989) (finding that homicides by women are more likely to be
in response to male violence than male-perpetrated homicides are to be in response to female violence);
Wilson & Daly, supra, at 206 (emphasizing that men "often hunt down and kill spouses who have left them
[and] .... kill in response to revelations of wifely infidelity; women almost never respond similarly ....
Men often kill wives after subjecting them to lengthy periods of coercive abuse and assaults; the roles in
such cases are seldom if ever reversed.").
83. See George W. Barnard et al., Till Death Do Us Part: A Study of Spouse Murder, 10 BULL. AM.
ACAD. PsYCHIATRY & L. 271, 274 tbl.2 (1982) (finding that 56.5% of wife killers studied were estranged
from their wives as opposed to 9.1% of husband killers); Jacquelyn C. Campbell, "If I Can't Have You,
No One Can": Power and Control in Homicide of Female Partners, in FEMICIDE 99, 106-07 (Jill Radford
& Diana E.H. Russell eds., 1992) (reporting study of Dayton, Ohio murder police files showing that of 33
intimate murders by former or present husbands, boyfriends, or casual lovers, 48% involved separation (5
former casual sex partners plus II estranged husbands or boyfriends)); Barbara Hart, Gentle Jeopardy: The
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study to date, Martin Daly and Margo Wilson have concluded that "wives are
much more likely to be slain by their husbands when separated from them than
when coresiding." 84 If they are correct, it is unsurprising to find a high
percentage of claims (sixty-five percent) 85 in my research in which the
relationship was over, ending, or in which the victim sought to leave.
If separation is a fact of intimate homicide, it is a fact likely to surprise
lawyers. The law's vision of a crime of passion, a view reflected in treatises,
casebooks, and scholarly work, focuses on sexual infidelity, not departure.
This, of course, raises several questions of interest: If intimate homicide
frequently involves separated couples why does our canonical legal image still
revolve around sexual infidelity? Is separation simply irrelevant to legal
practice? Or, if it is relevant, how is it relevant? Has reform, in rejecting
adultery as a legal category, embraced or rejected separation?
To answer these questions, I sought to study intimate homicide cases in
three types of jurisdictions: MPC, traditional, and mixed. The MPC data set
was developed by collecting all 86 intimate homicide cases reported from 1980
to 1995 in which a provocation claim was asserted in the context of an adult
intimate relationship 87 in the eleven states and two territories adopting the
Code's formulation in whole or in part. 88 Many provocation cases (e.g.,
Further Endangerment of Battered Women and Children in Custody Mediation, 7 MEDIATION Q. 317, 324
(1990) ("Almost a quarter of the women killed by their male partners in one study in Philadelphia and
Chicago were separated or divorced from the men who killed them; 28.6 percent of the women were
attempting to end the relationship when they were killed.") (citation omitted); Margo Wilson & Martin
Daly, Spousal Homicide Risk and Estrangement, 8 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 3, 4 (1993) (reporting Australian
study finding that 45% of women slain by husbands "had left their killers or were in the process of
leaving").
84. Wilson & Daly, supra note 83, at 8. Each country studied (Canada, Australia, the United States
(Chicago)) showed a significant increased homicide risk to women who were estranged from their husbands
or boyfriends. See id. at 7 tbl.l (reporting ratio of female to male victims in coresiding versus estranged
couples as 3.77 to 9 in Canada, 2.91 to 15.33 in Australia, and 1.02 to 2.25 in Chicago). Because the idea
that "separation" may increase the risk of violence is controversial for some, see, e.g., ALAN M.
DERSHOWITZ, THE ABUSE EXCUSE 34-35 (1994), it is worth noting that Wilson and Daly are evolutionary
psychologists, not radical feminists. On the relationship between sociobiology, libertarianism, and feminism
with reference to Wilson and Daly's work, see Case, Of Richard Epstein, supra note 30, at 395-97. See
also David M. Buss, Evolution and Human Mating, 18 HARY. J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y 537, 538-40 (1995)
(discussing evolutionary psychology and male violence).
85. This number (86/133) is based on my estimate of "separated couples" in the MPC data set (all
claims in which the parties are estranged, living apart, divorced, or separated at the time of the killing or
in which we know that the provoking party sought to leave). See Appendix A; Table F. Table F shows that
67% (821122) of male defendant claims as opposed to 36% (4111) of female defendant claims involved a
couple that was "separated" in this sense. These figures ( 1.9 to I) are close to the lower end ratios, shown
by other social science research, of male versus female killings in estranged situations. See Wilson & Daly,
supra note 83, at 7. Note that the number of "separated couples" is actually larger than the number of
"separation" claims because some separated defendants' provocation claims may not be based on
"separation" in whole or in part. See supra note 454.
86. It is possible, of course, that my data set misses relevant cases. If so, this should not impugn the
integrity of my research as long as my methodology proceeds without bias. See Appendix A.
87. An "adult intimate relationship" is defined to include opposite sex as well as same-sex
relationships. For more on this definition, see Appendix A.
88. Today, eleven states and two territories have adopted, in whole or in part, the MPC "extreme
emotional distress" formulation: Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN.§ 5-I0-104(a)(l) (Michie 1993); Connecticut,
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§§ 53a-54a(a) (West 1994); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. II,§§ 632(3), 641
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barroom brawls) do not involve intimate partners. To obtain the broadest
possible coverage, I began by using a computer search designed to find all
cases in which a provocation or "extreme emotional disturbance" (EED) claim
was raised, whether or not the parties were related to each other. Each case
returned was then individually reviewed to determine whether there was an
intimate relationship between the "provoking party" 89 and the defendant. This
data set was then compared to samples drawn from selected "traditional" and
"mixed" jurisdictions. 90 I defined "traditional" jurisdictions 91 as those that
use the common law's categories both for including claims (e.g., adultery) and
for excluding claims (e.g., claims based on "words alone"). 92 I defined
"mixed" jurisdictions as those in which the courts still accepted some
traditional rules but had liberalized the defense by rejecting the categories and
favoring a more subjective approach toward the defendant's claims. 93
For each jurisdiction, the aim was to determine whether the law would
permit juries to return manslaughter verdicts under common factual scenarios.
Cases were coded based on four scenarios: separation, infidelity, physical
violence, and other. These factors were often found alone but could also be

(1995); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 707-702(2) (Michie 1995); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN.§§
507.020(1)(a), 507.030(1)(b) (Michie 1985); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-103(1) (1995); New
Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:2 (1996); New York, N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.20(2),
125.25(1)(a), 125.27(2)(a) (McKinney 1996); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE§ 12.1-16-01(2) (1985);
Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.115(1 )(a), 163.118(1)(b), 163.135 (1995); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5205(1 )(b) (1995); American Samoa, AM. SAMOA CODE ANN. § 46.3504(a)(2) (1987); and Guam, 9 GUAM
CODE ANN.§ 16.50(a)(2) (1992). Two of the states-New Hampshire and Utah-have adopted only part
of the MPC formulation but are included here to provide the broadest possible coverage. See Singer, supra
note 53, at 292-94. The District of Columbia has considered the adoption of the MPC approach by judicial
interpretation but has not reached a final decision. See Simpson v. United States, 632 A.2d 374, 377 (D.C.
1993) (discussing dispute about recognition of EED defense). For an analysis of the particular nuances and
differing formulations of these statutes, see ROBINSON, supra note 52,§ 102(a), at 481 n.9; id. Supp. at 75.
89. The "provoking party" is typically the victim, but not always. Imagine a defendant who finds out
that his wife is having an affair and who kills a bystander. The "provoking party" is the wife; the victim
is the bystander.
90. For the method by which these jurisdictions were chosen, see Appendix A.
91. The "traditional" state sample is derived from all cases reporting that a provocation claim was
made in an intimate homicide case from 1980-95 in the states of Illinois and Alabama. Most states have
moved away from the "categories" and associated limiting rules, but Alabama and Illinois are not alone
in retaining some or all of them. For a discussion of the factors that led to the choice of Illinois and
Alabama, see id.
92. For a description of the common law rules limiting provocation claims, see supra text
accompanying notes 57-60.
93. The "mixed" state sample is derived from all cases reporting a provocation claim in an intimate
homicide case from 1980-95 in the states of California and Minnesota. "Mixed" states tend to be the norm
in the United States. Because these states often follow different mixtures of doctrinal rules, however, it is
difficult to compare practices across jurisdictions. For example, if a jurisdiction retains the "words alone"
rule but in all other respects looks like a "reform" jurisdiction, one's results would be skewed based on that
one particular rule. I have chosen California and Minnesota because their mixture of rules appears similar
and representative of moderate reform-some subjectification of the defense but retention of rules such as
the "third party" rule (barring use of the defense when the defendant kills someone other than the
provoking party). I hope, in further work, to be able to provide a comprehensive survey of the law of
traditional and mixed jurisdictions. In this work, however, because my purpose is to identify the changes
wrought by legal reform, I have limited my survey to selected jurisdictions. For a discussion of the factors
that led to the choices of Minnesota and California, see Appendix A.
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present in the same case (separation and infidelity were a common
combination, for example). Separation cases were those reporting that the
defendant and the provoking party had separated, in fact or in law, or in which
there was evidence that the provoking party sought to leave. 94 Infidelity cases
were those reporting or suggesting that the defendant's claim rested upon
unfaithfulness, defined broadly to encompass every act from intercourse to
dating or walking down the street with a romantic rival. Physical violence
cases were those reporting or suggesting that the defendant relied upon some
incident of physical violence prompting the emotional disturbance, whether that
physical violence occurred immediately preceding the events or earlier in time.
Other cases fit none of these categories; these were cases in which the claim
rested on insults, hinged entirely on psychiatric diagnoses, or listed a variety
of miscellaneous factors. 95
For each of these factors, the case was assessed to determine whether, at
trial, the jury could have returned a manslaughter verdict. Table A summarizes
this comparative research. Note that separation figures frequently in cases that
reach juries. Indeed, in at least two-thirds of the cases studied in MPC or
"mixed" jurisdictions, juries were allowed to return a manslaughter verdict in
cases involving a couple that had separated, were divorced, were estranged, or
in which the victim sought to leave.
TABLE A. FACTUAL SCENARIOS IN CLAIMS REACHING JURIES 96

ELEMENT

MPC

TRADITIONAL

MIXED

(n=99)

(n=38)

(n=35)

Separation

67% (66/99)

39% (15/38)

66% (23/35)

Infidelity

54% (53/99)

45% (17/38)

49% (17/35)

Physical Violence

17% (17/99)

68% (26/38)

40% (14/35)

Other

7% (7/99)

3% (1/38)

6% (2/35)

94. This included reports that the parties had divorced, were separated, lived apart, or were estranged,
as well as reports that the defendant had been ordered to avoid contact with the provoking party or where
there was evidence that the provoking party sought to leave or rejected the relationship. For more on the
definition of "separation," see id.
95. In a sense, these categories are quite artificial. Indeed, it is possible to describe many of these
cases, including cases that involve "another" party, as claims based on attempts by the victim to separate
from a relationship hindered by the defendant's efforts at control. For these reasons, I have deliberately
avoided the terminology of "separation assault," see Mahoney, supra note 4, at 5--Q & passim, which covers
a broader class of cases than the category of "separation" or "departure." I have chosen these categories
to isolate the claimed effect of "infidelity" on the legal and rhetorical construction of these cases. For my
definition of "separation," see Appendix A.
96. These figures were determined by summing every case in which "separation" or "infidelity" or
"physical violence" appeared in the factual circumstances of the cases listed in Appendix B. They do not
add up to 100% because some cases involve more than a single factor (e.g., separation and infidelity appear
together quite frequently).
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Of course, since many of the "separation" cases also involved infidelity or
physical violence, I sought to refine the analysis by isolating cases involving
no infidelity or physical violence. 97 I categorized the cases as follows: (1)
departure claims, in which the defendant did not rely upon sexual infidelity or
physical violence but in which there was evidence of a separation or rejection
initiated by the provoking party; (2) separation and infidelity claims, in which
the defendant did not rely upon physical violence but in which there was
evidence of both separation and infidelity;98 (3) simple infidelity claims, in
which the defendant did not rely upon departure or physical violence, but in
which there was evidence of sexual infidelity; (4) physical violence claims, in
which the defendant may have relied on a variety of factors, including
departure or infidelity, but in which there was evidence of physical violence
by the provoking party; 99 and (5) other claims, in which the defendant did not
rely upon physical violence or sexual infidelity or departure but, instead, on
a claim that did not fit in the first four categories. 100 Table B reveals the
results of this analysis, showing that over one-quarter of the MPC cases
(twenty-six percent) reaching juries involved no infidelity or physical violence,
but only departure.
My study turns on what happens at trial-whether juries are permitted to
return manslaughter verdicts. The focus on jury instructions aims to provide
a picture of trial practice that neither doctrinal analysis nor social science
research has ever fully depicted. Recent Justice Department research tells us
that most spousal murder cases yield a manslaughter, rather than a first or
second degree murder, disposition. 101 But we do not know the legal bases for
97. I chose to conduct the analysis in this way, rather than through a standard regression analysis,
because I believe that, to most traditionally trained lawyers, a focus on the "exclusive" categories would
be more easily accessible and ultimately more persuasive. I also believe that a more sophisticated statistical
analysis might have suggested that my argument is based on a "disparate impact" theory. See supra note
44 (noting other scholars' reliance on disparate impact theories). My argument uses the recurrence of
"separation" and of "departure" in these cases to destabilize current understandings of a "passionate
murder" long enough to make a normative argument. Without such data, I feared that my analysis could
too easily be dismissed as anecdotal. My argument about why reform has failed or how the defense should
be reconstructed could as easily be made with 10 cases as with 200. For the statistical validity of the
separation and departure proportion, see Appendix A.
98. If there was any doubt about the "separation" aspect of the case, it was coded as "simple
infidelity." See, e.g., Lovelace v. Lopes, 632 F. Supp. 306, 308 (D. Conn. 1986) (containing one line
suggesting victim had moved to mother's home, and classified as simple infidelity); Estes v.
Commonwealth, No. 85-CA-1143-MR, available in LEXIS, States Library, Kycts file (Ky. Ct. App. May
20, 1986) (slip op.) (describing case in which victim is at mother's home, suggesting departure, classified
as simple infidelity).
99. For example, the presence of physical violence might be a sufficient reason to reach the jury,
without regard to the influence of departure or infidelity. In the case of an overlap between "physical
violence" and "other," the case was categorized as "physical violence."
100. For a more rigorous definition of these exclusive categories, see Appendix A.
I 01. This includes manslaughter dispositions obtained both by plea and jury verdict. See LANGAN &
DAWSON, supra note 66, at iii (stating that while 70% of those "arrested ... for spouse murder were
charged with first degree murder, most persons convicted (52%) of spouse murder" were convicted of
manslaughter or negligent manslaughter); id. at 6 (stating that 24% of spousal homicide defendants tried
and convicted were convicted of voluntary manslaughter and 9% were convicted of negligent
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TABLE B. PROVOCATION CLAIMS REACHING JURIES 102

CATEGORY

ALL MPC

TRADITIONAL

MIXED

(991133) 103

(38/81)

(35/53)

Departure

26% (26/99)

0% (0/38)

17% (6/35)

Separation & Infidelity

37% (37/99)

18% (7/38)

34% (12/35)

Simple Infidelity

12% (12/99)

11% (4/38)

3% (1135)

Physical Violence

17% (17/99)

68% (26/38)

40% (14/35)

Other

7% (7/99)

3% (1/38)

6% (2/35)

these decisions nor how those decisions break down on gender lines. My study
tries to reconstruct provocation's role in manslaughter dispositions by
identifying those cases in which juries may return manslaughter verdicts based
on provocation. "Getting to the jury," therefore, not the actual verdict or
holding, 104 is my measure of a "successful" claim. 105 Although this may
appear to be an indirect way to study the ultimate question, it is the only way
to do so without introducing deliberate legal distortions from the start: To
study the verdict question directly, one would have to follow cases from police
investigation through verdict and appeal, a project that could only be
undertaken in a particular jurisdiction or subset of a jurisdiction (e.g., cities or
counties). 106 Given the diversity of legal regimes governing provocation
claims, conclusions drawn from a single legal jurisdiction or even multiple
manslaughter); id. at II (stating that 58% of spousal homicide defendants who pled guilty pled to voluntary
manslaughter while 12% pled to negligent manslaughter); id. at 17 (stating that 42% of spouse murder
convictions were for nonnegligent manslaughter). These figures do not include divorced couples, nor are
the voluntary manslaughter dispositions limited to cases of provoked manslaughter as opposed to reckless
manslaughter or manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense.
I 02. To determine the number of separated couples in my MPC data set, one cannot simply add the
"departure" and "separation and infidelity" categories in this table. For example, the departure category only
includes those separations known to be initiated by the provoking party. Note that the columns may not
add to I 00% because of rounding.
I 03. The numerator in this fraction refers to the total number of claims resulting in jury instructions.
The denominator refers to the total number of claims in the data set, whether or not they reached a jury.
104. Not surprisingly, the vast majority of cases in my MPC sample are cases in which the law
permitted the jury to reach a manslaughter verdict based on EED, but the jury chose to return a murder
verdict.
I 05. For a similar measure of success, see Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths
and Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 379, 406 (1991) (basing empirical
study of self-defense claims on question of whether defendant is "able to get to the jury" on self-defense
issue).
I 06. Courts do not ordinarily keep criminal dockets in ways that permit searches for all cases by type
of verdict or charge or defense. Cases are filed and compiled in ways that make it easier for courts and
lawyers to do their jobs-by case name and number. To find all claims in which a heat of passion defense
is raised before or during trial, one would have to cull police files to find all intimate homicides, then
follow each police file through to the prosecutor's files and then to the trial transcript and appeal (if any).
In short, the effort would be enormous and the result might well be anomalous.
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jurisdictions that follow similar rules might provide a decidedly skewed picture
of trial practice. 107
My focus on trial instructions, rather than outcomes, also reflects the limits
of research based on reported cases. Obviously, reported cases cannot be used
to count up verdicts because reported cases do not reflect the full range of
possible dispositions by plea, acquittal, or dismissal. We know, however, from
existing research that manslaughter dispositions predominate in spousal murder
cases. My study simply tries to fill in the blanks left by this research, using
reported cases as accounts of what happened at trial. Obviously, this method
may suffer from limitations. 108 Indeed, any research based on reported cases
suffers from important limitations. 109 My method, however, does not raise
the most obvious shortcomings of opinion-based research. I have not searched
for legal holdings. 110 The vast majority of my MPC cases (eighty-three
percent) (1111133) did not go up on appeal for failure to instruct on
provocation. 111 I have used opinions just as one might use newspaper
accounts or police reports-as reports of the facts in particular cases-and I
have searched for an "outcome" that reflects events that happened at trial (an
instruction), not what happened on appeal. Relying on opinions for factual

I 07. For example, if one picked Albany, Hartford, and Portland as one's sample cities, one would
achieve results that would tend to suggest that the entire country follows the "reform" approach, a
conclusion that is not correct.
I 08. Most notably the sample leaves out cases resolved by guilty plea or dismissed before trial. See
LANGAN & DAWSON, supra note 66, at 5, II (indicating that, in spousal homicide cases, 43% of arrests
result in a guilty plea and 13% do not lead to prosecution). One might argue that by omitting cases that
led to pleas, I have overemphasized the "hard" cases and that is why we are likely to see more
"departure/separation" cases than expected. This argument makes several assumptions, however, that are
unlikely to hold. First, if my data were skewed toward departure/separation because departure cases were
more often appealed or reported, one would expect my overall results to be inconsistent with existing data
on separation drawn from other sources. In fact, my results on "separation" are quite consistent with data
drawn from other sources. See supra note 85. Second, this argument assumes that separation would have
a significant legal impact on the decision to plead when in fact this may not be the case. At least within
an MPC or mixed jurisdiction, there is nothing "harder" or "easier" about a case because of departure or
separation. Indeed, there is good reason to believe that most of the cases in my MPC and mixed samples
would be classified as "easy" provocation claims since the vast majority were never appealed on the
provocation question. Third, even if the hard cases going to trial are the ones about "departure" and the
easy ones about "infidelity" were pled, this would not account for the role of "departure" in the infidelity
cases. Assuming that all of the departure cases that I identify turned out to include infidelity, that would
not change my basic conclusion that the role of departure is "ignored" in these cases and that courts and
commentators had wrongly assumed that infidelity was the sole determining factor.
I 09. This applies to studies of trial or appellate cases, based on reported outcomes in civil or criminal
contexts. See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex
Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1749, 1766 n.71 (1990).
II 0. "Holdings" on provocation typically occur when there has been a failure to instruct on
provocation. A sample based on appellate holdings would yield, by definition, very few successful cases.
It would also tend to provide a rather skewed picture of legal practice because it would not give any sense
of the cases in which juries were actually instructed on provocation.
Ill. Instead, the cases reached the appellate court for other reasons. See, e.g., State v. Fair, 496 A.2d
461, 462-63 (Conn. 1985) (appealing on grounds that compelled psychiatric examination violated privilege
against self-incrimination and that admission of psychiatric testimony based on presentence report was
improper).
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reports has its disadvantages, 112 but they are not disadvantages that
significantly skew my research from the start. My purpose here is comparative:
to compare what we know about instructional practices in MPC jurisdictions
(based on all reported cases in all MPC jurisdictions) with likely practice in
other jurisdictions (based on all reported cases within selected jurisdictions).
Cross-jurisdictional hypothesis testing of this sort is not impugned by data
based on reported outcomes, because each jurisdiction's data is based on the
same data source. 113 Finally, let me emphasize that my purpose is to suggest
differences in legal practices across jurisdictions based on a universe of cases
from MPC jurisdictions. It is neither to prove the statistical likelihood of any
particular kind of provocation claim nor to establish the likelihood of a
manslaughter verdict or plea.
C. Departure

Darrell Perry's stepdaughter obtained a protective order directing the
defendant to vacate the home he shared with his then-bedridden wife. "After
Perry removed some personal effects from the home, " the Deputy Sheriff
charged with executing the warrant turned to leave. 114 Perry fired five shots
at the deputy, then physically attacked him. "When Perry finally stopped, he
stuffed the restraining order in [the sheriff's] mouth and left in the deputy's
cruiser, " attempting to back over the wounded man before leaving the scene.
He drove to his business, picked up more ammunition and another pistol,
"drove his van to a residence where his bedridden wife was located," and
asked his step-grandson where his wife was. Perry then struggled with the
young man, shooting him in the stomach. 115 The defendant was charged with
two counts of attempted murder, and the jury was instructed that it could
return a verdict of attempted manslaughter or assault based on extreme
emotional disturbance. 116
On the evening of April 24, 1983, Carlos Guevara and his wife argued
about her intent to institute a divorce proceeding. "During the argument, the
defendant left the room, obtained a two-foot-long wooden board and returned
to beat his wife about the face and neck. When she collapsed on the bed but
112. One might argue that appellate cases will inevitably skew results because the facts are told from
the prosecution's view when the claim on appeal is insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. That
is only one, however, of the many types of claims raised on appeal in my data set. Other claims, based on
evidentiary objections or the propriety of particular wording of instructions, view the evidence from
precisely the opposite direction. There is no reason to believe that there is a single set of biases reflected
in the report of factual material.
113. See Appendix A for a discussion of the statistical viability of the comparisons made across
jurisdictions.
114. Perry v. Commonwealth, 839 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Ky. 1992).
115. /d. at 270.
116. See id.
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continued to move, the defendant tied her legs together. " 117 Then, the
defendant "searched the room for the divorce papers, found them, fled through
the bedroom window, and returned to his girlfriend's apartment in the
Bronx. " 118 The jury was instructed that it could return a manslaughter
verdict based on extreme emotional disturbance. 119
"She 120 left," 121 "she rejected me," 122 "she filed a warrant," 123 "she
kicked me out": 124 These are cases I class under the heading, departure.
Departure is not an official category in the law of murder, but it is a frequent
factual scenario in intimate murder cases in reform jurisdictions. 125 In my
study, over one-quarter of the MPC claims (twenty-six percent) that reached
juries involved what I classify as a departure. By contrast, in common law
jurisdictions, no departure claim in this category reached a jury. 126 In none
of these departure claims did the court report that the defendant acted because
the victim was having an affair. 127 In each, there was evidence that the
"provoking" party sought to leave the relationship and that the parties'
relationship was over, ending, or about to end. In all but one case, the

117. People v. Guevara, 521 N.Y.S.2d 292,293 (App. Div. 1987).
118. /d.
119. See also id. at 294 ("The court's charge on extreme emotional disturbance was proper .... ").
120. I have chosen in what follows to let the data dictate the pronouns. Combining all categories
except physical violence, 97% of the MPC defendants are male; to use the term "he or she"' in these
circumstances would be inaccurate. In physical violence cases, however. where the distribution of sexes
is far more even, I have used the term "he or she."'
121. State v. Fair. 496 A.2d 461, 462 (Conn. 1985) ("On December 26, 1980, the victim left the
defendant. taking the child with her. She notified the defendant on December 28 that she intended to move
to Boston and that he would never see their son again.").
122. People v. Fardan, 628 N.E.2d 41, 42 (N.Y. 1993) ("At trial, defendant's principal contention was
that he acted under extreme emotional disturbance. brought on by the victim's refusal to have sex, and
therefore was liable only for manslaughter and not murder.").
123. Matthews v. Commonwealth. 709 S.W.2d 414, 418-19 (Ky. 1985) (noting that defendant used
his wife"s "supposedly unjustified bringing of warrants"' to explain his emotional state).
124. State v. Dilger, 338 N.W.2d 87, 88 (N.D. 1983) (stating that after argument in bar next door to
apartment, victim made two trips bringing defendant's belongings to bar, and defendant was teased that he
would have to sleep in bar).
125. See Appendix B (listing MPC "departure"' cases).
126. This figure is based on the departure cases that reached juries (26) as compared to the total
number of claims that reached juries (99) in the MPC data set. See supra Table B. As a percentage of all
claims, reaching juries or not. departures represented 33 of 133, or 25%. See id.
127. It is possible, of course, that appellate reports simply fail to report an affair. I do not claim that
these opinions are always factually accurate; on the other hand. I see no reason to believe that there would
be systematic bias against reporting infidelities in these cases. Indeed, the cases are far more likely to omit
mention of departure or intent to depart unless it is central to the situation triggering an EED claim. Even
if it turned out, upon examination of the trial transcripts in these cases. that a significant number involved
a third party. that would not undermine my overarching claim about the "legal rationality" of departure.
The same reports on which I rely are the ones that lawyers and judges will use to determine the boundaries
of the defense. Moreover, my point is not simply to emphasize cases involving departure alone. Even if
all of these cases turned out to involve claims of infidelity as well, it would still mean that departure is as
significant an element in the cases as infidelity. a conclusion that challenges the law's standard image of
intimate homicide and provoking circumstances.
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provoking party was a woman. 128
Departure claims involve a wide range of situations inspiring rage, from
divorce to rejection, from protective orders to broken engagements. On one end
of the spectrum are cases of legally enforced departure, in which one partner
forces the other to leave by obtaining a protective order. 129 At the other end
are cases that amount to "rejection" in dating or other casual relationships. 130
Somewhere in between these two extremes are the majority of cases, cases in
which the victim moves the furniture out, 131 announces that she is
leaving, 132 or files for divorce. 133 In all cases, the defendant's legal theory
depended in whole or in part upon the separation. 134 Often, however,
defendants sought to shift the equities against their intimate partner 135 by
claiming that the "break up" was really her "fault": 136 for example, because

128. The prosecution made the "departure" claim in this case. See People v. Ambrose, 553 N.Y.S.2d
896, 896 (App. Div. 1990) (noting defendant's claims that she killed because of abuse and threats to her
child and prosecution's claim that she killed because he was going to "leave her").
129. See, e.g., Perry v. Commonwealth, 839 S.W.2d 268, 269-70 (Ky. 1992) (reporting that defendant
claimed extreme emotional disturbance as defense to incident after defendant was served restraining order);
Matthews v. Commonwealth, 709 S.W.2d 414, 417-18 (Ky. 1985) (wife's "swearing out warrants," one
of which was based on sexual abuse of daughter, was part of marital strife underlying provocation claim).
Protective orders figured in a number of cases, although it is not clear in all of them whether the defendant
relied upon the orders as part of his EED claim. See, e.g., State v. Wille, 858 P.2d 128, 130 (Or. 1993)
(stating that victim had obtained temporary restraining order preventing defendant from entering her
residence); see also cases cited infra note 177.
130. See People v. Wood, 568 N.Y.S.2d 651, 652 (App. Div. 1991) (noting defendant's claim at
second trial that he snapped, "triggered by his dissatisfaction with the victim who reportedly turned her
back on him and went to sleep after they engaged in sexual intercourse"), aff'd, 591 N.E.2d 1178 (N.Y.
1992); see also People v. Fardan, 628 N.E.2d 41, 42 (N.Y. 1993) (defendant claimed victim's refusal to
have sex triggered "extreme emotional disturbance").
131. See State v. Reams, 616 P.2d 498, 499 (Or. Ct. App. 1980), aff'd and remanded, 636 P.2d 913
(Or. 1981).
132. See People v. Benedict, 609 N.Y.S.2d 100, 100 (App. Div. 1994) ("At trial-in an attempt to
prove that he was acting under extreme emotional disturbance as a defense to the intentional murder
charge---{!efendant explained that he had been arguing with his wife over her suggestion that they
separate.").
133. See, e.g., People v. Guevara, 521 N.Y.S.2d 292, 292-94 (App. Div. 1987) (noting that defendant
and his wife "argued ... about her intent to institute a divorce proceeding" and that after fatally beating
his wife, defendant searched room for divorce papers); Wille, 858 P.2d at 130 ("Defendant was very upset
that his wife had filed for a dissolution.").
134. In all cases classified as "departure," the case reported that the provoking party sought to leave
or had left the relationship. This includes a case in which the defendant is the one who actually leaves the
home, but it is at the victim/provoking party's initiative. See, e.g., State v. Blades, 626 A.2d 273, 275
(Conn. 1993) (reporting that defendant left home because of marital difficulties and that victim wanted him
to leave because she was afraid of him and wanted divorce).
135. That the defendant blames the provoking party for the disintegration of the relationship does not
disqualify the claim as a "departure." For even when the defendant asserts a reason for the leaving or the
breakup (e.g., her complaints), those reasons depend for their plausibility upon their context within a
relationship that is ending or over. Imagine that a defendant claimed that his brother "complained" too
much and that was the "reason" for his rage and one quickly sees how the context (e.g., the breakup) is
essential to the defendant's claims.
136. As I indicated earlier, I use the term "her" to reflect my data. In my data set, there was only one
MPC case in which a female defendant's claim was predicated on "departure" and the "departure" claim
was made by the prosecution. See People v. Ambrose, 553 N.Y.S.2d 896, 896 (App. Div. 1990) (reporting
defendant's claim that she killed because of abuse and fear for her child and prosecution's claim that she
killed because he was going to "leave her").
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she claimed that he was sexually abusing their daughter, because she
complained too much about his drug use, or because she refused to let him see
the children. 137
At the extremes, these cases bear little resemblance to the conventional
image of a crime of passion. They also offend most common intuitions about
criminal culpability. Consider State v. Traficonda, 138 a case in which
"numerous witnesses" attested to the physical violence the victim suffered. 139
In considering the defendant's argument that the jury's murder verdict should
be reduced to manslaughter, the Supreme Court of Connecticut recounted
detailed evidence of "mental and physical abuse of the victim." 140 The victim
had asked police to remove from her home the Winchester rifle that ultimately
killed her and had consulted a lawyer two days before the shooting about a
divorce. 141 The court noted that most of the evidence supporting the
defendant's EED defense "pointed to the defendant's mental and physical
abuse of the victim." 142 If one pauses, however, that statement reveals quite
an astonishing admission. After all, it means that the trial court was willing to
allow the jury to return a manslaughter verdict based, at least in part, on the
defendant's own violent acts. 143
Traficonda may be an unusual case, but it is not as rare as one might
expect. The MPC asks juries to consider the defendant's "situation," and
sometimes those situations include not only the defendant's perception of the
situation but also his perception of the equities of the situation. 144 For
example, the defendant in the Guevara 145 case, summarized above, came
137. See McGee v. Delaware, 1990 WL 254349, at **I (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. II, 1990) (reporting
defendant's argument that he was entitled to an EED instruction because his wife's "complaints about his
drug use" caused him stress); Jones v. Hawaii, 902 P.2d 965, 967 (Haw. 1995) (reporting defendant's claim
that victim refused to speak to him about child visitation); Matthews v. Commonwealth, 709 S.W.2d 414
(Ky. 1985) (reporting defendant's argument that victim had no basis to obtain warrant for his arrest based
on charges that he sexually assaulted his daughter).
138. 612 A.2d 45 (Conn. 1992).
139. /d.at47.
140. /d. ("Sergeant Robert Flannigan testified that he had been called to the defendant's residence to
investigate a domestic dispute less than two weeks before the victim's death. The victim, who had a cut
and bruised lip, had urged Flannigan to remove the '30-30' caliber Winchester rifle from their home.").
141. See id. ("[The lawyer] testified that he had noticed bruises on her legs, arms and neck. He
testified that the victim had told him that she was afraid that if she divorced her husband, he would attempt
to obtain custody of their young child.").
142. ld. at 49.
143. The defendant's brief in Trajiconda indicates that the defendant had accused the victim of
"cheating on him." Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 6, State v. Traficonda, 612 A.2d 45 (Conn. 1992) (No.
S.C. 14310). Although the defendant does not appear to have relied upon this as the basis for the EED
claim, nor did the appellate court mention it, I have classified Traficonda, for purposes of my statistical
analysis, as a "separation and infidelity" claim. Nothing in the presence of those allegations, however, takes
away from the analysis of the issues raised in this paragraph.
144. Often, of course, courts sitting as triers of fact reject these claims. See, e.g., People v. Rivera,
507 N.Y.S.2d 266, 266-67 (App. Div. 1986) (upholding trial court's rejection of extreme emotional
disturbance defense where defendant relied upon marital situation for claim of compassion when his
relationship with "estranged wife was plagued by constant strife, as evidenced by their periodic separations,
and was punctuated by sporadic instances of physical abuse by the defendant") (emphasis added).
145. People v. Guevara, 521 N.Y.S.2d 292 (App. Div. 1987).
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from his girlfriend's home to kill his wife, who wanted a divorce. If the law
asks us to adopt the defendant's perspective, we must put on the shoes of one
who is himself unfaithful to a relationship. Or consider the defendant in the
Perry 146 case. In that case, the defendant became enraged when a sheriff
sought to execute a court order requiring him to leave his house. If we must
adopt the defendant's perspective, we must put on the shoes of one claiming
that a lawful court order (obtained upon representations that the defendant had
refused to leave the home and was feared by his wife) entitled him to our
compassion. 147 In both of these cases, as in Traficonda, juries were permitted
by law to conclude that manslaughter was the appropriate verdict based on an
EED theory. 148 That the triers of fact in these cases returned murder verdicts
does not diminish the fact that the law permitted these cases to come out quite
differently, allowing defendants with essentially "unclean hands" to claim the
law's leniency. 149
These are fairly unusual cases, but they reflect the logic of all departure
cases. The normative conflicts we see in Guevara, Perry, and Traficonda are
extreme versions of the basic conflict between a law that permits spouses to
leave relationships and a law that views rightful departures as partially
exculpatory of murder. The law has long permitted wives and husbands to
divorce, to separate, or to move away. Indeed, the law has steadily made this
conduct easier, less legally burdensome, and more protected. 150 It has even
come to encourage victims of battery to leave a violent partner. When the law
of murder says that a rational jury may find that departure may reduce a
murder verdict to manslaughter, it partially, but clearly, punishes the act of
leaving. Although this conflict is set into high relief in cases of battered
women, where "leaving" is itself the issue, these same issues apply in all cases
of intimate murder predicated on separation or departure.
It is fascinating, but true, that these results appear to be the product of
"liberal" reforms. In the traditional jurisdictions I studied, departure cases are
146. Perry v. Commonwealth, 839 S.W.2d 268 (Ky. 1992).
147. See Brief for Appellant at A-7, Perry v. Commonwealth, 839 S.W.2d 268 (Ky. 1992) (No. 91-SC93-MR) (reporting that defendant's version of affidavit supporting protective order included claim that Perry
had "refused and failed" to vacate and that his wife had expressed her fear that Perry "will seriously harm
her"). The protective order was sought in connection with an action by the defendant's daughter-in-law to
annul the recent marriage of the defendant to her mother, who was dying of cancer. See id. at 12-13, app.
at A-2. The Supreme Court's opinion indicates that Perry had no basis for believing that the protective
order was procedurally or substantively defective. See Perry, 839 S.W.2d at 271.
148. In fairness to the defendant, he claimed at trial that his daughter-in-law had taken his wife,
without his knowledge or approval, and that he was upset because his wife was dying. See Brief for
Appellant at 12-13, Perry (No. 91-SC-93-MR).
149. That "jurors invoke certain rules within a ruleless EED redounds not to the EED, but to the
jurors." Norman J. Finkel, Achilles Fuming, Odysseus Stewing, and Hamlet Brooding: On the Story of the
Murder/Manslaughter Distinction, 74 NEB. L. REv. 742, 803 (1995); cf. Dressler, Reflections, supra note
24, at 752-53 (arguing that jurors' ultimate rejection of provocation defense in homosexual advance cases
undercuts argument that defense is homophobic).
150. See generally Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443 (noting
emergence of notions of individual privacy and decisional autonomy in family law).
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rare and almost never reach juries. As Table C indicates, departure cases
constitute a significant percentage of provocation claims reaching juries in
MPC jurisdictions (twenty-six percent). None reached a jury in the traditional,
common law jurisdictions I studied (zero percent). 151 If this data suggests
that law reform has brought us here, one might still wonder whether the
MPC's approach is an aberrant interpretation, rejected in other jurisdictions.
To check this, I compared the MPC results against selected "mixed"
jurisdictions, jurisdictions following some traditional rules but significantly
liberalizing the defense. The results of that research suggest that my MPC
findings are not obviously anomalous. Departure cases reach juries in other
jurisdictions, although not as frequently, or as uniformly, as in MPC states. As
Table C indicates, in the mixed jurisdictions I studied, successful departure
claims were less common than in the MPC data set, making up seventeen
percent of all claims reaching juries. At the same time, however, such claims
were far more common than in traditional jurisdictions where none reached
juries. Similarly, the success rate for departure claims in mixed jurisdictions
(eighty-six percent) is far closer to the MPC rate (seventy-nine percent) than
that of traditional, common law jurisdictions (zero percent).
TABLE

C.

DEPARTURE CLAIMS REACHING JURIES BY JURISDICTION

DEPARTURES

%

of

Total 152

Success Rate 153

TYPE OF JURISDICTION
MPC

TRADITIONAL

MIXED

26% (26/99)

0% (0/38)

17% (6/35)

79% (26/33)

0% (0/38)

86% (617)

If this is really MPC trial practice, one might ask, why is it that we have
not seen it before? In part, we have not seen it because we were simply not
looking for it: Culture and law have conspired to make us see departure as a
species of infidelity, as a wrong of some kind, even as the law elsewhere
affirms the right to depart. 154 Appellate holdings have also obscured our view
of underlying trial practice. Scattered MPC opinions can be found in which
courts affirm a trier of fact's determination of "unreasonableness" or a court's
refusal to grant an instruction in cases similar to those discussed here. 155 For
151. I am not an advocate of the traditional approach. My point here is simply to contrast the legal
practice of reform jurisdictions with that of more conservative ones.
152. By "% of total," I mean the number of departure cases reaching juries as a percentage of all cases
reaching juries.
153. "Success rate" means the percentage of all "departure" claims reaching juries.
154. In part, we have not seen it because juries quite frequently reject such claims. As I have already
indicated, that wisdom speaks better of the jurors than of the law. See supra note 149.
155. See, e.g., People v. Murden, 593 N.Y.S.2d 837, 838 (App. Div. 1993) (affirming failure to
instruct based on defendant's "engaging in an argument with the victim prior to the crime" or "claimed
difficulties between the defendant and his girlfriend"); People v. Feris, 535 N.Y.S.2d 17, 18 (App. Div.
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example, in People v. Casassa 156 (a case reprinted in various criminal law
case books), 157 the victim and defendant had "dated casually" until the victim
told the defendant that she was "not 'falling in love"' with him. 158 The
defendant responded to that rejection with what the court called a "bizarre
series of actions" that included stalking the victim and ultimately killing
her. 159 The appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the
defendant's claims were so "peculiar to him" that they could not be considered
reasonable. 160
Focusing on cases like Casassa may suggest to the casual observer that
departure plays an insignificant role in reform cases. Actual practice, however,
is clearly to the contrary. As Table C shows, Casassa's factual pattern is far
from the "peculiarity" that the court termed it. Similar cases go to juries on a
regular basis in MPC states. Indeed, careful attention to the procedural posture
of Casassa explains why. The court in Casassa affirmed a finding of law and
fact by a judge sitting as the trier of fact. Casassa never held that instructions
should not be given in departure cases. Indeed, it was only because the trial
judge did consider the defendant's EED claim that the decision was affirmed.
Presumably, such a holding actually encourages instructions by suggesting that
triers of fact should consider whether a rejection-prompted killing is supported
by a "reasonable excuse or explanation." 161
Of course, there may be other explanations for this instructional practice.
As a practical matter, judges may send almost every case to a jury under the
MPC for fear of reversal on appeal or with the hope that the jury is unlikely
to return a manslaughter verdict. Even if true, however, this begs the question.
My point is that the decision to send the case to a jury itself has legal
meaning. If my data show anything, it is that the legal standard matters in
instructional practice. Expedience may explain the practice, but it neither sets
the legal standard nor accounts for its legitimacy. One cannot answer questions
about the proper legal practice by asserting the existence of an expedient one.
Finally, other factors might explain this instructional practice. These cases
might get to juries not, for example, "because" of the departure but because
courts have been moved by evidence of a psychiatric disorder. Without

1988) (affirming in memorandum opinion failure to instruct based on "defendant's jealousy and anger over
the complainant's new boyfriend"). But see People v. White, 581 N.Y.S.2d 651, 653 (1992) (stating that
"defendant may have met his burden with respect to the first element of the affirmative defense by evidence
of a violent and tumultuous relationship with his wife"); People v. Guevara, 521 N.Y.S.2d 292, 293 (App.
Div. 1987) (reporting that EED instruction was given in case in which wife's "intent to institute a divorce
proceeding" prompted fatal beating).
156. 404 N.E.2d 1310 (N.Y. 1980).
157. See, e.g., KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 55, at 420-23; LOW ET AL., supra note ), at
896-902.
158. Casassa, 404 N.E.2d at 1312.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 1313.
161. MODEL PENAL CODE§ 210.3 (1985).
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question, the EED formulation has encouraged defendants' reliance on expert
psychological testimony, even though most jurisdictions do not require such
evidence. 162 Indeed, there is some reason to believe that psychiatric evidence
might incline both judges and juries to treat the defendant's claims more
sympathetically. 163 Ultimately, however, this practice does not answer the
question we are asking about the defense. Unless the provocation defense is
to become a different defense (e.g., diminished capacity), an emotional
impairment itself cannot be the "reasonable" explanation for the rage. 164 The
MPC drafters may have contemplated such an interpretation, but no court has
openly embraced that view. Nor would one sit easily with the text of Model
Penal Code section 210.3, which requires a "reasonable excuse or explanation"
for the defendant's emotional distress, not simply the presence of an emotional
disorder. 165 As long as the law purports to claim for itself some critical
evaluation of the defendant's claimed emotion, the defense must rest upon
something other than claims of diminished capacity or mental illness alone.
D. Can One Be Unfaithful to a Relationship That Is Over?

"In April, 1985, the defendant's wife . .. left the defendant because of his
drinking problem and moved to Connecticut. In May, 1985, [she] filed for
divorce and a restraining order was issued against the defendant. " 166 The
next month, her husband drove to see her in Connecticut. She spoke to him at
her neighbors' house and "told [him] that she wanted to end their
marriage. " 167 There are indications that during this or other conversations,
they spoke of his allegations that she had been seeing another man. Twenty
minutes later, the defendant drove to his wife s location, and they had an
argument that ended in a scuffle, during which defendant "repeatedly stabbed
the victim. " 168 The jury was instructed that it could return a manslaughter
verdict based on EED. 169

162. See Singer, supra note 53, at 298-304 (discussing psychological focus of MPC defense).
163. Based on his research, Professor Norman Finkel, a professor of psychology, argues that the
MPC's subjective formulation tends to influence judges and juries to view the defendant's claims through
the lens of a "naive," "anything goes" psychology. See Finkel, supra note 149, at 798-99.
164. See Wellman v. Commonwealth, 694 S.W.2d 696, 697-98 (Ky. 1985) ("[M]ental illness may be
considered ... when there is probative, tangible and independent evidence of initiating circumstances, such
as provocation at the time of his act which is contended to arouse extreme emotional disturbance. It is not
such a disturbance standing alone.").
165. See People v. Casassa, 404 N.E.2d 1310, 1316 (N.Y. 1980) (''The ultimate test ... is objective;
there must be 'reasonable' explanation or excuse for the actor's disturbance.") (citing MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 201.3 commentary at 41 (1959)).
166. State v. Hull, 556 A.2d 154, 157 (Conn. 1989).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See id. at 165.
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"On the morning of April 11, 1988, defendant, armed with a shotgun,
confronted the victim outside the victim's apartment. An argument followed,
and the defendant ... shot the victim four times at close range .... " 170 "At
the time of the killing, the victim had been dating a woman whom defendant
had dated for a short time a year and a half earlier, and whom defendant had
continued to pursue, against her wishes. " 171 At trial, the defendant "did not
contest the State's claim that the killing was intentional and so testified. He
characterized the slaying as 'an acceptable solution [that] ... made sense, '
even though he knew it was wrong. " 172 The jury was instructed that it could
return a verdict of manslaughter based on extreme emotional distress. 173
The classic story of intimate murder assumes a continuing relationship.
Indeed, infidelity implies an ongoing relationship to which the parties are
expected to be faithful. But what if the parties are legally divorced? Separated
by force of law? What if the defendant finds the rival in the arms of his exwife, ex-lover, or ex-girlfriend? A jilted lover snaps when he sees his former
girlfriend "dancing" with another man? A battered woman is thwarted by
physical violence when she tries to leave for another? Seen through the lens
of infidelity, these cases may seem only minor extensions of our canonical
image of a crime of passion. Seen through the lens of departure, however,
these cases challenge us to ask whether it is possible to be unfaithful to a
relationship if one party believes that there is no relationship at all.
In MPC jurisdictions, unlike traditional ones, I found three times as many
infidelity cases reporting separation (thirty-seven percent) 174 as cases of
infidelity in a continuing relationship (twelve percent). 175 Indeed, cases of
"separation and infidelity" are the single largest category in reform
jurisdictions. In all of these cases, the relationship was ending or was over.
Consider, for example, the Hul/ 176 case cited above. The victim moved,
sought to end her marriage, filed for divorce, notified the police, and obtained
a restraining order. 177 Testimony at trial suggested that the victim told the
170. Rodebaugh v. State, No. 436, 1990 WL 254365, at **I (Del. Nov. 27, 1990).
171. !d.
172. /d. These facts are drawn from an unpublished opinion that appears at 586 A.2d 1203 (Del. 1990)
but appears in full at Rodebaugh, No. 436, 1990 WL 254365. The facts about the trial instruction appear
in State v. Rodebaugh, CR. A. Nos. IN88-04-0668R2, IN88-04-0669R2, 1993 WL 603334, at *I (Del.
Super. Ct. Mar. 5, 1993), aff'd, No. 123, 1994 WL 91251 (Del. Mar. 16, 1994).
173. See Rodebaugh, 1993 WL 603334, at *I (noting that "[t]he Court gave appropriate instructions
regarding ... the defendant's burden of proof on his claim of extreme emotional distress").
174. See Appendix B (listing "separation and infidelity" cases).
175. See id. (listing "simple infidelity" cases).
176. State v. Hull, 556 A.2d 154 (Conn. 1989).
177. See id. at 157 ("In May, 1985, the victim filed for divorce and a restraining order was issued
against the defendant"; in June, she was killed by her husband.). Other cases in the "separation and
infidelity" category also involved protective orders. See People v. Fediuk, 480 N.Y.S.2d 913,914-16 (App.
Div. 1984) (describing case in which defendant's wife moved out and obtained protective order, and when
defendant found out she loved another man, he killed his rival), aff'd, 489 N.E.2d 732 (N.Y. 1985); see
also People v. White, 590 N.E.2d 236, 238 (N.Y. 1992) (describing court's finding that defendant meets
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defendant that she would not return and may have "mentioned another
man," 178 or told the defendant that "'he could believe what he wanted to
believe about the rumors'" about another man. 179 Clearly, this case is not
simply about a rival (even if we assume that there is another man, as my
methodology requires). One party has sought to end the relationship, and the
other refuses to accede to that choice, killing the party who seeks to leave.
Not only does the category of "separation and infidelity" include cases
such as Hull in which the departure figures prominently, but it also includes
claims in which departure is harder to see. Consider the case of Camelia
Bellido. She had lived with Jose Rivera for nineteen years, and the couple had
four children. In 1986, the couple separated and Bellido rented her own
apartment. When Rivera learned that she was seeing someone else, he became
enraged and killed his rival. 180 This sounds like a classic case of betrayal and
infidelity; just the story the court told. Implicit in this description is the
judgment that Camelia had betrayed her common law husband, breaching her
obligations of loyalty to him. But it turns out, reading closely, that Camelia left
Rivera three years before the murder. 181 Seen as a case of infidelity, the
lapse of time might seem hardly noticeable; seen without the lens of infidelity,
we recognize that the defendant was claiming an emotional attachment to a
relationship that his partner did not share.
These cases are not aberrations. Cases of claimed "infidelity" in which the
relationship was ending or over represent a significant percentage of the MPC
cases I studied. 182 For example, in the Rodebaugh case described above, the

objective prong of EED standard based on "violent and tumultuous relationship with his wife," relationship
that produced protective order and arrest based on incident in which, among other things, her avowals of
her infidelities had caused him to beat her with iron pipe "in self-defense") (citing People v. White, 564
N.Y.S.2d 314,315 (App. Div. 1991)).
178. Hull, 556 A.2d at 165.
179. !d. at 166 (quoting witness testimony).
180. See State v. Rivera, 612 A.2d 749, 750-51 (Conn. 1992).
181. See id. at 750 ("Some time in 1986, ... the couple separated, and in August of 1989 [the month
of the murder], Bellido was dating the victim.").
182. See, e.g., State v. Chicano, 584 A.2d 425 (Conn. 1990) (describing case in which two months
after relationship deteriorates, defendant sees victim visited by another, overhears sounds he believes are
sexual activity, waits for half-hour, hides in house for one hour, and kills rival); State v. Ricketts, 659 A.2d
188, 189-90 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995) (describing case in which defendant moves out of lover's apartment
in early 1991; in July of 1991, defendant kills victim when he sees another man attempting to visit her);
State v. Burgos, 656 A.2d 238, 239-40 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995) (describing case in which defendant moves
out in summer of 1991 because victim is having an affair; on September 28, 1991, defendant kills victim
after she tells him she is leaving him); Re v. State, 540 A.2d 423, 424-25 (Del. 1988) (describing case in
which after short and violent marriage, defendant goes to house where victim is staying; when she returns
with a date, he kills her); Casalvera v. State, 410 A.2d 1369, 1371 (Del. 1980) (describing case in which
defendant moves away and victim seeks to end relationship; they set date to see each other, but victim
refuses to call him; when victim tells him that "things had changed" and she was seeing someone else,
defendant kills victim); State v. Steedley, Nos. IK90-06-0183RI, IK90-06-0184RI, IK90-06-0185RI, IK9006-0186RI, 1994 WL 750302, at *1-2 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 8, 1994) (describing case in which defendant
filed for divorce in 1989, victim rejected reconciliation attempt seven months later after defendant
threatened to kill her; the weekend after divorce becomes final, defendant kills ex-wife and new lover);
State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981, 981-82 (Utah 1989) (describing case in which victim breaks off engagement
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defendant dated a woman "briefly," a year and a half before. 183 He killed the
woman's new boyfriend in a jealous rage. Other MPC cases reveal
relationships that have been "over" for substantial periods of time, 184 indeed,
relationships that have been legally severed. 185 The pattern of these stories
soon becomes familiar. The court narrates a story of infidelity. Only later do
we see the claims of departure-that the victim was divorced from the man
now claiming her loyalty, that she had left because she believed he was
abusing their daughter, 186 that she sought shelter in a home for battered
women. 187 Indeed, on occasion, defendants themselves reveal that it is the
departure as much as the infidelity that prompted their rage. 188
We may rightly ask in these cases why the relationship lingers after life
or law has ended it. At what point, for example, does Rivera's emotional
attachment to Camelia Bellido begin to become "irrational"? At four years? At
five? At what point does Rodebaugh's claim of attachment to a woman he
dated a year and a half earlier expire? Murder law may well want to
acknowledge the emotional ties of relationships, but it cannot at the same time
ignore the other side of the story. Existing law assumes that defendants' claims
of attachment are "rational," even in cases where time or other factors suggest
quite the contrary. In such cases, the law of murder does in so-called
"infidelity" cases just what it does in "departure" cases: It allows defendants
to enforce a relationship by claiming an emotional attachment that the victim
has repudiated. Given that the criminal law rarely if ever embraces those who

when she feels affection for another; as they are discussing this and she is moving defendant's possessions
out of apartment, he kills her after learning that she has had sexual relations with his rival).
183. Rodebaugh v. State, 586 A.2d 1203 (Del. 1990) (reported in full at No. 436, 1990 WL 254365,
at* I (Del. Nov. 27, 1990)); see State v. Rodebaugh, CR. A. Nos. IN88-04-0668R2, IN88-04-0669R2, 1993
WL 603334 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 5, 1993), aff'd, No. 123, 1994 WL 91251 (Del. Mar. 16, 1994).
184. See, e.g., State v. Gaynor, 880 P.2d 947, 948-50 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (describing case in which
parties separated and then divorced; three months after divorce and nine months after split, husband killed
man his wife had just recently begun to date). This phenomenon is not limited to MPC jurisdictions. See,
e.g., People v. Ogen, 215 Cal. Rptr. 16, 17-18 (Ct. App. 1985) (describing case in which victim moved
away in February 1980, and sought to end relationship completely in July 1981; five months later,
defendant raped victim; while on bail, he killed victim; provocation instruction given).
185. See, e.g., Steedley, 1994 WL 750302 (describing case in which parties were divorced at time of
killing; jury instructed on EED); State v. Lyon, 672 P.2d 1358, 1359 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) (describing case
in which defendant was divorced and his "ex-wife" was seeing the victim; jury instructed on EED).
186. See State v. Wood, 545 A.2d I 026, I 030 (Conn. 1988).
187. See People v. Fediuk, 480 N.Y.S.2d 913, 915 (App. Div. 1984), aff'd, 489 N.E.2d 732 (N.Y.
1985).
188. See, e.g., State v. Burgos, 656 A.2d 238, 240 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995) (reporting "separation and
infidelity" case in which, during argument, defendant told victim "that he would kill her before he let her
go anywhere"); Re v. State, 540 A.2d 423, 425 (Del. 1988) (reporting "separation and infidelity" case in
which defendant said: '"Don't leave me, because if you do, I'll kill you."') (citation omitted); People v.
Hartsock, 592 N.Y.S.2d 511, 511 (App. Div. 1993) (reporting "separation and infidelity" case in which,
"[i)n the course of an argument, during which the victim refused to reconcile with defendant and insisted
that it was over between them, defendant shouted 'if I can't have you nobody else [will]'; he then fired
three shots at her from his 12-gauge shotgun").
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use violence in response to lawful acts, 189 this should be a controversial
outcome in reform states, although it presently is not.
Strangely enough, such outcomes are controversial, as a doctrinal matter,
in jurisdictions following the most traditional provocation rules. As Table D
suggests, claims of separation and infidelity were far less likely to reach juries
in traditional jurisdictions than in reform jurisdictions. Because adequate
provocation requires "adultery," which depends, by definition, upon a
continuing relationship, courts in traditional states are quite hostile to claims
of infidelity when the relationship is over. They have held quite explicitly that
"divorced persons may not claim the benefit of the voluntary manslaughter
instruction." 190 Logically enough, this understanding has also been applied
to nonmarital relationships, with courts holding that there is no reason to
"afford [a provocation] instruction to unmarried persons whose relationship has
ended." 191 In short, common law jurisdictions have come to protect departure
explicitly in ways that MPC jurisdictions neither recognize nor address.
TABLE D. SUCCESS RATES FOR SIMPLE INFIDELITY AND
SEPARATION AND INFIDELITY CLAIMS REACHING JURIES 192

MPC

TRADITIONAL

MIXED

Simple Infidelity

75% (12/16)

44% (4/9)

100% (111)

Separation &

88% (37/42)

39% (7118)

60% (12/20)

Infidelity

E. The Idea of Infidelity

The defendant and the victim had "made a decision to marry in the near
future. They went to a bar in Little Rock ... to celebrate. " 193 The defendant
became jealous when his fiancee "asked an acquaintance to dance with
her. " 194 He went home, and then returned at the request of the victim's
sister. When the defendant returned he saw his fiancee "again dancing with
the other man, " 195 charged her and knocked her down. Defendant was then
ejected from the bar. Later that night, he showed up at the victims home, and
189. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing "lawfulness" restrictions on other MPC
defenses).
190. People v. McCarthy, 547 N.E.2d 459, 463 (Ill. 1989).
191. !d.; see also People v. Santiago, 582 N.E.2d 1304, 1312-13 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (refusing
instruction where parties' "marital-type relationship" had ended); People v. Elder, 579 N.E.2d 420, 424 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1991) (refusing instruction where nonmarital relationship had ended two months previously).
192. These figures were calculated by determining the total number of "simple infidelity" or
"separation and infidelity" claims and then determining the percentage of similarly classified claims leading
to jury instructions.
193. Dixon v. State, 597 S.W.2d 77, 78 (Ark. 1980).
194. !d.
195. !d.
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proceeded to beat her severely until she passed out and was taken to a
hospital. The victim died twelve days later. The jury was instructed on
"extreme emotional disturbance" and returned a manslaughter verdict. 196
The defendant "fully confessed to the murder of his wife, explaining that
they argued when he found a letter in her purse alluding to her relationship
with another man." The defendant testified that "[a]lthough he was very
angry, they attempted a reconciliation only to realize that their relationship
would never be the same because 'she wasn't pure anymore.' According to the
defendant, she wanted him to kill her and he complied. " 197 Defendant argued
at trial that he killed under "extreme emotional disturbance, " and the court
instructed the jury that they could return a manslaughter verdict. 198
The classic claim of infidelity not only assumes a continuing relationship,
it assumes a particular kind of conduct: discovery of one's lover in an act of
"passion." At common law, courts required "ocular evidence of actual
adultery." 199 Today, a minority of jurisdictions still apply that rule, rejecting
claims based on a confession or knowledge of adultery. 200 In reform
jurisdictions, the possible range of unfaithful conduct is far broader. In State
v. Martinez, 201 the defendant's former boyfriend had seen her "dancing with
another man," two weeks before the killing and the jury was instructed that it
could return a manslaughter verdict based on EED. 202 In People v.
Wood, 203 the defendant's theory was that the victim had "turned her back"
on him after sex 204 and the jury was instructed that it could return an EED
manslaughter verdict.
By jettisoning the adultery limitation, the MPC has done more than
broaden the range of possible relationships that might give rise to a
provocation claim. It has also broadened the type of conduct that might be
classified as "infidelity."205 Claims of "discovered adultery" appear quite
rarely in my MPC data set, whether the claim arises in the context of a former

196. See id. at 78-79. The appellate court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the
verdict on either an EED or a recklessness theory. See id. at 78.
197. People v. David, 533 N.Y.S.2d 627, 629 (App. Div. 1988).
198. /d.
199. State v. Saxon, 86 A. 590,594 (Conn. 1913).
200. See LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 14, § 7.10, at 656-57 ("The modem tendency is to extend the
rule of mitigation beyond the narrow situation where one spouse actually catches the other in the act of
committing adultery.").
201. 591 A.2d 155 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991).
202. See id. at 156 (jury returned manslaughter verdict on theory that defendant intended to cause
serious injury that caused death).
203. 568 N.Y.S.2d 651 (App. Div. 1991) (reporting defendant's claim that he snapped "because of an
extreme emotional disturbance triggered by his dissatisfaction with the victim who reportedly turned her
back on him and went to sleep after they engaged in sexual intercourse").
204. /d. at 652; see also People v. Wood, 488 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1985) (prior appeal).
205. See Appendix B (listing "simple infidelity" claims).
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or a current relationship. 206 Far more frequent are claims based on
confessions or allegations of infidelity. 207 Less frequent, but also present, are
cases involving lesser breaches, such as "dancing with [an]other man," 208
"receiv[ing] a phone call from a former boyfriend," 209 or seeing the victim
with another. 210
As a species of infidelity, these lesser betrayals may seem trivial. And yet,
reform tells us that these cases must reach a jury as readily as cases of
discovered adultery. Although some MPC courts have resisted such outcomes,
it remains the case that the defendant's perception, from the defendant's
"situation," is determinative under the MPC. Once one accepts that perspective,
it becomes clear how judges might believe that a trivial rejection such as
turning one's back may support an EED instruction. What seems less clear is
how the law can avoid the implications of its choice-that it partially condones
the use of private violence to punish dancing, traveling, and turning. Again,
that these cases reach juries should be controversial but it is not: Rarely, if

206. Of 133 total claims in the MPC sample, only four (three percent) involved a "simple infidelity"
claim that involved a current partner in anything approaching a "discovery" situation. See Worring v. State,
638 S.W.2d 678, 679 (Ark. Ct. App. 1982) (stating that defendant followed husband and found him seated
in parked car with alleged lover); State v. Valera, 848 P.2d 376, 378 & n.2 (Haw. 1993) (stating that
defendant followed wife to parking lot where he found her in car with alleged lover with his "pants
undone"); Smith v. Commonwealth, 737 S.W.2d 683, 685 (Ky. 1987) (stating that defendant discovered
his lover and victim with "pants down" in truck); People v. Rowe, 568 N.Y.S.2d 648,649 (App. Div. 1991)
(stating that defendant found rival in bedroom). Four other cases involving seven claims (another five
percent) involved discovery in the context of a relationship that was ending or over. See State v. Chicano,
584 A.2d 425, 428 (Conn. 1990) (reporting that defendant waited outside bedroom window and heard
· "sounds of sexual activity" whereupon he entered house, hid in bathroom for one hour, then killed his
former girlfriend, her boyfriend, and her son); People v. Berk, 629 N.Y.S.2d 588, 589-90 (App. Div. 1995)
(reporting that defendant discovered rival in bed with estranged wife who had initiated divorce
proceedings), aff'd, 88 N.Y.2d 257 (1996); State v. Lyon, 672 P.2d 1358, 1359 (Or. Ct. App. 1983)
(reporting that defendant found ex-wife in bed with new lover); State v. Florez, 777 P.2d 452, 453 (Utah
1989) (reporting that defendant returned to former home and found ex-girlfriend in bed with lover).
207. See, e.g., Lovelace v. Lopes, 632 F. Supp. 306, 308 (D. Conn.) (noting confession of infidelity),
aff'd, 802 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1986); People v. David, 533 N.Y.S.2d 627, 629 (App. Div. 1988) (noting
discovery of letter alluding to another relationship); People v. Maggio, 494 N.Y.S.2d 424, 425 (App. Div.
1985) (noting declaration of infidelity); State v. Davis, 606 P.2d 671, 672 (Or. 1980) (noting "alleged
sexual affair" victim had with neighbor).
208. Dixon v. State, 597 S.W.2d 77, 78 (Ark. 1980). Similarly, another case noted that:
Two weeks before the victim's death, the defendant, the victim's former boyfriend, had seen
the victim dancing with another man. The night before the victim's death, the defendant was
seen throwing rocks at her window. The defendant also had been seen lingering in the vicinity
of the victim's apartment for two days prior to the incident.
State v. Martinez, 591 A.2d 155, 156 (Conn. 1991).
209. People v. Aphaylath, 499 N.Y.S.2d 823, 824 (App. Div.), rev'd on other grounds, 68 N.Y.2d 945
(1986); see also 68 N.Y.2d at 946 (characterizing claim as defendant's "jealousy over his wife's apparent
preference for an ex-boyfriend" including unidentified displays of affection and "receiving phone calls from
an unattached man"). But see People v. Checo, 599 N.Y.S.2d 244, 244 (App. Div. 1993) ("[Defendant's]
explanation that he experienced 'emotion' and 'jealousy' at the mere sight of his former wife in the
company of another man, did not provide a 'reasonable explanation or excuse."').
210. See State v. Ott, 686 P.2d 1001, 1004 (Or. 1984) (reporting that defendant was "angered and
disappointed when his wife's new lover appeared at the hospital").

1997]

Passion's Progress

1365

ever, does the law grant the protection of a defense or partial defense in cases
where the act is so disproportionate to the threatened harm. 211
Infidelity cases that one sees quite frequently in reform jurisdictions are
unlikely to reach juries in traditional states. Common law jurisdictions continue
to adhere to the category of "discovered adultery," barring claims involving
confessions or allegations of infidelity. Claims based on "words alone" are
thought insufficient to sustain a manslaughter verdict in traditional
jurisdictions. 212 Moreover, courts in traditional states have expressed a good
deal of skepticism about unsupported allegations of infidelity,213 a skepticism
unshared by courts in MPC jurisdictions. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, traditional jurisdictions often reject heat of passion claims where
the infidelity was known to the defendant well before the killing, on the theory
that there was no "sudden" passion. 214
This last factor illustrates another way in which the logic of reform, which
focuses almost exclusively on the defendant's subjective state, operates to
obscure competing factual narratives. In many of the MPC cases, for example,
the defendant appears to have had prior knowledge of a wife's or ex-wife's
infidelity and arrived at the scene armed. 215 In others, the defendant appears
to have made his intention to kill the victim known in advance. 216 In some,
the claimed infidelity appears weeks before the killing. 217 All of these
factors, which may be relevant to the determination of "sudden passion" in
211. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (detailing MPC defenses requiring proportionality
between violence and triggering circumstances in self-defense, duress, and necessity).
212. See, e.g., People v. Chevalier, 544 N.E.2d 942, 944 (Ill. 1989) ("[M]ere words are insufficient
provocation ... no matter how aggravated, abusive, opprobrious or indecent the language."); People v.
Cedeno, 635 N.E.2d 1047, 1052 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (applying "mere words" rule); People v. Hightower,
629 N.E.2d 1197, 1201 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (applying "mere words" rule and defending it against alleged
exception).
213. See, e.g., People v. Burts, 628 N.E.2d 515,519 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (expressing skepticism about
defendant's claims of infidelity unsupported by other evidence), vacated, 630 N.E.2d 845 (Ill. 1994).
214. People v. Schorle includes a typical statement:
[D]efendant did not kill his wife immediately after discovering her in an adulterous act, or
immediately prior to or after an act of adultery. The record shows that defendant loaded his gun,
waited for his wife, and shot her seconds after she smiled and verbally admitted that she
enjoyed the adulterous act. [These words were not] legally sufficient to reduce defendant's
homicide to voluntary manslaughter.
565 N.E.2d 84, 89 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
215. See, e.g., Rodebaugh v. State, No. 436, 1990 WL 254365, at **I (Del. Nov. 27, 1990) (reporting
that defendant arrived at scene armed and killed man now dating his ex-girlfriend and that EED instruction
was given); Rev. State, 540 A.2d 423, 425 (Del. 1988) ("On the night he killed his wife Re went to the
house where she was staying and waited for her to return.") (EED instruction given); State v. Lyon, 672
P.2d 1358, 1359 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) ("He arrived there armed with a rifle and a pistol[, which he used to
kill his ex-wife's new boyfriend.]") (EED instruction given).
216. As the court noted in one such case in which an EED instruction was given,
Davis, who was then separated from his wife, called his wife and threatened to kill her and her
boyfriend Baird, with a gun. Davis told his wife that he was coming to the apartment complex
where she lived and that he would kill both her and Baird if they were there.
Davis v. State, 522 A.2d 342, 342 (Del. 1987).
217. See State v. Martinez, 591 A.2d 155, 156 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991) ("Two weeks before the victim's
death, the defendant, the victim's former boyfriend, had seen the victim dancing with another man.") (EED
defense raised).
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other jurisdictions, are irrelevant to a provocation claim in reform states. The
MPC rejected the traditional focus on the suddenness of the emotionally
provoking event, permitting claims based on emotional grievances that grew
over time. 218 By "broaden[ing] the time frame," as Mark Kelman has termed
it, 219 the MPC makes the provocation claim available to defendants whose
criminal acts appear not only intentional, a necessary predicate to an EED
instruction, but also premeditated. By contrast, such claims typically do not
reach juries in traditional states. 220

F.

Physical Violence

"She hit me, I became enraged, and killed"; "he beat me, I fought back,
and killed." Physical violence cases represented a fairly small piece of the
reform "pie" (seventeen percent). 221 By contrast, in traditional jurisdictions,
the vast majority of claims reaching juries (sixty-eight percent) involved some
kind of physical violence. Unlike other categories, these cases tend to be far
more evenly distributed between male and female defendants. 222
TABLE E. PHYSICAL VIOLENCE CLAIMS REACHING JURIES
VIOLENCE
%of Total

JURISDICTION
MPC

TRADITIONAL

MIXED

17% (17/99)

68% (26/38)

40% (14/35)

59% (10117)

69% (18/26)

64% (9/14)

77% (17/22)

60% (26/43)

74% (14/19)

Claims
%Male
Defendants
Success Rates

Since an assault or battery is itself a wrong, and may give rise to what the
common law termed "mutual combat," the embrace of such cases in traditional
jurisdictions seems quite understandable. The difference in the two jurisdictions
comes, not surprisingly, from the willingness of reform jurisdictions to tolerate
more trivial forms of provocative battery. In MPC states, a relatively minor
218. See People v. Patterson, 347 N.E.2d 898,908 (N.Y. 1976), af!'d sub nom. Patterson v. New York,
432 U.S. 197 (1977).
219. Kelman, supra note 64, at 601.
220. See, e.g., People v. Elder, 579 N .E.2d 420, 424 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (refusing provocation
instruction in traditional jurisdiction because lack of "sudden passion" was demonstrated by fact that
defendant "carried a loaded gun" and followed victim). I do not advocate a "sudden passion" rule over the
"slow bum" rule. The temporal dimensions of the rule, in my opinion, stand in for other considerations.
If the defense is transformed in the ways I believe that it should be, a "cumulative provocation" approach
might well remain appropriate. See infra Part IV (arguing for "warranted excuse" theory of passion
defense).
221. See Appendix B (listing physical violence cases).
222. Of all 22 MPC physical violence cases, 64% (14/22) involved male defendants.

1997]

Passion's Progress

1367

scratch or slap may well bring a case to a jury. 223 By contrast, cases of
"slight provocation," in which the fight is not "on equal terms," 224 do not
reach juries in traditional jurisdictions. At the same time, traditional
jurisdictions appear more hostile to the claims of women who kill, particularly
in cases involving battered women. A woman who kills her batterer in a
reform jurisdiction should, under current doctrine, easily reach the jury on a
theory that she was provoked. 225 Here, the court's opening of the "time
frame" encompasses not only responses to immediate attacks, those most likely
to yield a classic self-defense claim, but also cases in which there is a greater
time lag. In traditional jurisdictions, however, a provocation defense may be
precluded if serious physical violence did not immediately precede the killing
on the theory that there was no "sudden" passion or "mutual combat." 226
Finally, it is important to note that in battered women's cases a heat of passion
theory may be asserted against the defendant's wishes, to counter claims of
perfect self-defense. 227
G. Other Claims
Given reformers' anticategorical approach, one might expect that many
MPC cases would fall within the residual "other" category. In fact, my data
suggests that residual claims are fairly rare and unlikely to reach juries in
reform states. 228 Claims in the residual category fall into three major
groups: 229 (1) claims that depend upon insulting remarks or arguments

223. See State v. D'Antuono, 441 A.2d 846, 850 (Conn. 1982) (suggesting that court might have
accepted EED defense based on defendant's testimony that he "'freaked out' when she scratched him with
the carving fork," but affirming bench trial rejection of this claim).
224. People v. Crum, 539 N.E.2d 196, 202-03 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (citing People v. Matthews, 314
N.E.2d 15, 15 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974)).
225. See Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772, 780 (Pa. 1989) (reporting that counsel was held
ineffective for failing to seek instruction on cumulative provocation in case where woman was harassed
and stalked over period of time and then killed her ex-boyfriend). Pennsylvania is not an MPC state, but
it has adopted a cumulative provocation rule similar to the one the MPC commentary suggests.
226. See, e.g., People v. Garcia, 651 N.E.2d 100, 110 (Ill. 1995) (finding no "mutual combat" as
matter of law in case where victim allegedly struck female defendant); People v. Falconer, 522 N.E.2d 903,
906-07 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (holding victim's slap insufficient to constitute "mutual combat" despite history
of past violence by victim against female defendant).
227. See, e.g., People v. Ambrose, 553 N.Y.S.2d 896, 896 (App. Div. 1990) (defendant claims she
killed because of abuse and threats to her child; prosecution claims she killed because her partner was
going to "leave her").
228. In MPC jurisdictions, "other" claims represented only 7% (7/99) of claims reaching juries and
15% (20/133) of all claims. Of the total 20 claims, only 7 reached juries, revealing a 35% success rate.
These results are not unlike those in "traditional" jurisdictions where "other" claims represented II% (4/38)
of all claims and 3% (1/38) of cases reaching juries, revealing a 25% success rate.
229. Some cases, of course, did not fall into any of these groups. See, e.g., People v. Matthews, 632
N.Y.S.2d 298 (App. Div. 1995) (reporting that defendant was distraught because he believed he had been
infected by sexually transmitted disease and noting that no instruction was ordered because no evidence
of subjective loss of self-control); People v. Morrison, 464 N.Y.S.2d 245 (App. Div. 1983) (reporting that
defendant was distraught over wife's multiple threats and attempts to commit suicide).
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between intimates (arguments not involving separation or departure); 230 (2)
claims that look very much like a diminished capacity defense and depend
primarily on psychiatric evidence; and (3) claims in which defendants present
evidence from their life histories to elicit sympathy. 231 Claims involving
"marital disputes" and "insulting" remarks represent one of the more
interesting features of the "other" category. Courts are divided on whether an
argument alone (without factors such as sexual infidelity or physical violence)
is sufficient to support a jury verdict. 232 A similar approach appears in
"mixed" jurisdictions. 233 In traditional jurisdictions, not surprisingly, claims
based on arguments between intimates have typically failed. 234
II. THE THEORY OF SELF-CONTROL RECONSIDERED
So far, I have emphasized the ways in which the law has failed to
appreciate the role of separation in intimate homicide cases. My argument,
however, is not a claim that the victim's right to leave must cancel the
defendant's right to be treated as an autonomous being. Instead, I try to show
in this Part that, although reform rests on a claim to preserve the defendant's
autonomy, it operates quite differently in practice. It protects something more
than emotional disturbance; it protects particular reasons for emotional
disturbance. If, then, it is autonomy that supports reform, it is autonomy of a
peculiar kind, a freedom not only to choose, but to judge. In the end, the law
of reform, like the common law before it, has selected particular relationships
230. If a claim was based on an argument about departure, it was classified as a "departure" claim,
not an "other" claim. In the interest of a conservative approach, I made one exception for a case that could
be interpreted as "rejection," but which appeared significantly different from most departure/separation
scenarios. That case was classified as "other." See People v. Moye, 489 N.E.2d 736, 738 (N.Y. 1985)
(reporting that defendant decapitated woman who taunted his impotence, laughing at him and telling him:
"[G]o on little boy. I don't need you.").
23 I. See, e.g., State v. Skjonsby, 319 N.W.2d 764, 779 (N.D. 1982) (defendant asserted the following
as factors that establish EED: "(I) failing businesses and several lawsuits concerning those businesses; (2)
problems with his relationship with Charlotte; (3) putting his grandmother in a nursing home; (4) telephone
call from Kurtz and Skonsby's knowledge about Kurtz; and (5) his fear that Charlotte was in trouble").
232. See, e.g., State v. Marino, 462 A.2d I 021, I 028 (Conn. 1983) ("[T]he evidence of the relationship
of the defendant to the victim [boyfriend/girlfriend], the quarrel which preceded the shooting and his
distraught appearance at the time the police arrived [means that] .... [w]e cannot say that the evidence
was legally insufficient to establish [EED]."). But cf People v. Adams, 422 N.E.2d 537 (N.Y. 1981) (noting
that defendant claimed that he was entitled to EED instruction in case of murdering police officer based
on claim he argued with his girlfriend about money before incident).
233. For a case in which the defendant received a heat of passion manslaughter instruction for killing
his wife while she slept after a long, bitter argument, see State v. Schmit, 388 N.W.2d 748 (Minn. 1986).
Similarly, in State v. Werman, 388 N.W.2d 748, 749 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), the defendant "was angry that
his wife had not returned home with him, and he threw things around the house, including leftover dinner."
He "passed out" and when he came to, she had returned and they "argued about the messy house"; he then
retrieved his gun and shot her. The jury was instructed on heat of passion manslaughter. But see State v.
Hoffman, 328 N.W.2d 709, 718 (Minn. 1982) (denying heat of passion manslaughter instruction where
defendant "testified that when Carol rejected his sexual advances and told him, 'Why don't you go
downstairs and fuck your fat mama,' he lost control and began to choke her").
234. See, e.g., People v. Smalley, 621 N.E.2d 7, 10 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) ("It is not sufficient to
constitute intense provocation that the unarmed decedent and defendant had argued.").
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to protect and has judged them by traditional norms of intimate loyalty, norms
that remain more powerful today precisely because the law denies that it is
making normative judgments. I begin this Part by looking at the conventional
arguments offered to support reform's vision of the provocation defense.
A. The Conventional Arguments
If the Dean of the Model Penal Code, Professor Herbert Wechsler, were
alive today, I suspect that he would find nothing very strange or unfortunate
about many of the cases I have discussed. He would argue that juries are right
to believe that it would be both cruel and useless to punish a human being
who, whether because of a loved one's departure or infidelity, was driven to
kill by emotional pain. 235 Wechsler's focus on "self-control" has a
distinguished liberal pedigree and a strong following. 236 In his classic work,
Punishment and Responsibility, 237 H.L.A. Hart explained the theoretical basis
for the idea of mitigation enshrined in the MPC. 238 Hart maintained that
excusing conditions were necessary to maximize individual choice, to protect
citizens' ability to predict and control the future. 239 Under this theory, any
natural condition that diminishes self-control should excuse, at least
partially. 240
However distinguished its advocates, the liberal theory of provoked
homicide leaves some very important questions unanswered. It purports to
depend upon behavior (lack of self-control), but it never provides a behavioral
theory. Hart, for example, concedes that he relies upon "common sense
generalizations" about "human nature" for the conclusion that men are
"capable of self-control when confronted with an open till but not when
confronted with a wife in adultery." 241 In the absence of anything more

235. See Herbert Wechsler & Jerome Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide: I, 37 COLUM. L.
REv. 701, 717-20 (1937) [hereinafter Wechsler & Michael, Homicide!]; Jerome Michael & Herbert
Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide II, 37 COLUM. L. REV 1261, 1280-81 (1937) [hereinafter
Michael & Wechsler, Homicide II]; MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 commentary at 60-62 (1985).
236. Virtually every criminal law scholar treats the MPC defense in terms of self-control, even if ideas
differ about the nature of that self-control and its relationship to normative judgments. See, e.g., FLETCHER,
supra note 25, § 4.2.1, at 249 (arguing that "self-control" issue turns on determination of what impulses
"we expect people to completely control"); LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 14, § 7.10(b), at 654 ("[W]hat
is really meant by 'reasonable provocation' is provocation which causes a reasonable man to lose his
normal self-control."); Dressler, Reflections, supra note 24, at 747-48 (arguing that "at some point, anger
becomes so intense that people find it extremely difficult to control themselves").
237. See HART, supra note 33.
238. See id. at 46-53; Tentative Draft, supra note 49, § 21 0.3, at 47 (discussing reasons for adding
defense to MPC).
239. See HART, supra note 33, at 49 ("In this way, the criminal law respects the claims of the
individual as such, or at least as a choosing being.").
240. As Hart put it, "Justice requires that those who have special difficulties to face in keeping the
law which they have broken should be punished less." /d. at 24.
241. !d. at 33 (noting that these factors come into play because of "difficulty of proof' of subjective
states).
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rigorous than such assumptions, one could easily imagine filling this gap with
a normative theory. But reform's defenders have assiduously refused this
invitation, preferring to increase rather than decrease the subjectivity of the
defense. 242 We are left with the obvious question: Why do some losses of
control count (e.g., infidelity-inspired rage), while others do not (e.g., tillinspired greed)? Modern theories of the defense have finessed these questions,
embracing the language of behavioral theory, but never putting to rest the
lurking normative questions. Every conventional attempt to defend passion as
a mitigating factor trades upon this elision. And the Code itself, as its
commentators acknowledge, is "designedly ambiguous" on this score. 243
1.

The Quantitative Theory

One version of the liberal self-control theory relies upon metaphors of
quantity, emphasizing that the "amount" of passion differentiates murder from
manslaughter. 244 All crimes may be acts of impulse, but crimes of
manslaughter are crimes of emotional extremity. 245 Although intuitively
appealing, this approach leaves a good deal unanswered. It provides no way
to measure the degree or severity of particular mental states. Perhaps more
importantly, it does not explain the defense we have. It is the law of no state
that a loss of self-control, alone, is sufficient to sustain a manslaughter
verdict. 246 Even the MPC, the most subjective of formulations, requires the
defendant to provide a "reasonable explanation or excuse" for this lack of selfcontrol. 247 If provocation is to be anything other than a special diminished
capacity defense, 248 it must involve something more than the subjective
242. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 commentary at 61--63 (1985) (clarifying subjectivity of
emotional distress standard).
243. See id. commentary at 62.
244. Although the MPC does not rely exclusively on this theory, it does not discourage it either. The
Code itself provides that there must be "extreme" emotional distress or disturbance. See id. § 21 0.3; see
also Michael & Wechsler, Homicide II, supra note 235, at 1281 (suggesting that reasonable person's
"intensity" of feeling increases the "greater the provocation"). For applications of EED, see, e.g., State v.
Elliott, 411 A.2d 3, 8 (Conn. 1979) ("To be 'extreme' the disturbance had to be excessive and violent in
its effect upon the individual driven to kill under it."), and People v. Patterson, 347 N.E.2d 898, 901 (N.Y.
1976) (noting that lower court's conclusion that "extreme" emotion required by MPC precludes "mere
annoyance or unhappiness or anger"), aff'd sub nom. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
245. See, e.g., People v. Shelton, 385 N.Y.S.2d 708, 717 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (emphasizing exposure to
"extremely unusual and overwhelming stress" and "extreme" reaction to that stress, resulting in "intense
feelings" that overpower self-control and reason).
246. "It has never been a sufficient, as opposed to a necessary, condition of mitigation that defendant
satisfy the excusatory element, by proving simply that they killed in anger." HORDER, supra note 44, at
Ill.
247. MODEL PENAL CODE§ 210.3; see also KENT GREENAWALT, LAW & OBJECTIVITY 119 (1992)
(noting that "the phrase 'reasonable explanation or excuse' envisions some moral judgment by the jurors
about defendant's culpability").
248. A diminished capacity defense is premised on the theory that the defendant, because of a mental
disturbance not amounting to insanity, is less culpable than an intentional killer. It is "entirely subjective"
in character. See MODEL PENAL CODE§ 210.3 commentary at 71. Most states have, however, refused to
find the MPC's EED defense indistinguishable from a diminished capacity defense. See, e.g., McClellan
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mental state of the defendant. Indeed, this is precisely what the MPC tells us:
that the provocation defense requires a showing that the defendant's loss of
self-control was in some sense "reasonable" in the context of the
"situation. " 249
2.

The Situation Did It

Professor Wechsler's argument for reform assumed that the situation,
rather than the man, was the culprit. 250 He urged that the extremity and
unusualness of the situation demanded compassion, an argument that strongly
influenced Code drafters. 251 Whether in the form of a causal claim252 or in
the form of excuse, 253 this argument's focus on the "extraordinary character
of the situation" 254 sits uneasily when it comes to intimate homicide. Divorce
and separation are all too common in the United States today. 255 Of course,
in a particular individual's life, the event may be unusual, but the point of the
situational argument is not to differentiate the situation from others in the
defendant's life but to differentiate this defendant's situation from the
situations of others that we deem "normal." 256 Since most persons who are
divorced, and probably most persons who discover adultery, do not kill, it is
difficult to see how the situation could be designated as "extraordinary" unless
that designation reflects a choice rather than a description, a choice to see
some situations as less deserving of punishment than others. In this sense, the
situational argument does not answer the normative question/ 57 it simply
v. Commonwealth, 715 S.W.2d 464, 468 (Ky. 1986) (rejecting idea that MPC's EED defense is based on
lesser form of insanity and disapproving earlier opinions suggesting that MPC formulation should be
equated with diminished capacity defense).
249. MODEL PENAL CODE§ 210.3 commentary at 62.
250. See Michael & Wechsler, Homicide II, supra note 235, at 1280 ("By provocation we mean the
power possessed by some kind of things and events external to human beings, of arousing in them desires
by which they are moved to particular acts."); id. at 1281 (noting that greater the passion. more likely are
we to attribute "lack of self-control" to "the extraordinary character of the situation").
251. See MODEL PENAL CODE§ 210.3 commentary at 62.
252. See Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1091 (1985) (discussing
causal theory generally).
253. See Dressler, Reflections, supra note 24, at 745-46 (stressing that MPC provocation defense is
classic "excuse").
254. See Michael & Wechsler, Homicide II, supra note 235, at 1281.
255. There were approximately 1,215,000 American divorces in 1992. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 105 (1994).
256. See Michael & Wechsler, Homicide II, supra note 235, at 1281 ("[T]he point is that the more
strongly [most men] would be moved to kill by [such] circumstances ... the less does his succumbing
serve to differentiate his character from theirs.").
257. The normative character of the inquiry is clear from Hart's work. He states that it is cruel to
punish one who lacks self-control because such individuals do not have a "fair opportunity to choose
between keeping the law ... or paying the penalty." HART, supra note 33, at 23 (emphasis omitted). If this
is so, the provocation defense cannot be fully explained without also explaining the "fairness" of certain
kinds of situations from the unfairness of others. Hart himself suggests the normativity of the inquiry by
stating that the loss of self-control required is one in which conformity to the law is "a matter of special
difficulty ... as compared with normal persons normally placed." /d. at 15 (emphasis added); see also id.
at 153 (describing provoked defendants as those for whom self-control is "abnormal[ly] difficult")
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shifts that question to the environment.
3.

Let the Jury Decide

Ultimately, the Code offers an institutional solution: It tells us that the jury
should decide whether the situation merits compassion. 258 Again, this simply
evades, rather than answers, the lurking normative questions. Arguing that
juries "should decide" tells us nothing about which cases "should" go to juries.
The very act of sending a case to a jury requires some kind of normative
judgment, some choice about those cases in which a rational jury could find
a "reasonable" explanation for rage. The institutional argument, however, gives
us little clue about which cases satisfy that minimal test of rationality. Nor
does it tell us much about how juries are to make their normative decisions.
Jurors are told to put themselves in the defendant's position, to adopt his or
her perspective and, yet, at the same time, to be "reasonable." They are asked
to exercise independent "moral judgment," 259 and, at the same time, adopt
the defendant's vantage point. 260 In practice, this has done little to resolve
the problem and much to confound judges and jurors. 261 After days of
deliberation in a case in which a defendant killed a man who had parked in his
parking place, 262 one jury summed up its confusion about the EED defense
by sending a note to the judge, asking, Whose norms apply, his or ours ?263
(emphasis added).
258. See MODEL PENAL CODE§ 210.3 commentary at 61 (1985) ("[I]t is for the trier of fact to decide,
in light of all the circumstances of the case, whether there exists a reasonable explanation or excuse for the
actor's mental condition.").
259. GREENAWALT, supra note 247, at 119 ('"[R]easonable explanation or excuse' envisions some
moral judgment by the jurors about defendant's culpability.").
260. The impulse here is natural. MPC drafters were worried that if they simply asked jurors to be
"reasonable people" that jurors would automatically reject the defense since "reasonable people" do not kill.
See. e.g., Tentative Draft, supra note 49, at 47 ("[T]he reasonable man quite plainly does not kill.");
Michael & Wechsler, Homicide II, supra note 235, at 1281 ("[M]ost men do not kill on even the gravest
provocation .... "). The MPC answer to this is to separate the killing from the emotion and to maintain
that the question is not whether a reasonable person kills but whether a reasonable person would experience
the kind of emotion that might lead to a murderous rage. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 commentary
at 60-62; Michael & Wechsler, Homicide II, supra note 235, at 1281.
Separating the person and his emotions from the act is consistent with the liberal focus on excuse,
but it has also led scholars to focus almost exclusively on how we characterize the person. Today, the most
pervasive questions raised about the provocation defense depend on whether a reasonable person bears such
characteristics as impotence, disability, or terrorist upbringings. See FLETCHER, supra note 25, § 4.2.1, at
247-48; Kelman, supra note 64, at 636-37. In this world, Professor Dan-Cohen is surely right to conclude
that the provocation question has become more than a question about emotion or situation, but about how
we define the "self." See Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of Self, 105 HARV. L. REV.
959 (1992).
261. When confronted with Wechsler's plea that the jury is "'asked to show whatever empathy it
can,'" one court replied that Wechsler's statement "may explain the rationale of the draftsmen but ...
ignore[s] the realities of the courtroom." State v. Elliott, 411 A.2d 3, 7-8 (Conn. 1979) (quoting Herbert
Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the United States: The Model Penal Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV.
1425, 1446 (1968)).
262. See State v. Raguseo, 622 A.2d 519, 522-23 (Conn. 1993).
263. See id. at 526 ("[T]he jury sought reinstruction again on extreme emotional disturbance,
requesting that the trial court focus on ... whose norm is relevant, society's or the defendant's .... ").
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4. Dangerousness and Deterrence
The classic utilitarian arguments about dangerousness and deterrence 264
do little better in answering the normative questions the defense poses. Take
the claim that a more severe penalty is unlikely to deter defendants who lack
self-control. The obvious rejoinder is that this explains too much, that almost
all criminal behavior is impulsive. 265 If lack of self-control means that we
should partially excuse, we are going to be excusing the man who impulsively
kills a gas station attendant as well as the man who impulsively kills his
wife. 266 Both intended to commit the crime but neither controlled their
impulses. 267 If we are confident that the gas station killer is deterrable while
the wife killer is not, it is because we implicitly distinguish the cases. We tell
ourselves that, in the one case, the defendant was "really" upset; that the
adultery "situation" was more likely to make a reasonable person upset; that
the jury should decide whether similarly situated defendants might have been
deterred. In short, we are back at square one. Once we are prepared to look at
the circumstances of individual cases, the deterrence argument quickly searches
out the very same normative criteria that we are trying to identify.
The dangerousness variation on this argument fares no better on this score.
There is no reason to believe that spouse killers, as a class, pose little risk of
further antisocial behavior. Recent data from the Justice Department shows that
seventy percent of husbands who kill their wives and twenty-seven percent of
wives who kill their husbands had a prior arrest or conviction. 268 Although
many believe that recidivism is unlikely in these circumstances, there are wellknown examples of defendants who manage to find the same situation again
and kill. 269 In People v. Stanley, 270 the defendant threatened to kill his first
264. On the utilitarian theory of excuse, see generally FLETCHER, supra note 25, § 10.3.5, at 813-17.
265. On the limits of deterrence, see HART, supra note 33, at SO ("Human beings in the main do what
the law requires without first choosing between the advantage and the cost of disobeying, and when they
obey it is not usually from fear of the sanction.").
266. See Williams, supra note 64, at 742 ("[I]t is a curious confession of failure on the part of the law
to suppose that, notwithstanding the possibility of heavy punishment, an ordinary person will commit it.
If the assertion were correct, it would raise serious doubts whether the offence should continue to be
punished.").
267. EED does not negate intent. See, e.g., State v. D' Antuono, 441 A.2d 846, 849 (Conn. 1982)
("Extreme emotional disturbance does not negate intent."); State v. Gaynor, 880 P.2d 947, 95 I (Or. Ct.
App. 1994) ("To the extent that defendant suggests that evidence of his EED negates the state's evidence
of intentional conduct, he is wrong.").
268. See LANGAN & DAWSON, supra note 66, at 21 tbl.35. In 5 I% of the cases in which wives killed,
the victim had a prior arrest or conviction. See id.; cf BRIAN A. REAVES & PHENY Z. SMITH, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 1992
( 1995) (reporting that among all defendants charged with murder in 75 largest counties of United States,
56% had felony arrest record and 47% had prior conviction for misdemeanor or felony).
269. In Garcia v. Superior Court, 789 P.2d 960 (Cal. 1990), the defendant, while on parole for the
murder of his first wife, began to live with another woman. When that woman left, he killed her. See id.
at 962-63. In People v. Pickett, 210 Cal. Rptr. 85 (Ct. App. 1985), the defendant, who had previously been
convicted of strangling his first wife, was tried for the murder of his second wife. See id. at 86-87.
270. 897 P.2d 481 (Cal. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1825 (1996).
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wife, he was on parole for the murder of his second wife, and his third wife
had mysteriously disappeared, when he killed his fourth wife. 271 In
Minnesota v. Phelps, 272 the defendant hired a gunman to kill his wife and the
hired killer went on to kill his own girlfriend, pleading guilty to manslaughter
for the girlfriend's death. 273 There are also well-known examples of
defendants who clearly "use the situation," who rely upon the heat of passion
defense to rationalize their decision to kill. In more than one case, defendants
have admitted that they were willing to serve the "five to seven" years "to get
rid of' a partner74 or to eliminate a rival. 275 In fact, defendants have, on
occasion, expressed their confidence that they will be exonerated by claiming
emotional instability. 276
One need not believe that all partner killers are likely to repeat their
offense or that all partner killers find emotional reassurance in the provocation
defense, to believe that some do. The dangerousness argument, however,
neither permits exceptions nor allows case by case inquiries. It assumes that
all similarly situated spouse killers are, by definition, less dangerous than other
killers. In the end, to accept the dangerousness argument is to find ourselves
back where we began, with the MPC drafters' claims that these defendants are
less dangerous because the situation caused the crime or because the defendant
was uncharacteristically upset. Like the deterrence argument, the dangerousness
claim rejects individualized assessments in favor of stock normative judgments
clothed in questionable empirical garb.
B. Murder Law's Silent Demands of Loyalty

To students of the provocation defense, it will hardly come as news that
the MPC's reforms aspire to normative agnosticism. 277 Nor will it come as
a surprise that this creates the potential for normative conflict: Even drafters
271. See id. at 503 & n.l5.
272. 328 N.W.2d 136 (Minn. 1982).
273. In Phelps, the defendant hired his wife's brother, Wolfe, to kill defendant's wife (Vicky). Wolfe
subsequently killed his girlfriend (Kim) when she became engaged to another man. Wolfe pled guilty to
manslaughter for Kim's death and received immunity for the killing of Vicky in exchange for his testimony
against defendant who was convicted of first degree murder of Vicky. See id. at 137-38. Phelps's request
for a heat of passion manslaughter instruction was denied.
274. See People v. Kozel, 184 Cal. Rptr. 208, 213 (Ct. App. 1982).
275. In People v. Thompkins, 240 Cal. Rptr. 516 (Ct. App. 1987), the defendant became upset when
his wife filed for divorce. He believed that she was "seeing someone else" and told a friend that he might
have to "take him out." The friend tried to dissuade him from this course of action but defendant persisted
"saying he was willing to 'do seven years for taking them out."' /d. at 517.
276. See Re v. State, 540 A.2d 423, 429-30 (Del. 1988) (reporting testimony that defendant had told
victim "one and one-half weeks" before her death, '"Don't leave me because if you do, I'll kill you"' and
that when victim suggested that "he would go to jail," defendant was reported to have said "that he would
just act like he was crazy and get off').
277. Although liberal theory justifies the defense in terms of self-control, scholars readily acknowledge
the lurking normative questions. See FLETCHER, supra note 25, § 4.2.1, at 243-49 (emphasizing normative
issues); Dan-Cohen, supra note 260, at 993-96 (noting temptation to evade normative issues).
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of the MPC knew that if what the Code terms "the situation" 278 is defined
to include a defendant's idiosyncratic norms, the provocation defense will by
definition produce normative conflict. 279 This is the obvious lesson of those
hypotheticals in casebooks about defendants who adopt the moral code of
terrorists, 280 and the vast commentary about the "characteristics" of the
reasonable provoked killer. 281 What has yet to be appreciated, however, is
how far-reaching this problem is in real life-how this conflict takes place
regularly, among the cases we know as intimate homicide-and, more
importantly, how it is tied to more basic intellectual habits nurtured by law
reform.
1.

The Relationship Within the Idiom of Emotion

In reform states, no doctrine tells judges to focus on particular
relationships; that sort of focus was the stuff of the common law's adultery
limitation. 282 When we look at the law in practice, however, we find a
different story. Cases reaching juries in reform jurisdictions involve certain
kinds of relationships. When, for example, a young man argues that he was
grievously insulted by his friends, judges easily conclude that the man's rage
is irrational and refuse a jury instruction.Z 83 Similarly, when an employer has
insulted a defendant, a judge will find it difficult to believe that such an insult
could rationally lead to murderous violence; this defendant, too, will be denied
a jury instruction. 284 Take away the intimacy of a relationship and passion's
278. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 ( 1985) ("The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse
shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the circumstances as he
believes them to be.").
279. See id. commentary at 62 (rejecting notion that defendant's characteristics should include
"idiosyncratic moral values").
280. See, e.g., ROBINSON, supra note 25, at 619.
281. See, e.g., State v. Ott, 686 P.2d 100 I (Or. 1984) (addressing question whether peculiar personality
characteristics of defendant should be included in "situation"); MODEL PENAL CODE§ 210.3 commentary
at 62-63 (discussing characteristics question generally); Dressler, Reflections, supra note 24, at 752-53
(same); see also Dan-Cohen, supra note 260, at 993-96 (discussing this issue in context of famous case
of Bedder v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, 2 All E.R. 801 (H.L. 1954)); infra text accompanying notes
404-12.
282. See Rex v. Greening, 3 K.B. 846, 849 (1913) (holding when there is no legal-i.e.,
marriage-relationship, defendant "has no such right to control" over his faithless lover); Dressler,
Provocation, supra note 24, at 440 (noting traditional approach in which killing for unfaithfulness of wife
yields manslaughter but killing for unfaithfulness of "lover or fiance is murder[]").
283. See, e.g., Frazier v. State, 828 S.W.2d 838, 839 (Ark. 1992) ("The fact that one friend teases
another is not a reasonable excuse for a state of emotional disturbance so great as to excuse killing."); Parr
v. State, No. CACR 94-1256, 1995 Ark. App. LEXIS 565, at *5 (Ark. Ct. App. 1995) ("'[E]ven if
appellant's irritation from being teased could somehow constitute extreme emotional disturbance, there was
no proof that it was reasonable."') (quoting Frazier, 828 S.W.2d at 839).
284. See, e.g., Frazier, 828 S.W.2d at 839 (holding that EED instruction was unnecessary in case in
which defendant, male friend of victim, said "'Ooh, Dana peed on hisself"' and defendant was "tired" of
victim "'messing with him"'); Thompson v. Commonwealth, 862 S.W.2d 871, 877 (Ky. 1993) (holding that
instruction defining EED was not required in case where prison inmate at work farm killed his supervisor
after he became upset that his supervisor had criticized him, because "being 'upset' and 'uneasy' does not
constitute extreme emotional disturbance" as defined by court); see also People v. Pride, 833 P.2d 643, 676
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"rationality" disappears. Return that same claim to intimacy, however, and the
emotion becomes "rational" once again. An insult by a wife, ex-wife,
girlfriend, or even a casual sex partner often constitutes precisely the
"humiliation"285 necessary for a court to believe that the emotion is
sufficiently "rational" to send the case to a jury. 286
Although reform may have jettisoned "relationship" as relevant legal
doctrine, legal practice has never jettisoned "relationship" in constructing
claims of passion. Instead, reform folded this idea into the concept of a
"rational" emotion, 287 transforming judgments about the relationship into
judgments of affect. We see this most clearly in departure cases. A defendant
who claims rage because his friends "were leaving him out" will be told that
his defense is irrational, that he cannot rightfully claim an EED instruction
because the explanation for his rage is unreasonable. 288 Yet in reform
jurisdictions, a defendant who kills because he was rejected by an intimate,
because "she turned her back" after sex, 289 or because she moved the
furniture out, 290 is entitled to plead his case to the jury. The provoking factor
here may be quite the same: leaving and rejection. That, then, cannot be the
reason why juries are entitled to reach different results. Courts see these cases
differently because the relationship between the parties is different; because
the relationship is, in some sense, "making" these emotions seem rational.
If Professor Wechsler seems momentarily vindicated, let me pause to
emphasize the way in which "the situation" seems to make these judgments
rational. Why is it that the same event, in two different contexts, yields such
different judgments of "rationality"? Why are we given to say that the emotion
is all out of proportion to the deed when friends, employers, or landlords leave

(Cal. 1992) (holding in mixed jurisdiction, janitor's written criticism of defendant's work was "insufficient"
provocation).
285. See People v. White, 590 N.E.2d 236 (N.Y. 1992) ("The fact that defendant had been repeatedly
humiliated by [his wife] was sufficient to establish the requisite provocation.").
286. See, e.g., People v. Moye, 658 N.E.2d 232 (N.Y. 1985) (reporting that defendant was insulted
by woman with whom he was trying to have sex and reversing for failure to instruct on EED); People v.
Benedict, 609 N.Y.S.2d 100, 101 (App. Div. 1994) (reporting that jury heard EED claim based on argument
in which an insult by victim "made him so angry" that "he lost control of himself').
287. I use the term "rational" emotion here as shorthand for the determination by a judge that the case
should go to the jury, i.e., that a "rational jury" could conclude that there was a "reasonable explanation
or excuse." See MODEL PENAL CODE§ 210.3 (1985).
288. See State v. Russo, 734 P.2d 156, 160 (Haw. 1987) (holding that defendant presented no
"'reasonable' explanation or excuse" by arguing that he murdered friends who were "leaving [him] out"
of their activities); see also Cecil v. Commonwealth, 888 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Ky. 1994) (holding that no
instruction on EED available in case in which female defendant became "emotionally dependent" on her
friend and increasingly "jealous" of time friend spent away from her).
289. People v. Wood, 568 N.Y.S.2d 651, 652 (App. Div. 1991) ("At his second trial, the defendant's
defense was that he had 'snapped' and was 'totally out of control' at the time of the killing" because of
EED "triggered by his dissatisfaction with the victim who reportedly turned her back on him and went to
sleep after they engaged in sexual intercourse").
290. See State v. Reams, 616 P.2d 498 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (reporting that defendant's wife moved
furniture out of house and that defendant relied on EED defense), aff' d in part and remanded, 636 P.2d
913 (Or. 1981).
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or reject us, 291 while the same acts, with the same relation to the crime, may
seem "rational" in the context of an intimate relationship? The MPC drafters
would tell us that this is life-that it is the "situation" that makes some claims
of emotion appear "rational" while others are not. But what kind of judgments
are these? They are not necessarily judgments of fact. We can easily imagine
cases in which the betrayal of a lifelong friend falls far more heavily on our
emotional scales than an ex-boyfriend's new affections. Judgments of
rationality in these cases are not attempts to obtain "full information" about
actual emotional reactions. Instead, they express commitments to apply certain
generalizations about intimacy, whether or not the facts support such
generalizations. 292 In other words, our judgments of rationality express
commitments to a norm rather than an actual description; 293 they ask us to
assume the existence of legitimate emotional ties even in the face of facts
suggesting quite the contrary. And in that commitment, they "steer
understanding and observation" away from any other reconstruction but the one
that we have assumed. 294
2.

The Claims of Loyalty Implicit in "the Situation"

We can see the normative character of these judgments more clearly if we
remember some of the cases described earlier. Would a court ever find that it
was "rational" to become enraged by a stranger who "turned her back" in an
elevator? That witnessing a dancing competition could rationally inspire rage?
The acts themselves are perfectly innocuous. 295 They are not the problem; it
29!. See State v. Wilbanks, No. C9-90-2430, 1991 WL 171989, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 1991)
(expressing skepticism about "rational basis" of claim that defendant acted in heat of passion because "the
prospect of eviction drove [him] over the edge").
292. Frederick Schauer would describe this as an "entrenched generalization." For example, if a "No
dogs allowed" rule were applied to ban a seeing eye dog, the generalization underlying the rule (dogs are
badly behaved and create disturbances) would be "entrenched": It would apply "even in those cases in
which that generalization failed to serve [the rule's] underlying justification." FREDERICK SCHAUER,
PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW
AND IN LIFE 48-49 (1991) (emphasis omitted). Applying the generalization in this way transforms it, in
my view, from a description to a norm.
293. See ALLAN GIBBARD, WISE CHOICES, APT FEELINGS: A THEORY OF NORMATIVE JUDGMENT 162
(1990) (describing use of term "rational" as commitment to norms that would permit act to be described
as "rational").
294. As Frederick Schauer has observed:
[D]escriptive possibilities that may exist in theory are blocked in practice by the way in which
existing generalizations steer understanding .... The generalizations channel our perceptions,
making it difficult to jump the channels of existing apprehension. Insofar as available
generalizations are entrenched, some descriptive options will never be seen, others will become
substantially harder to express, and still others will become less understandable than they would
have been had not certain generalizations been entrenched.
SCHAUER, supra note 292, at 44.
295. Often, when the defendant's claim is of such a nature, courts will be tempted to say that the
defendant "indulged" his emotions, betraying that what they mean is that the defendant "should" have
controlled them. See HORDER, supra note 44, at 97-99 (discussing early analogue of this view based on
"weakness of will").
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is that these acts take place within a context which gives them a certain
meaning-and that context plus its meaning generate claims of plausible
emotion. It is only when we give turning and dancing and dating the meaning
of "rejection" that the defendant's claim of emotion becomes "rational." 296
That intellectual move requires not only that there be some kind of relationship
to reject, but also that the relationship generates meanings based on our
expectations of intimacy. In other words, when we say that a situation
plausibly evokes emotion, we do more than describe that situation, we commit
to a world of meanings in which relationships demand particular kinds of
loyalty. 297 More importantly, we commit to a world in which some violations
of loyalty are offenses against that relationship.
That the relationship does the work of normativity here becomes even
clearer when we consider the assumption of "lingering" emotion. Earlier, we
saw courts assuming the "rationality" of extreme emotion based on past
intimacy. The implicit argument was that these defendants had been wrongfully
deserted. We know, however, that relationships may end for many different
kinds of reasons-not only because the victim deserts a grieving partner but
also because both parties want the relationship to end or because the
defendant's own bad acts have caused the departure. There is no necessary
connection between lingering emotions and the simple fact that the partners
have gone their separate ways. Our sympathy for lingering emotions betrays
more than the end of the relationship; it betrays an implicit judgment that the
departure reflected betrayal, desertion, or abandonment. If we were to believe
that the defendant's own wrongful acts caused the departure, we would not
describe the case as one of "lingering feelings" even though the defendant may
well have had such emotions. What makes the defendant's claim rationally
productive of emotion is not the fact of a prior relationship alone, nor the
leaving itself, but a set of meanings about relationships in which it is wrong
to leave, in which leaving breaches a covenant implicit in the relationship. This
is why some courts are quick to drop judgments of "rational" emotion when
they discover acts that challenge the assumed equities, when they find out that
the defendant battered his wife, abused her children, or that the claimed
infidelity was the defendant's own. 298 In these circumstances, the defendant's
296. See, e.g., People v. Fediuk, 480 N.Y.S.2d 913, 914-15 (App. Div. 1984) (Weinstein, J.,
dissenting) (describing separation as rejection), aff'd, 489 N.E.2d 732 (N.Y. 1985).
297. See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF RELATIONSHIPS 7
(1993) ("(T)he question of loyalty does not arise in the abstract but only in the context of particular
relationships. Further, by definition, these ties generate partialities in loyalties, loves and hates, dispositions
to trust and distrust.").
298. See, e.g., People v. Rivera, 507 N.Y.S.2d 266, 267 (App. Div. 1986) (upholding trial court's
rejection of EED on basis that defendant's relationship "with his estranged wife was plagued by constant
strife, as evidenced by their periodic separations, and was punctuated by sporadic instances of physical
abuse by the defendant") (emphasis added); see also State v. Traficonda, 612 A.2d 45 (Conn. 1992)
(affirming jury's rejection of EED defense based on defendant's own battering); Fediuk, 489 N.E.2d 732
(rejecting EED defense over dissenting opinion below in case where victim was trying to leave and had
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rage no longer seems rational because the relational equities have changed.
Stepping back for a moment, we can see how reform has, once again, used
the "rationality" of emotion to do just what it pretends not to do. We have
already seen how the idea of relationship folds into the question of "rational"
emotion. Here we see how the concept of rationality is transformed into
judgments about those relationships. When reformers rid the law of the
nineteenth-century categories, they believed they were ridding us of a longoutdated code of honor. When they declined to judge the adequacy of
provocation, they rejected an approach that bestowed privileges on certain
relationships. But getting rid of the categories, and forcing normative
judgments on juries, did not prevent courts from deciding normative questions.
It simply disguised these judgments by changing the ways we argued about
them. It transformed them into questions that did not seem normative at all,
into questions about situations or emotions or the defendant's
characteristics. 299
All of this is a rather abstract way of saying something simple and
intuitive. In the end, our judgments about "passion" turn on the equities of
intimacy and loyalty. Defendants regularly portray their partners as the
wrongdoers in the relationship, as the cheaters who heartlessly left. Under the
old law, however, defendants were limited to a particular "wrong," namely
adultery. By rejecting the adultery limitation, reform has made way for a far
broader set of equitable claims, claims about messy houses, child visitation,
and moving the furniture. 300 If this is the direction of reform, we can begin
to see why the defense, in MPC form, has proven troubling. After all, is a
murder trial really a place to adjudicate a relationship? Should murder trials
become a species of "divorce court" in which juries are asked to side with one
party or another? Perhaps more importantly, should courts attempt such an
adjudication when one of the parties is unavailable to tell her side of the story?
Aren't the risks too great that our assumptions about relationships will stand
in for the story that would have been told?
The problem with reform's approach now becomes clear. Although reform
opened cases up to claims about relational equities, it claimed that the law was
stayed at battered women's shelter), aff'g Fediuk, 480 N.Y.S.2d 913. For the dissent below, see Fediuk,
480 N.Y.S.2d at 914-15 (Weinstein, J., dissenting) (arguing for reduction to manslaughter verdict).
299. Feminist theory posits, of course, that this kind of rhetorical transformation sits at the core of
"liberal legalism." See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward
Feminist Jurisprudence, reprinted in CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 56, 62 (Allan C. Hutchinson ed., 1989)
(stating that liberal legalism "legitimizes itself by reflecting its view of ex;isting society, a society it made
and makes by so seeing it, and calling that view, and that relation, practical rationality").
300. See, e.g., State v. Fair, 496 A.2d 461, 462 (Conn. 1985) (reporting that defendant relied upon
EED defense in case where defendant was upset because his ex;-girlfriend moved and told him he would
never see his son); State v. Werman, 388 N.W.2d 748, 749 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (reporting that jury was
instructed on provocation in case where parties argued and argument included dispute about messy house);
State v. Reams, 616 P.2d 498 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (reporting defendant relied upon EED defense in case
where defendant claimed he snapped when his wife moved furniture out), aff'd in part and remanded, 636
P.2d 913 (Or. 1981).
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not considering the equities, that all it was doing was describing the situation
of a reasonable person. Precisely because the equitable discussion occurs on
the rhetorical rather than the doctrinal level, it has a way of creating
unexamined and unexaminable inconsistencies. Consider a series of cases in
New Hampshire. In January 1983, the New Hampshire Supreme Court decided
a provocation case, State v. Smith, 301 in which it interpreted the state
manslaughter statute to require that no "lawful" act could constitute the basis
for a claim of "extreme emotional distress." 302 The court held that the
defendant had no viable provocation claim because he argued that he was
provoked to kill by a bouncer who acted lawfully in ousting the defendant
from a local bar. With that holding, one might imagine that other lawful acts,
such as departure or divorce, might fall outside the scope of the defense. Five
months after the court's 1983 ruling in Smith, however, the court heard another
case, State v. Little, 303 involving a man who killed his wife because she
refused to reconcile. Although the court cited and discussed Smith in general
terms, it never mentioned the idea that her "leaving" might be a lawful act (nor
did it ask whether Little's claim was barred under Smith). 304 In the world of
the Little case, the relationship and the implicit norms of loyalty that it silently
imposes have become more "rational" than the law itself. 305
This strategy, which simultaneously denies yet depends upon judgments
of intimate loyalty, has allowed reform to cling to older notions of relationship
otherwise discarded by law and society. Why else would the law encourage
protective orders in domestic violence cases but hold that juries could find
such orders good cause for murderous rages? How else are we to explain that
divorce or departure, lawful acts, are assumed to spawn murderous rages that
survive for months and years? How else are we to understand why the
reformed defense, unlike almost any other in the criminal code, shows
compassion to defendants who have created the conditions of their own
defense, who respond to what would otherwise seem trivial slights, or who use
violence to punish lawful acts? Because the relationship supplies the norms
that the criminal law denies. Because, in denying its normativity, the law of
passion may practice normativity free of critical judgment.

301. 455 A.2d 1041 (N.H. 1983).
302. See id. at I 043 ("[W)e hold that a lawful act cannot provide sufficient provocation to support a
finding of manslaughter.").
303. 462 A.2d 117 (N.H. 1983). The trial judge had given the jury a manslaughter instruction even
though the provoking situation involved the victim's attempt to end the relationship. See id. at 118.
304. See id. at 118-19 (discussing Smith, 455 A.2d 1041).
305. New Hampshire is not the only state in which this appears to have happened. In New Mexico,
a non-MPC state, the supreme court ruled in State v. Manus, 597 P.2d 280 (N.M. 1979), that no lawful act
may constitute provocation. See id. at 285. Later, in a departure case, the court made no mention of this
point. Instead, it held that rejection did not amount to a "sudden quarrel" sufficient to give rise to adequate
provocation. See State v. Robinson, 616 P.2d 406, 413 (N.M. 1980).
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C. A Brief Response to the Unpersuaded
There are those who will say that in any contest of claims between the
defendant and the victim, we should resolve uncertainty in favor of the
defendant, that we should stifle any doubts we have about the defendant's
claims to protect his freedom. My argument does not seek to pit the
defendant's autonomy claims against the victim's. What this Part has tried to
show is that reform protects something more than the defendant's freedom.
Reform's focus on self-control means that the defendant not only has a right
to choose, but also to judge. It is ironic but true that a defense that has been
touted as the most "behaviorist" of provocation formulas does just what all the
older formulas do: It simply disguises what it is doing in the form of ideas
about rational emotion. In the end, advocates of reform must not only defend
reform in terms of Hart's "freely choosing self," they must grapple with
whether the "freely choosing self' also includes judgments about how we
relate to those with whom we are most intimate.
Some may insist that I have simply taken the victim's point of view, but
this is far too glib a response. As I try to show later, 306 the divide between
those who support, and those who seek to abolish, this defense reflects deep
conceptual disagreements. More importantly, I doubt whether this claim would
be made in other cases. Would scholars say that the law of self-defense takes
the "victim's side" when it requires that the triggering violence was unlawful,
or when it requires a showing of proportionate violence? 307 Would scholars
say that the law of duress or imperfect self-defense takes the "victim's side"
when it bars claims for defendants who intentionally create the conditions of
their own defense? 308 To the extent that the provocation defense departs from
these principles and yields results contrary to our intuitions about criminal
culpability, my argument is precisely the opposite of a claim that is partial to
the victim. Instead, it is an argument that proceeds from existing criminal law
theory and practice.
Others will insist that I have wrongly discounted the role of emotion in
intimate relationships. I mean no disrespect to emotion; indeed, as I argue
later, I believe that current behavioral theory falsely subordinates emotion
when, in fact, both science and law tell us that emotion may be essential to
reason. 309 I do, however, take a different view of emotion than reform's

306. See infra Part III (arguing that differences between feminists and reform's defenders depends
upon excuse).
307. See MODEL PENAL CODE§ 3.04 (1985) (providing that deadly force must be proportional); see
supra note 20 (identifying other defenses with proportionality requirements).
308. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.09(2), 3.04(2)(b)(i), 3.09.
309. See infra Part IV (arguing against abolition position because law needs to protect emotion as
essential to our attachment to law itself).
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defenders. There is no question in my mind that heightened emotions may
distort our judgments. 310 But the reverse is also true: The more one feels
"justified" or "vindicated," the greater the intensity of the emotion. When we
change our judgments, our emotions and our actions often follow suit. 311
This dual aspect of emotion is ignored by arguments that assume spouse killers
are incapable of controlling their emotions or actions. Good evidence suggests
that many persons in these defendants' situations also feel extreme emotion,
but do not act upon these emotions: There are the hundreds of thousands of
persons who get divorced or separated every year who do not kill. The
problem is not simply heightened emotion, it is that emotion reflects and
reinforces judgments for which liberal behavioral theories provide no account.
Students of the provocation defense may put this argument in the language
of excuse and justification, and claim that I have wrongly transformed a
defense that focuses on state of mind as partial excuse into one that evaluates
the defendant's conduct as partial justification. 312 As I argue later, I believe
that the defense is most definitely an excuse, although not in the traditional
understanding of that term. 313 At a more fundamental level, however, this
argument misses the point. Whatever one believes about the nature of emotion
in the abstract, any satisfying theory must deal with the practice of the
defense, a practice that is distinctively normative. In assessing emotion, courts
have consulted neither "quickened heart-beats nor ... shallow breathing, ...
trembling lips nor ... weakened limbs." 314 They have looked to cultural
ideas of "rational emotion," a practice that assumes much about the loyalties
created by intimacy. 315 To argue that the defense has been improperly
practiced as partial justification, when it should have been partial excuse, does
nothing to undermine my claim. Defenders of such a theory must simply

310. See id. (arguing that sincere emotion may be relevant to sentencing or grade of offense).
311. See ROBERT C. SOLOMON, THE PASSIONS: EMOTIONS AND THE MEANING OF LIFE 187 (1976).
312. See, e.g., Dressler, Reflections, supra note 24, at 746 n.l07 (arguing that MPC's provocation
formula is clearly based on concept of "excuse"). An "excuse" is a defense that adjudges the defendant less
culpable, typically because of the defendant's state of mind (e.g., insanity); a "justification" is a defense
that adjudges the defendant less culpable because his acts, all things considered, were the right things to
do in the circumstances (e.g., necessity). This division is a rough approximation, not a rule. See generally
Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1897 ( 1984)
(arguing that Anglo-American criminal law should not attempt to distinguish systematically between
justification and excuse).
313. See infra Part IV.
314. 2 JAMES, supra note 16, at 452 (espousing physicalist view of emotion). There is some evidence
that learning of infidelity increases male, but not female, heart rates by up to five beats a minute (the
apparent equivalent of a jolt of three cups of coffee). See Buss, supra note 84, at 543 (reporting results
from experiment). This, of course, does not explain why we should not want to partially excuse the use
of vi.olence in response to such emotional "jolts." A "behavioral" model would not only have to explain
the emotional reaction, but also the physical or behavioral compulsion or quasi-compulsion to use violence
in response to the three-cups-of-coffee reaction.
315. See supra Subsection II.B.2.
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explain its practice or provide an alternative means of making the defense
practice as excuse. 316
Finally, one might argue that the conflicts I emphasize are inevitable and
thus merit no change in the defense. As Professor Meir Dan-Cohen has so
insightfully shown, the criminal law speaks with two, often inconsistent,
voices-with one voice that tells us all to conform our conduct to the law
("conduct rules") and with another voice that tells judges to make exceptions
for particular cases ("decision rules"). 317 In this instance, however, we have
moved beyond the conflict between conduct rule and decision rule. Here the
conflict is within the defense itself, 318 between the conduct rule the defense
implicitly creates and other laws and commitments, outside the criminal law
in family law and civil law. 319 In this sense, the passion defense is far from
representative of other defenses. Indeed, it is virtually alone: It creates conflicts
between the private and public use of violence that have no analogue in the
law of self-defense, necessity, or duress. 320
My argument should not be confused with the position that relationships
involve no special claims of loyalty or fidelity (they do) or that individuals are
not, in part, defined by their relationships (they are). But if these are the
important questions, they are ones that the liberal theory of self-control cannot
answer. Although law reform makes choices about what claims of loyalty it
will honor, it denies that it is making these choices. It wraps these questions
up in other ideas: the rationality of the emotion, the situation, or the
characteristics of the defendant. As a result, it honors loyalties based on a
single sexual act as easily as those based on twenty years of marriage, and it
punishes disloyalty in the "turning [of] one's back" 321 as easily as deliberate
fraud.

316. In theory. the defense could be practiced as an excuse if it operated as a diminished capacity
defense. One might define, for example, a "reasonable excuse or explanation" as a mental disorder. Some
courts have seemed to approach, but have ultimately refused to embrace, such a formulation. See. e.g., State
v. Dumlao, 715 P.2d 822, 829-31 (Haw. Ct. App. 1986) (suggesting that MPC's EED defense is partial
diminished capacity defense).
317. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal
Law, 97 HARV. L. REv. 625, 625 (1984) (arguing that separation between decision and conduct rules
presents inherent conflicts in criminal law).
318. An example may help to see this distinction: The provocation defense applied in a murder case
creates a conflict between what Professor Dan-Cohen sees as a conduct rule (the rule against murder) and
a decision rule (the rule of provocation). See id. at 626-27 (describing and defining decision versus conduct
rules). But the defense itself incorporates an unacknowledged conduct rule (as I have construed it) relative
to the provoking behavior that is a condition of the defense. That conflict is one within the defense, not
between the defense as decision rule and offense as conduct rule.
319. As Professor Dan-Cohen notes, selective transmission may operate illegitimately in precisely
those cases in which the law uses the distinction between conduct rules and decision rules to achieve
something that it could not otherwise achieve. See id. at 665 n.IIO.
320. By this I mean that these defenses are typically unavailable if the acts triggering the defendant's
claims are lawful.
321. People v. Wood, 568 N.Y.S.2d 651,652 (App. Div. 1991).
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Ill. PASSION PERSONIFIED

For some time, feminists have raised concerns about the heat of passion
defense, arguing that its history and impact reveal gender bias. 322 Although
occasionally acknowledged, these claims have sparked no major judicial or
academic revision in the theory or practice of the defense. Indeed, the practice
has remained remarkably consistent despite these challenges. This reflects a
familiar misunderstanding: Liberals tend to hear the claims of feminists as
"political" charges. Feminists, on the other hand, tend to believe that liberals
neither understand nor appreciate women's "experience." I think that the
misunderstanding is more sophisticated, but far more understandable, than this
standard account suggests. The conflict, as I see it, depends on criminal law's
theory of excuse and its assumptions, assumptions that feminists seek to
challenge. In this Part, I argue that reform's method, judged by any standard,
whether feminist or not, forced the law of provocation to stand still in the face
of changing social norms. I then examine the ways in which the liberal theory
of this defense assumes precisely what feminists contest.
The history of the passion defense, from the common law to the Model
Penal Code, is the history of a "passion" that is increasingly private and
personal. Once an honor code, then heated blood, now a state of mind, the idea
of passion has moved steadily inward. That move has fundamentally changed
the shape of the defense. When honor ruled, courts imposed categories of
wrongs defined by social relationships. 323 When passion became a natural
force within the "blood," all the important doctrinal limitations focused on
when the blood could cool. 324 When passion became mental distress, our
questions delved into the minds of ordinary persons to provide answers. 325
The Model Penal Code was the logical culmination of this shift. It took the
"reasonable person" model a step further by asking juries not only to look into
persons' minds but also to identify their personality characteristics. 326 What
had moved from norm to body to mind was now a question of identity.
By embracing this shift, MPC reformers never intended to endorse
outdated norms about relationships. By eliminating the category of adultery
and extending coverage to nontraditional relationships, reformers no doubt saw
themselves as taking the progressive position on gender issues. What reformers
did not envision, however, was that their intellectual method might betray their
322. See Coker, supra note 57, at 75; Mahoney, supra note 4, at 79-80; Taylor, supra note 63, at
1689-92.
323. See HORDER, supra note 44, at 62-63.
324. As contemporary common law jurisdictions explain this formulation, the cooling off prohibition
is the objective counterpart to the heat of passion requirement. See Tripp v. State, 374 A.2d 384, 391 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1977).
325. See, e.g., KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 55, at 411-14 (explaining move toward reasonable
person formulation).
326. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE§ 210.3 commentary at 62 (1985).
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purpose. Internalizing the defense within the minds of reasonable defendants
simply ignored the normative questions about relationships that remained. In
a world in which social norms are changing, not taking a position becomes a
position, one that endorses the status quo even as it denies that it is endorsing
anything at all.
The shift from a normative defense to one based on identity is not simply
a shift in doctrine or theory; it is a shift in intellectual method. It transforms
the questions we ask of the defense. Once, we inquired whether the victim had
done something wrong relative to the killer and our attention was
correspondingly focused on the norms governing their relationship. While the
norms embodied in that early modern defense are unrecognizable today, they
were acknowledged as norms nonetheless. 327 The move inward, what I would
call the "personification" of the defense, shifted that question inside the
emotional life of one person. It takes normative questions (which passions the
law should protect) and puts them, in answer form, into the minds of
defendants. Now, the standard questions asked in provocation cases all focus
on the emotional life of reasonable persons.
Given this approach, it should be no surprise that feminists have balked.
Feminism is a normative enterprise. It asks how we should understand gender
and what effects gender should have on the world. 328 To the extent that
feminism asserts that women's experiences are different and valid, 329 it
necessarily embraces a normative view challenging the existing order. 330
Hence, it is no wonder that advocates of the defense cannot engage feminist
claims. The defense and its theory aspire to a world of "is" rather than
"ought," to a world in which self-control is measured in degrees and emotion
described as situation. This aspiration to descriptive neutrality means that
normative challenges are likely to be rejected out of hand. For if one believes
327. See HORDER, supra note 44, at 62-63 (noting that early modern law recognized passion as
deliberate act of retaliatory anger, anger that depended upon judgments of "wrongdoing and of appropriate
response").
328. See Case, Of Richard Epstein, supra note 30, at 370 (explaining that feminism "asks what, from
a feminist perspective, is wrong with the world; how much does the law have to do with creating,
reinforcing and meaning what is wrong; what would the ideal world look like; and how can law help us
to get to that ideal").
329. One form of feminist argument proceeds to "uncover and claim as valid the experience of
women." MacKinnon, supra note 299, at 57. To the extent that such an argument takes its nonnative
authority solely from sex, it is often confused with a kind of victimology, an argument that gains authority
by a "state of injury." See generally BROWN, supra note 29 (exploring how injury has become basis of
political and legal identity). Although such claims have done much to jolt the debate, they also present
problems. Cf Martha L.A. Fineman, Feminist Theory and Law, 18 HARY. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 349, 356
(1995) (noting it is problematic to rely upon "mere presence of a characteristic or set of characteristics [that
give] the individual ... authority and legitimacy"). My effort here has not been to privilege the
characteristic or quality of "sex" in any particular way. Instead, I use what I believe are rather conventional
legal tools to demonstrate the ways in which legal discourse has made nonnative commitments regarding
gender and, in particular, relationship as sex, impossible to see. This is not a simple claim that "neutrality"
has led us here; it is an investigation into the intellectual habits of neutrality.
330. See MacKinnon, supra note 299, at 57 (observing that feminism "is creating a new process of
theorizing and a new form of theory [in opposition to] male dominance['s] ... paradigm of order").

1386

The Yale Law Journal

[Vol. 106: 1331

that the only way to answer provocation's questions is by describing situations
or persons or characteristics, a normative challenge will inevitably look, by
comparison, as an effort to achieve "political" ends.
One does not have to be a feminist to see why the personification of the
defense drove the law to a position that inadvertently protected older gender
norms. R.M. Hare explained it well when he reminded us that, "standards only
remain current when those who make judgments in accordance with them are
quite sure that, whatever else they may be doing, they are evaluating (i.e.,
really seeking to guide conduct)." 331 To choose, one must believe that one
is making a choice. 332 That, however, is precisely what Wechsler and Hart
hoped to avoid, by sending cases to juries, seeking a scientific explanation of
passion, and focusing our attention on the situation of the reasonable
person. 333 Each of these strategies, and others, aimed to avoid choice by
suggesting that all the difficult questions could be resolved by "observing" the
situation or by "identifying" the defendant's personality characteristics. That
intellectual strategy depends upon a false metaphor, the idea that we "see"
answers to normative questions, 334 rather than commit to them. 335 As such,
it assumes from a start a position that is both passive and historical, that
simply imposes history upon the present. 336
The problem, however, is more than passivity. Internalizing questions
about provocation within the minds of reasonable persons assumes that the
331. R.M. HARE, THE LANGUAGE OF MORALS 147 (1972).
332. See id. at 127 ("When we commend or condemn anything, it is always in order, at least
indirectly, to guide choices, our own or other people's, now or in the future.").
333. Unfortunately, many of the drafting choices made by reformers only intensified the degree to
which the defense seemed not to be making judgments at all. Consider the MPC's rejection of the common
law's specific categories. See supra text accompanying notes 48--49. Once one commits to an intellectual
strategy of description, generality will actually worsen the law's passivity by obscuring relevant features
of the normative inquiry. This is why common law jurisdictions with their more specific categories have
an easier time addressing changing cultural norms: Although they may apply the categories mindlessly, their
specificity actually focuses them on the idea of relationship. See supra text accompanying notes 190-91
(discussing how traditional states' focus on departure stems from adultery category). Similar effects can
be seen in the MPC's choice to embrace the jury as the solution to the defense's normative problems. See
supra note 258 and accompanying text. One may well decide, it seems to me, that juries are the appropriate
place to debate normative conflict. To believe, however, that juries' decisions do away with normative
decisions elsewhere in the system can only increase normative passivity. See supra text accompanying notes
258-59 (arguing that sending case to jury does not eliminate question about which cases should go to
juries). If we believe that someone else is doing all the normative work, we will be tempted to think that
we are doing none.
334. See GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 303 (1949) (rejecting idea that theorizing is best
understood "by analogies with seeing": "the prompt, effortless and correct visual recognition of what is
familiar, expected and sunlit").
335. Norms, in my view, are commitments we make to each other. In this sense, the normative inquiry
necessarily rejects passivity and requires engagement; it does not look backward, but forward.
336. My claim that one cannot locate answers to the provocation defense within attributes of persons
is not an argument that norms do not exist or cannot be known. None of our most cherished legal
commitments (e.g., freedom, justice, security) "exist" or are "knowable" in the observational sense of the
term. Nor is it an argument that norms exist independent of fact or vice versa. One can quite readily accept
that "no identifiable normative interpretation stands neatly separable from descriptive interpretation,"
GREENAWALT, supra note 247, at 75, and still conclude that observation and normative judgment entail
identifiably different intellectual habits, see id. at 75-76.
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proper focus of the inquiry is on persons. Relationships become relevant only
to the extent that they can be described as a property of a person, a
characteristic. There is nothing illogical about such an approach, but it leads
to particular kinds of inquiries and answers. It is one thing to say, for example,
that intimate relationships are so important to self-definition that we should
deem persons who kill in intimate relationships to be less culpable. It is quite
another to say that persons with particular characteristics are likely to lose selfcontrol in these situations. The former statement invites rebuttal and argument
on the societal judgment about intimate relationships. The latter inscribes an
answer to the question the first asks-it naturalizes within the minds of
persons answers to the very questions we are struggling to answer. 337
With this understanding (which depends not a whit on feminist premises
or method), 338 it should seem less of a surprise why feminists have argued
repeatedly, and forcefully, that this defense asks questions about who the male
"is" to define "gender," i.e., relations between the sexes. Personifying the
defense means that normative questions about relationship are transformed into
questions about defendants (their minds, emotions and identity). 339 By
describing the defendant and his personality characteristics, the law
(consciously or not) provides answers to the underlying normative questions.
If the defendants involved in these cases are largely male, it follows that the
description of the defendant (who the "man" is) becomes the arbiter of the
implicit normative question (how we should "relate" to each other). This is not
a claim that the law tends to default, automatically, to the "male" position by
either osmosis or intentional bias. It is a claim that the law's technique, its
personification of the defense, leads quite naturally to the feminist argument
that the law asks questions about men to define gender. 340

337. This insight finds some resonance in the work of other scholars, albeit in different contexts and
on different topics. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARY. L. REv. 949,
953 ( 1985) (arguing that idea of reasonable man packs into itself both extensions and limitations of relevant
norms); Kelman, supra note 64, at 645-46 (arguing that character theories incorporate our judgments about
appropriate behavior into character at very start).
338. I say this not because a feminist argument cannot or should not be made. Such arguments have
been made. Here, however, I am trying to show why it is that liberals cannot see or appreciate the feminist
argument.
339. This may explain why reform's defenders could understand the potential for normative conflict
in theory but fail to see it in practice. Conflict was only perceived when the defendant's entire description
amounted to a normative proposition, when the defendant was defined by his terrorist upbringing. See
ROBINSON, supra note 25, at 619.
340. When feminists ask the descriptive question, they tend to find themselves facing similar
circumstances. Consider, for example, the debate about the adoption of "reasonable woman" standards. As
soon as courts began to adopt such standards, arguments quickly erupted within feminism over whether the
standard was too "objective" because it left out other individual characteristics or whether, by including
subgroups of women, the defense would become "oversubjectified." See Fineman, supra note 329, at
36~5 (discussing this question in context of sexual harassment law). Here, feminists are simply borrowing
the attributional logic of liberalism and having the same never-ending circular arguments about objectivity
and subjectivity, rephrased as essentialism and difference. If feminism seeks to be normative, in my view,
it must seek answers in relational understandings, not attributions.
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In the end, feminists and liberals talk past each other because feminism
seeks to contest fundamental assumptions upon which liberal theories of excuse
depend. The liberal emphasis on self-control necessarily focuses on self and
identity. Even those scholars who have sought to destabilize conventional
theories of excuse retain this focus on self. Thus, Mark Kelman assails the
time-bounded reasonable man with his artificially bounded personal
characteristics 341 and Meir Dan-Cohen offers us, instead, an intriguing
flexible self which expands and contracts to fit the situation. 342 This focus
on self, however flexible or determined, is precisely what feminists contest. As
Robin West so insightfully suggested some time ago, both liberal and critical
theory assume that connection poses a threat to individual freedom. 343 If the
measure of free will is freedom from relationship then, when emotional
relationships get the better of us, we appear naturally less culpable.
Relationship itself becomes a "natural" excuse. 344 From that perspective, it
should not be surprising to see courts opine as if an intimate relationship were
in and of itself a proper basis for a provocation claim. 345 Nor should it be
surprising that feminists and liberals talk past each other, for if liberal theories
begin from a position that ignores relationship, they begin from a position that
makes gender both irrelevant and invisible.
Familiar disputes about rape and battering reflect this deeper theoretical
impasse. The feminist position has emphasized the role of relationship in
producing consent or suggesting the victim's desert (in other words, the role
of relationship as excuse). 346 Catharine MacKinnon tells us that relationships
like marriage or dating "contraindicate rape," or battering. 347 Susan Estrich
reminds us that this is all tied to an idea of emotional entanglement that once
seemed quite "natural," pointing us to cases in which judges explained that
those who raped or battered their loved ones had let their feelings "'get out of
hand. '" 348 Relationship is an excuse in precisely the same way as in

341. See Kelman, supra note 64, at 633-37 (arguing that "broad and narrow" views of defendant
dictate outcomes in variety of criminal law cases, including provocation cases).
342. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 260.
343. See Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. I, 1-3 (1988).
344. This view governs excuses that cover women as well as men. See Coughlin, supra note 28, at
26-43 (discussing traditional ideas of moral agency in context of understanding criminal law's approach
toward moral agency of women).
345. See People v. White, 590 N.E.2d 236, 237 (N.Y. 1992) (stating "that defendant may have met
his burden with respect to the first element of the [EED] defense by evidence of a violent and tumultuous
relationship with his wife"); see also State v. Marino, 462 A.2d 1021, 1028 (Conn. 1983) (finding sufficient
evidence to convict on EED manslaughter based on "the evidence of the relationship of the defendant to
the victim, the quarrel which preceded the shooting and his distraught appearance").
346. See. e.g., SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 4 ( 1987) ("[T]he law's abhorrence of the rapist in stranger
cases ... has been matched only by its distrust of the victim who claims to have been raped by a friend
or neighbor or acquaintance."); Mahoney, supra note 4, at 61-63 (arguing against public assumption that
continued physical presence of victim after pattern of abuse constitutes partial consent).
347. MacKinnon, supra note 299, at 64.
348. ESTRICH, supra note 346, at 103 (quoting People v. Gauntlet!, 352 N.W.2d 310,313 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1984)).
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provocation cases: a portrait of victimization by emotion. Defendants swept up
by their feelings suddenly become less culpable of rape or battering in the
same way that they are less culpable of killing. In each case, the feminist claim
strikes most cunningly at the liberal premise: that relationships expressed as
emotional entanglement necessarily excuse.
Looking back now, it is possible to see why a doctrine that easily fails the
standards of a second-generation feminism 349 has remained safely intact.
Feminists' arguments about this defense have fallen on deaf ears in large part
because defenders of the EED formulation, or provocation in general, do not
have an intellectual method that will permit them to engage a claim of gender
bias. Without recognizing that there are normative commitments about
relationships being made in the practice of the defense, there is no cause to
evaluate those norms. Feminists ask: "How could the law possibly permit
batterers to claim an excuse, even a partial one, based on their own battering?"
Liberals ask: "Who is the defendant? Did he have the capacity for self-control?
What were his personality characteristics in the situation?" With these inquiries
firmly in place, the normative issue about relationship cannot be joined.
Liberals ask who we are; feminists ask how we should relate to each other. It
is no wonder that, in a world where feminists have declared victory on a
number of issues, 350 feminist challenges here have resulted in no major
changes in law or treatise or statute.

IV. TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF THE PASSION DEFENSE
My research prompts me to return to the grand old question of the
provocation defense: Why do we partially excuse some defendants who kill
even though we know that no "reasonable person" kills? My proposal seeks
to reconstruct, rather than abolish, the defense. It will not satisfy everyone; like
any other proposal, it is not immune from the vagaries of implementation and
context. It cannot, in my view, be accomplished without corresponding changes
in murder law, lest our reshaping of the provocation defense leave the criminal
law rushing toward unmerited punishment. In the end, however, I believe that

349. When I gave a version of this Article at a women's conference, one of the participants remarked
that my argument depended upon a feminist approach identified with "second-generation" feminism,
exposing a purportedly neutral law for all its nonneutrality, rather than relying on women's experience or
other "third-generation" feminist analytic techniques. This comment poses the interesting question of why
a legal standard that fails "easy" feminist arguments still exists or, even if the law has not changed, why
this Article had never been written before. One could, I suppose, simply say that gender bias keeps the law
and scholarship in place. What I have tried to show, however, is that given current assumptions about the
theory of excuse, defenders of the EED defense do not have the intellectual equipment that permits them
to see the law as biased. This says something more than that the law is nonneutral; it exposes the
intellectual techniques that keep liberals and feminists talking past each other.
350. Cf Martha Albertson Fineman, Preface to MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN & ROXANNE
MYKITIUK, THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE: THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC ABUSE at xiii
(1994) (noting successful feminist challenges in "war" to redefine role of women).
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we can better address the conflicts I posed in Part I by developing a new
theory of why we partially excuse in provocation cases, a theory that speaks
explicitly to the reasons why defendants claim that they have killed.
A. Emotions and Reasons
Advocates of abolition face an obvious question: If we abolish the defense,
what becomes of the woman who, distraught and enraged, kills her stalker, her
rapist, or her batterer?351 I suspect that many would say that these women
deserve our compassion. The most persuasive scholarly defenses of
provocation have all invoked examples, like these, in which the defendant's
emotion reflects the outrage of one responding to a grave wrong that the law
otherwise punishes. Commentators frequently use examples of men killing their
wives' rapists or children who kill abusive parents as clear cases of provoked
murder. 352 When, for example, the MPC drafters sought to justify their
expansion of the defense, they relied on a case involving forcible sodomy. 353
The problem comes when we focus on cases in which the emotion is based
on less compelling "reasons"-when women kill their departing husbands or
men kill their complaining wives. Under conventional liberal theory, if extreme
emotion is shown, these cases should be handled no differently from cases
where victims kill their rapists and stalkers and batterers. The quantity or
intensity of the emotion provides the excuse, not the reasons for the emotion.
This focus on emotion, to the exclusion of reason, reflects a very important
assumption made by liberal theories of the defense, that emotion obscures
reason. When we distinguish the rapist killer from the departing wife killer, we
acknowledge a very different view of emotion, one in which emotion is
imbued with meaning. Both the departing wife killer and the rapist killer may
be upset, but the meanings embodied in their claims for emotional
understanding are quite different. In distinguishing these cases based on the
reasons for the claimed emotion, we acknowledge a view of emotion in which
emotion is not the enemy of reason but, instead, its embodiment.
Recently, in a wise and imaginative article, Professors Dan Kahan and
Martha Nussbaum have argued that the criminal law's conventional
behavioristic assumptions obscure the degree to which emotion reflects
judgment. 354 Their view is neither idiosyncratic nor unscientific. In the past
two decades, the idea of emotion as the natural enemy of reason has been
351. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772 (Pa. 1989) (describing situation in which
woman killed her former boyfriend who had stalked and harassed her and finding on appeal that she was
entitled to assert provocation theory based on cumulative impact of earlier events). This assumes, of course,
that there is some time lag between the rape and the killing, or the stalking and the killing; otherwise, the
defendants would have perfect or imperfect self-defense claims.
352. See ROBINSON, supra note 52, § 102, at 479.
353. See MODEL PENAL CODE§ 210.3 (1985) (citing State v. Gounagias, 153 P. 9 (Wash. 1915)).
354. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 38, passim.
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seriously questioned by brain scientists 355 and psychologists, 356 by
rhetoricians 357 and philosophers, 358 by classicists359 and even by legal
scholars. 360 That both brain scientists and philosophers may now agree that
emotion reflects or assists our reasoning processes tells us something that law,
and life, already reflect. When we see that someone is angry, we do not call
Mr. Wechsler's psychiatric expert for a diagnosis, we simply ask "why?" We
expect reasons, and they are typically attributions of wrongdoing and blame.
This intuition is reflected in almost all versions of the provocation defense. No
form of the defense excuses, even partially, based on emotion alone. Even the
MPC's version of the defense, the defense most devoted to behavioral
explanation, nevertheless assumes that it is possible to have reasons for
emotions. 361
The traditional ideal of emotion as the lesser sister of reason not only
mimics an external gender hierarchy by placing reason as the "master
within," 362 it obscures the degree to which reason may need emotion. 363
355. See ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN BRAIN
at xii (1994) ("[E]motions and feelings may not be intruders in the bastion of reason at all: they may be
enmeshed in its networks, for worse and for better."); see also W. Gerrod Parrott & Jay Schulkin,
Neuropsychology and the Cognitive Nature of Emotions, 7 COGNITION & EMOTION 43, 56-57 (1993)
(arguing that emotion and sensation cannot be independent of cognition). Thanks to Ann Althouse for
introducing me to Damasio's fascinating book.
356. See, e.g., JAMES R. AVERILL, ANGER AND AGGRESSION: AN ESSAY ON EMOTION 7-13 (1982)
(arguing that emotions are social constructions); RichardS. Lazarus, Cognition and Motivation in Emotion,
46 AM. PsYCHOLOGIST 352, 352-54 (1991) (arguing for cognitivist position). A psychologist has recently
taken to the law reviews for the express purpose of showing that the provocation defense is "bad"
psychology. See Finkel, supra note 149, at 796-803. For the recognition of similar ideas in evolutionary
biology and anthropology, see Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 38, at 291-92.
357. See DOUGLAS WALTON, THE PLACE OF EMOTION IN ARGUMENT I ( 1992) ("[A]ppea)s to emotion
have a legitimate, even important, place as arguments in persuasion dialogue.").
358. See RONALD DE SOUSA, THE RATIONALITY OF EMOTION I 07-11 ( 1987); EXPLAINING EMOTIONS
(Amelie Rorty ed., 1980); GIBBARD, supra note 293, at 126-32; ROBERT C. SOLOMON, THE PASSIONS:
EMOTIONS AND THE MEANING OF LIFE at ix ( 1993). This view is accepted by philosophers working within
a variety of traditions. See, e.g., MARK JOHNSON, MORAL IMAGINATION: IMPLICATIONS OF COGNITIVE
SCIENCE FOR ETHICS 58-59, 132-33 (1993); RYLE, supra note 334, at 114-15; I CHARLES TAYLOR,
HUMAN AGENCY AND LANGUAGE: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 50 (1985); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER,
PASSION: AN ESSAY ON PERSONALITY I 01-07 (1984 ). Many thanks to David Luban for steering me toward
Solomon's and Gibbard's works.
359. See MARTHA NUSSBAUM, THE THERAPY OF DESIRE 507-10 (1994).
360. The first criminal law scholar to attack the conventional view and to recommend a more
cognitively based idea of emotion was Samuel Pillsbury, who made the argument in the context of the
death penalty. See Samuel H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal
Punishment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 655, 674-84 (1989). This challenge was asserted in a broader context
by Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 38. Both give excellent treatments of the arguments against a
behaviorist view of emotion. For that reason, I do not repeat those arguments at length here.
361. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 (1985) (requiring that there be "reasonable excuse or
explanation" for defendant's claim of emotional distress).
362. 2 TAYLOR, supra note 35, at 159 (referring to use of term by Romantic philosopher Friedrich
Schiller); see FRIEDRICH SCHILLER, ON THE AESTHETIC EDUCATION OF A MAN IN A SERIES OF LETTERS
34-45 (Reginald Snell trans., 2d ed. 1965).
363. This is a far from radical proposition, nor is it one that is necessarily inconsistent with liberal
philosophical traditions. See HANNAH ARENDT, LECTURES ON KANT'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 72 (Ronald
Seiner ed., 1982) (analyzing Kantian "judgment" in terms of communicability of feeling: "[W]hen one
judges, one judges as a member of a community," judgments that depend upon our ability to communicate
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Antonio Damasio, a neuroscientist, recently reported that patients who had lost
the capacity to experience emotion also found their ability to reason
impaired. 364 He recounted the story of a judge who, because of a brain
injury, lost the capacity to feel and resigned from the bench, saying "that his
injury totally disqualified him": "[H]e could no longer enter sympathetically
into the motives of anyone concerned." 365 As the judge's statement
acknowledges, the partnership of emotion and reason may be necessary to any
shared legal enterprise. Because it binds us to each other, emotion may be
essential to our deepest commitments; indeed, it may even be essential to
envisage the very relationships that make normativity possible. 366

B. A Proposal for a "Warranted Excuse"
Where does this understanding of emotion lead us? It helps us to see why
we might distinguish intuitively the rapist killer from the departing wife killer.
In the first case, we feel "with" the killer because she is expressing outrage in
ways that communicate an emotional judgment (about the wrongfulness of
rape) that is uncontroversially shared, indeed, that the law itself recognizes.
Such claims resonate because we cannot distinguish the defendant's sense of
emotional wrongfulness from the law's own sense of appropriate retribution.
The defendant's emotional judgments are the law's own. In this sense, the
defendant is us. 367 By contrast, the departing wife killer cannot make such
a claim. He asks us to share in the idea that leaving merits outrage, a claim
that finds no reflection in the law's mirror. In fact, the law tells us quite the
opposite: that departure, unlike rape and battery and robbery, merits protection
rather than punishment.
This understanding finally allows us to suggest an answer to the paradox
with which we continually confront our law students: How can it be that a
reasonable person kills in these circumstances and, if a reasonable person
would, why not completely exonerate him? 368 The short answer is that
"our feeling" to others) (citing IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT § 49 (Werner S. Pluhar trans.,
1937)); see id. at II 0 ("If thinking ... actualizes the difference between our identity ... then judging ...
realizes thinking, makes it manifest in a world of appearances, where I am never alone .... ).
364. In his study of patients who have lost their ability to feel because of brain surgery or accident,
Damasio found that loss of emotion was tied to these patients' inability to make decisions, to wed
themselves to common ideals, and to evaluate (i.e., place values upon) different choices. See, e.g.,
DAMASIO, supra note 355, at 46-51, 53. He concluded that, from a neurobiological position, a "[r]eduction
in emotion may constitute an equally important source of irrational behavior." !d. at 53 (entire quote
italicized in original).
365. OLIVER SACKS, AN ANTHROPOLOGIST ON MARS 287-88 (1995) (attributing example to Damasio).
366. The traditional master/slave dichotomy of reason/emotion assumes from the very start that both
reason and emotion are "within us" as atomistic individuals. To see emotion as that which binds us together
is not only to challenge the reason/emotion relationship, it is to challenge the underlying intellectual
commitment that we are alone with our emotions/reason.
367. It is in this sense that the defendant is "us," rather than in the sense that she is a "reasonable"
person or in the sense that she has exhibited "human frailty."
368. See Williams, supra note 64, at 742 (asking this question).
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"reasonable men and women" do not kill in these circumstances, but
reasonable men and women may well possess emotions that the law needs to
protect. Without protecting some emotions, the criminal law contradicts itself.
It punishes the very emotions implicit in the law's own judgments that killing
and raping and robbing are both wrong and merit retribution. At the same time,
protecting emotion does not require us to protect the deed. If we protect the
act of killing, the criminal law commits itself to a different contradiction, one
in which the State embraces or at least tolerates vigilantism.
We can now see why the provocation defense has always stood on the
fence, partially condoning, yet partially exculpating. In every provoked murder
case the law risks the embrace of revenge. To maintain its monopoly on
violence, the State must condemn, at least partially, those who take the law in
their own hands. At the same time, however, some provoked murder cases
temper our feelings of revenge with the recognition of tragedy. Some
defendants who take the law in their own hands respond with a rage shared by
the law. In such cases, we "understand" the defendant's emotions because
these are the very emotions to which the law itself appeals for the legitimacy
of its own use of violence. 369 At the same time, we continue to condemn the
act because the defendant has claimed a right to use violence that is not his
own.
The important point to see here is that the provoked killer's claim for our
compassion is not simply a claim for sympathy; it is a claim of authority and
a demand for our concurrence. The defendant who asks for our compassion,
that we feel "with him," asks that we "share the state of mind that [he]
express[es]." 370 He asks that we share his judgments of emotional blame.
Precisely because he asks us to embrace those emotional judgments, he asks
us to embrace him as legislator, as one who rightly sets the emotional terms
of blame and wrongdoing vis-a-vis his victim. When a defendant responds with
outrage to wrongs the society otherwise punishes, he asks us to believe that he
has legislated nothing. However, when a defendant responds with outrage to
conduct society protects, he seeks to supplant the State's normative judgment,
to impose his individual vision of blame and wrongdoing not only on the
victim, but also on the rest of us.
As should be obvious by now, my theory of the defense is based as much
on equality as it is on autonomy. All defendants who kill, with good reason or
no reason at all, assert superiority over their victims, the superiority that comes
from using the victim as a means rather than an end. 371 But in provoked
369. This is a coherence argument and, like all coherence arguments, it provides a necessary, rather
than a sufficient, condition of justice. I recognize that there may be cases that raise "hard" issues. I believe,
however, that many of the most common provocation claims, particularly the claims I have emphasized in
this Article, raise simple, rather than difficult, issues because they raise obvious issues of coherence.
370. See GIBBARD, supra note 293, at 172.
371. See Jean Hampton, Punishment as Defeat, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 124-28, 130 (Jeffrie G.
Murphy & Jean Hampton eds., 1988) ("By victimizing me, the wrongdoer has declared himself elevated
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murder cases we also risk allowing the defendant to assert an emotional and
normative superiority. The danger is not only that the defendant will "use" the
victim but also that he will rationalize the "use" of the victim by claiming that
we share in his distribution of emotional blame. When we are sure that the
victim would not have shared the killer's emotional judgments (where she left
because she was beaten) or when we know that the victim would not have
expected punishment for the acts triggering the defendant's outrage (bad
cooking, complaints, and messy houses), we see that the defendant's claim for
compassion is false. It is a claim that we share in a set of emotional judgments
vis-a-vis the victim that are not shared. To embrace such claims is to permit
the defendant to sit on a higher normative plane.
1.

Merging Liberal and Traditional Theories

The proposal I am suggesting turns on the idea of "warranted excuse." To
see how this brings the best of liberal and traditional positions together, it is
important to address the obvious objections as well as the differences between
my proposal and those recently advanced by other scholars, such as Professors
Nussbaum and Kahan.
Conventional understandings of criminal law place defenses in two
mutually exclusive categories: as excuse or justification. In the excuse category
are defenses, such as insanity, that focus on state of mind; these defenses do
not embody judgments that what the defendant did was "right" or "justified,"
but that the defendant was less blameworthy. In the "justification" category are
defenses, such as self-defense or necessity, which assume that what the
defendant has done, overall, was "right" or "warranted." 372 Traditionally,
"excuse" and "justification" have been viewed as mutually exclusive
categories: A defendant cannot be both excused and justified because an
excused action presupposes that the action was wrong and therefore
unjustified. 373 This assumes, however, a crucial feature of the inquiry-that
we are evaluating acts and acts alone. To say that an act cannot be both
justified and excused is to say something about acts, not emotions. It is
perfectly consistent to say that one's emotions are justified or warranted even
when one's acts are not. Indeed, as I have noted above, we may easily say that
passionate killings are not justified even if we believe that the emotions
causing some killings are, in some sense, the "right" emotion.
It is by focusing on the emotion, rather than the act, that my proposal
distinguishes itself quite easily (both in theory and practice) from the
with respect to me, acting as a superior who is permitted to use me for his purposes.").
372. See Greenawalt, supra note 312, at 1903-11 (discussing different cases of warranted and
unwarranted behavior as justified or excused).
373. See Dressler, Provocation, supra note 24, at 437 ("[E]xcuses only exist in circumstances where
the conduct is unjustified.").
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traditional model of provocation as partial justification. My proposal does not
depend upon the theory that the victim deserves to be punished. 374 Instead,
I propose that the law should see the defendant's state of mind (his emotion)
as something that, in some cases, it should protect. Unlike a partial justification
model, my approach allows the defense to retain many features associated with
excuse. The law need not impose an "objective" standard. It may continue to
focus on the defendant's perception of the triggering act, rather than its quality
in the abstract-something that the partial justification model rejects. 375 Thus,
a defendant who believes she is being stalked, even if she is not, could
properly claim her emotion was warranted, based on her perception of the
situation. The law may also keep a liberal regard for the defendant's
characteristics when they are relevant to the underlying defense 376-again,
something irrelevant to the partial justification model. Thus, a defendant who
claims that she killed when enraged by a hate crime obviously raises an issue
to which racial, gender, or other characteristics may be relevant, if not crucial.
Finally, the law may provide for cases in which emotion builds over time-a
position that traditional models typically reject. 377 A defendant who claims
that he was sodomized and later outraged by taunts 378 will be allowed to
pursue the defense, 379 as would a battered woman who claimed that her
outrage and fear developed over time. 380
What the law cannot keep, however, is its present normative incoherence.
Claims of emotion (however deferential we are to the defendant's time frame,
personal characteristics, or perception of the victim's conduct) must reflect
374. The focus of the defense, in my view, remains on the defendant's particular emotional response,
not the provoking act itself. I reject the position, adopted by a theory based on partial justification, that the
defendant's culpability is reduced by the victim's "bad" act. I also reject the idea that victims have
"forfeited" their right to insist on life because of their bad acts. See id. at 450-59 (discussing comparative
moral wrongdoing and forfeiture theories supporting partial justification theory of provocation defense).
Moreover, as I indicate below, see infra text accompanying notes 375-80, I hold to none of the usual
practical implications of a justification or partial justification theory, theories which reject the defendant's
perception of the act, the defense's applicability in cases where third parties are killed, and the relevance
of the defendant's personal characteristics. See Dressler, Reflections, supra note 24, at 745-49 (discussing
doctrinal implications of excuse and justification theories of provocation).
375. See, e.g., Dressler, Provocation, supra note 24, at 440 (discussing how partial justification theory
judges triggering act without regard to defendant's emotional reaction).
376. See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 25, § 4.2.1, at 249-50 (arguing that defense should defer to wide
set of defendant's characteristics); see infra text accompanying notes 404-07 (discussing Bedder case and
arguing that impotence may be relevant to one normative reconstruction of issues in case).
377. See KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 55, at 414-15,419-25 (discussing common law doctrine
of cooling time).
378. See State v. Gounagias, 153 P. 9 (Wash. 1915) (holding that defendant who was sodomized,
taunted for two weeks, and finally killed assaulter did not qualify for heat of passion defense because of
adequate cooling time).
379. It is no surprise that the MPC defense adopted the cumulative provocation rule in the context of
a case that fits our strongest intuitions about emotional judgments, in a case where the defendant was
forcibly sodomized. See supra text accompanying note 353. Professor Finkel's recent research suggests that,
despite all the controversy, "cooling time" may have little to do with juries' perceptions of the
appropriateness of a manslaughter verdict when the triggering event is a serious wrong such as a rape. See
Finkel, supra note 149, at 784.
380. See Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772, 780 (Pa. 1989).
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relational, rather than idiosyncratic, norms. When a defendant asks for our
compassion, he asks us to allow him to legislate vis-a-vis his victim, to claim
that we should share his emotional assessment of wrongdoing and blame. We
may be deferential to the defendant's predicament without assuming that the
defendant's judgment would be shared by the victim or by the rest of us. To
merit the reduction of verdict typically associated with manslaughter, the
defendant's claim to our compassion must put him in a position of normative
equality vis-a-vis his victim. A strong measure of that equality can be found
by asking whether the emotion reflects a wrong that the law would
independently punish. 381 This is not because the law makes his emotion
"right," or "proportional," but because the "law" reflects an ex ante,
disinterested determination of the normative equities implicit in the defendant's
claim for compassion. In this sense, the law represents a kind of "original
position" from which we may ask whether the defendant's emotion reflects
normative superiority vis-a-vis the victim.
If accepted, this theory should bar many, if not most, provocation claims
in intimate homicide cases. It would not be enough for a defendant to claim
that a divorce or a protective order or moving out caused her rage. Defendants
who ask us for compassion in these cases can point to neither law nor social
norm that would punish leaving. My proposal would also bar the defense in
cases in which the defendant claimed rage inspired by infidelity. Society is no
longer willing to punish adultery. 382 In the absence of such a willingness, the
adulterer killer has no claim that his emotions were no different from the
emotions to which the law itself appeals to rationalize punishment. This does
not mean that infidelity is not emotionally painful. It does mean that those who
urge compassion based on infidelity can point to nothing in the law itself that
would demand that we have compassion for their violent outrage. The law only
suffers contradiction when it refuses to embrace a sense of outrage which is
necessary to the law's rationalization of its own use of violence. 383 When the
381. My proposal does not adopt the view that the unlawfulness of the provoking behavior is a
sufficient test of warranted outrage. A defendant who claims that he was outraged by a traffic violation
should not reach a jury because no rational trier of fact could find that the traffic violation provoked the
kind of outrage proportional to the use of deadly violence. Moreover, even in cases where the claim of
outrage is based on conduct that appears lawful, the defendant's provocation claim may reflect warranted
emotion under a different normative reconstruction of the provoking behavior. See infra note 386
(discussing case in which Holocaust survivor killed marcher who was protected by First Amendment).
Lawfulness is a guide to those kinds of outrage the law must protect. It is not a doctrinal standard. Nor
should it be applied without regard to the ultimate purpose of the inquiry-to determine whether the
defendant is asking us to accept a claim that permits him to legislate emotional blame vis-a-vis his victim.
382. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 63, 345-47 (reporting that fornication is generally no longer
criminalized and adultery no longer punished); RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 260-61, 309 ( 1992)
(discussing rarely enforced laws against adultery and consensual sodomy); see also Note, Constitutional
Barriers to Civil and Criminal Restrictions on Pre- and Extramarital Sex, 104 HARY. L. REv. 1660,
1670-72, 1672 n.89 (1991) (arguing that criminal laws against adultery are unconstitutional and, in practice,
selectively enforced).
383. It is not enough that the claimed outrage reflects widely shared social norms. Most people, I
believe, see sexual infidelity as a grave wrong, but would not support a referendum to put adulterers in jail.
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law refuses to jail adulterers, the contradiction operates the other way: We are
compelled to ask why it is that private parties may enforce a sense of outrage
that society has refused itself. 384
This approach isolates two sets of cases representing the ends of a
continuum. In one set of cases, the defendant's outrage is based on acts that
the law would uncontroversially punish. I have argued that in cases based
solely on such acts, the defendant's claim of outrage may be warranted. On the
other end of the continuum are cases in which the defendant's outrage is based
on acts that are uncontroversially protected by law, such as departure. In such
cases, I have argued that the defendant's claim of outrage cannot be warranted.
In neither case is lawfulness alone a necessary or a sufficient measure of
outrage; 385 courts and juries may also have to consider whether the defendant
created the conditions of her own defense or whether the outrage was sincere,
spontaneous, or proportionate to the crime. Obviously, there will be claims that
will lie between these extremes, cases that cannot be confidently placed within
one camp or another. 386 That, however, should stand as no enemy to a theory
that easily resolves at least some of the most common provocation dilemmas.
Indeed, one of the great advantages of this approach is that it rejects both
traditional and liberal views of the defense at the same time that it seeks to
unify them. Until now, neither traditional nor liberal theories have been able
to explain why we need both emotion and judgment to explain this defense.
If, as partial justification theories would have it, the defendant is seen as less
culpable because the victim has done something "wrong," then why do we
need emotion at all ?387 On the other hand, if our theories of partial excuse
are correct, and the defendant is less culpable because of affect alone, why do

Nor is it enough that the parties may have agreed to remain faithful, ex ante, when they were married.
Marriage partners agree to remain faithful but do not agree that breaches may be punished by violence. My
argument that coherence compels the criminal law to protect the emotions to which the State itself appeals
to justify its use of violence depends upon the potential use of violence, not unlawfulness in name only,
nor in the violation of widely held social norms.
384. A similar analysis follows in cases in which defendant's claimed outrage is based on consensual
homosexual conduct or a nonviolent homosexual advance. In states where the law protects the privacy of
such conduct, such cases are no different from departure claims and should not reach a jury. In states where
the conduct is criminalized but remains unenforced, the analysis follows the same track as the adultery
example and, again, should not reach a jury.
385. Outrage inspired by nominally unlawful acts, such as adultery, should not reach a jury. Similarly,
outrage inspired by what might be lawful acts, see infra note 386, is not necessarily exempt from treatment
as warranted outrage. For further explanation, see supra note 381.
386. Some cases may involve a conflict between norms. Imagine a Holocaust survivor who, outraged
by a Nazi march, kills one of the marchers in a fit of rage. This case can be reconstructed in two ways.
The defendant will argue that his emotion was warranted and proportional to the monstrosity of Nazi war
crimes, an emotion triggered by the march. The prosecution will argue that the defendant's emotion was
disproportionate and unwarranted as a punishment of behavior protected by the First Amendment. Putting
the conflict this way does not make the case easy but seems a definite improvement over the question
whether the defendant's survivor status counts as a relevant "characteristic" in this "situation."
387. See, e.g., Dressler, Provocation, supra note 24, at 479 (noting that under justification theory
"there would not seem to be any reason why the provoked killing must occur during a moment of
passion").
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we need to judge his emotions or his acts? 388 Of course, if we take these
positions to their extreme-if the defense is conceived as all justification or all
excuse-then we commit ourselves to some rather unsavory positions, to
sanctioning deliberate acts of revenge or murderous responses to petty
emotional slights. By focusing on the reasons for emotion, we bring together
what excuse and justification seem to push apart, offering a theory of the
defense that requires both spontaneous emotion yet also seeks to evaluate that
emotion.
This position not only tends to bring together liberal and conservative
models of the defense, it explains the defense as excuse without dissolving into
false behaviorism. Those who have understood the defense as a partial excuse
have found that their theory, if taken seriously, leads to acquittal rather than
mitigation. 389 Those who have argued for a more traditional approach based
on partial justification have found themselves in the equally uncomfortable
position of arguing that there is something partially "right" about killing or that
some people "deserve" to die. Seeing the defense as one of "warranted
emotion," we need not ascribe either to the idea that the defendant must be
acquitted or that the act was somehow warranted. The defense remains an
excuse because it depends upon the particular defendant's state of mind (his
emotional reactions, rather than his act), but it is an excuse bounded by
relational meanings.
To adopt this theory, of course, requires us to reject the idea upon which
almost all contemporary theories of the defense are predicated: that we
partially excuse because the defendant lacks a full or fair capacity for selfcontrol. Let me be clear about what we reject here: We do not reject selfcontrol to embrace judgment; we reject a disguised judgment for one that is
acknowledged. 390 No matter how much we try to tie the defense to behavior,
no matter how insistent the rhetoric of subjectivity, decisions applying this
defense express judgments about when defendants "should" exercise selfcontrol. The law can continue to deny this if it chooses, to bury it within the

388. See. e.g., Maher v. People, I 0 Mich. 212, 220 (1862) (noting that if all it takes is emotion, then
"by habitual and long continued indulgence of evil passions, a bad man might acquire a claim to mitigation
which would not be available to better men").
389. See Dressler, Provocation, supra note 24, at 465-66 (arguing for full exculpation in cases where
actor is incapable of controlling his conduct).
390. Our belief that persons who lack self-control deserve less punishment purports to depend upon
an analogy with physical coercion: The emotion is seen as the "gun to the head" of the defendant. The
problem with this analogy is that there is no intellectually defensible stopping point: If true, we should be
excusing almost all defendants (because almost all defendants kill in a state of high emotion), and the
provocation defense should not be a mitigating factor but a full defense. When we mitigate rather than
acquit, we acknowledge that this metaphor cannot be quite true. For one thing, the supposed coercion is
not a gun; for another, the connection between the coercing force and the act does not lie in the hands of
another person. Most importantly, however, we mitigate rather than acquit because we do not believe that
emotions are like guns. We believe that we can reason ourselves out of emotion, indeed that emotion often
embodies a kind of archaic reasoning that, once brought to light, often changes the emotion itself. See
JONATHAN LEAR, LOVE AND ITS PLACE IN NATURE 29-68 ( 1990).
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qualities of a reasonable person, but it pays a heavy price-one not only of
incoherence, but of intellectual passivity and circularity. To say that we
partially excuse provoked murderers to increase men's freedom but that their
freedom is a condition of granting the excuse is to indulge in tautology. 391
In this circularity resides a space in which we find ourselves committed to
beliefs about men and women and their relationships that the law itself long
ago abandoned.
2.

Beyond the Relevance of Character or Characteristics

As I indicated above, Professors Dan Kahan and Martha Nussbaum have
recently proposed that judges should "judge" emotion as a reflection of the
defendant's character and screen cases from juries where the emotion is
"inappropriate." 392 I agree with much of the Nussbaum and Kahan thesis
about the criminal law's ambivalence toward emotion. 393 Ultimately,
however, I believe the move to judgment is necessary, but not sufficient, to
redress the dangers they identify.
First, it is not at all clear whether it would be enough to simply tell judges
to evaluate emotional claims. Remember the lesson of New Hampshire: Even
where courts have exercised a more active role in "judging" the reasons for the
claimed emotion, and have imposed on themselves rules that bar provocation
claims predicated on "lawful" acts, those rules have been promptly ignored in
intimate homicide cases. 394 If courts are unable to see that departure or
divorce are lawful, how are they going to be able to "screen out claims that
rest on manifestly inappropriate emotional valuations"? 395 Kahan and
Nussbaum recognize that evaluation alone "cannot assure justice," 396 but
argue that we would see the judgments as "inappropriate" 397 if they were
391. Saying that someone lacks self-control, like saying that his acts are involuntary, purports to be
a statement about behavioral events. However, it is typically a statement that already incorporates a
judgment about responsibility. Typically, when we say that someone acted without self-control, we have
already decided that he or she is not blameworthy. Of course, blameworthiness is the ultimate question that
we are trying to answer. See RYLE, supra note 334, at 69-74 (arguing that many statements of
voluntariness are in fact judgments of responsibility rather than statements about mental fact).
392. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 38, at 365.
393. Indeed, Professor Nussbaum's book The Therapy of Desire, NUSSBAUM, supra note 359, had an
enormous impact upon my thinking about the defense.
394. See supra text accompanying notes 301-05.
395. Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 38, at 365. These authors also argue for a greater legislative role,
see id. at 364, without acknowledging the dangers of a heated rush to legislative punishment. I say this as
one who detests vapid and uninformed criticism of legislatures and politics in general. However, having
spent three years of my life on the floor of the Senate watching crime legislation come to life, I am aware
of the political winds that will blow in these circumstances.
396. /d. at 374.
397. /d. at 362-65 (arguing that "evaluative view forces decisionmakers to accept responsibility for
their moral assessments and to give reasons for them in a public way" and that "acknowledging the
evaluative underpinnings of the law fully exposes decisionmakers' assessments to the public"); id. at 364
("We have suggested that evaluative doctrines have the potential to counteract the problem of bad morality
by exposing the resolution of contentious issues to plain view.").
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fully exposed. The only problem is that these judgments are fully exposed and
have been for some time. It is the law in almost every state of the union today,
noncontroversially and unambiguously, that infidelity produces rationally
murderous rages. 398 That we scholars now judge differently does not tell us
anything about why that must be so. Nor, without further explanation, is it
likely to change.
Second, it is also unclear to me whether Kahan and Nussbaum's focus on
character will help or hinder judges in their efforts to evaluate defendants'
claims of emotion. Putting aside for the moment difficulties with character
theories in general, 399 I am concerned that any proposal grounded in
character will collapse the evaluative inquiry back into a question of the
defendant's identity. As I have argued in Part III, at least some of the
difficulties of current approaches stem from the personification of the defense:
liberal theories' tendency to naturalize evaluative positions within the minds
of persons. If the evaluative project becomes hostage to a focus on character,
we may end up where we began-describing the defendants. Whether that
description is termed one of character or characteristics, our method may
undercut our evaluative purpose. I believe that we can only emerge from that
tendency, if we acknowledge that, defendants' claims of emotion ask us to
accept meanings about relationships as much as to define personality or
character.
Ultimately, Kahan and Nussbaum's emphasis on judgment, albeit
brilliantly defended, leaves us a crucial question: How are we to know the
"inappropriate" from the "appropriate" emotions?400 Even if today we believe
that it is wrong to see jealousy as a "rational" emotion, why are the present
judgments of Kahan and Nussbaum (or myself) any better than H.L.A. Hart's
judgment that killing in such circumstances is simply "human nature"t 01
Asking judges to take an active role in "judging" emotion may be necessary
to reform the provocation defense, but it is not sufficient without a theory
about which emotional judgments should count. Judges must not only be asked
398. See LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 14, § 7.10, at 656 ("It is the law practically everywhere that
a husband who discovers his wife in the act of committing adultery is reasonably provoked, so that when,
in his passion, he intentionally kills either his wife or her lover (or both), his crime is voluntary
manslaughter rather than murder."). As Kahan and Nussbaum note, the public has recently shown "outrage"
for some cases of wife-killing where the sentence meted out was quite low. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra
note 38, at 346-47. We have had outrage about such sentences in the past, however, and it has not led to
any grand movements of reform either from the judiciary, within legislatures, or from the criminal law
academy. See. e.g., Lynn H. Schafran, There's No Accounting for Judges, 58 ALB. L. REv. 1063, 1065-66
(1995) (arguing that "little has changed since 1984, when the Colorado judiciary came under siege after
a local judge gave a minimal sentence, to be served on weekends, to a man who killed his wife when she
tried to flee their abusive marriage").
399. For more on the debate between character and choice theories, see R.A. Duff, Choice, Character,
and Criminal Liability, 12 LAW & PHIL. 345 (1993), which argues that the debate rests on a false
dichotomy.
400. Kahan and Nussbaum recognize this problem when they consider whether their proposal might
enforce "bad morality." See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 38, at 362.
401. HART, supra note 33, at 33.
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to "judge" but must be told "how" to judge claims of emotion. Indeed, to ask
judges to "judge" without giving them a "theory" of judgment not only may
be ineffective, it may be counterproductive if the judgments remain grounded
in outmoded norms.
I have argued that the "how" question can best be answered by finding
ways to put the victim and the defendant on an equal normative (or legislative)
plane vis-a-vis their emotional judgments. Judges must not only evaluate, they
must be convinced that a law that, in effect, embraces divorce and moving out
as emotional "wrongs" cannot coexist in a world in which the law permits
women to divorce and separate. To make such judgments requires a
comparison of the defendant's asserted reasons for his emotions against the
reasons that both victim and defendant would share, ex ante. In many cases,
this comparison will simply place the defendant's claims to personal retribution
in the mirror of what the law itself assumes as a proper basis for publicly
sanctioned violence. 402 This approach offers no easy answers in hard
cases. 403 It does, however, provide for coherence, a minimal condition of
justice, in many of the most common provocation cases. In the end, my
recommendation is as much that judges seek to find the claims of reason in
emotion as it is a call for them, using existing law, to shape the jury's inquiry
by excluding reasons that are obviously improper bases for a manslaughter
verdict.
Consider, in this light, a case in which departure is combined with
elements of something that might give rise to a claim of grievous wrong: a
physical fight prompted by revelations of infidelity and an announced intention
to depart, for example. In such circumstances, the case should go to a jury to
determine whether the fight amounts to a wrong sufficient to breed outrage. At
the same time, however, the jury should be instructed that it cannot return a
verdict based on departure alone nor infidelity alone and that these factors are
irrelevant to the defendant's claim of"rational" emotion. Deciding the question
whether the defendant's emotional response was proportionate to the fight may
be a difficult one; it may be made more difficult by the presence of other
factors. But, surely, that question is easier to answer, and is more consistent
402. My reference to retribution here should not be taken to mean that I am in any way advocating
a pure retributive theory of punishment. I believe that my argument is consistent with various theories of
punishment, including both retributive and utilitarian theories. Indeed, Professors Kahan and Nussbaum
have laid this out quite clearly in their article. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 38, at 350-58. Perhaps
more than theirs, however, my proposal's emphasis on an equal normative plane has obvious resonance
with theories of punishment that include some recognition of the expressive and restorative aspects of
punishment.
403. One can easily imagine a case, for example, in which coherence alone would not be enough.
Imagine a different time and place in which the law punishes those who are members of particular political
organizations. A defendant kills, provoked by the knowledge that his victim was a member of the outlawed
organization and, hence, traitorous. If the State is willing to punish those who are members of the
organization, then the defendant's claim poses no danger of incoherence. Not only is proportionality a clear
limit on this exercise, comparing the defendant's reasons to legal sanctions is a guide; it is not sufficient
alone. See supra note 381.
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with a coherent theory of the defense, than are questions about norms wrapped
up in the guise of questions about the defendant's character or characteristics.
We can see this quite clearly by considering how the famous Bedder404
case would fare under my proposal. In Bedder, the defendant, an eighteenyear-old who knew he was impotent, went to a prostitute. When he failed to
perform, the prostitute jeered at him and tried to leave; the defendant held on
to her as she hit and kicked him, then stabbed her to death. 405 Traditionally,
scholars have had great sympathy for the youthful defendant but have had
trouble defending the proposition that impotence is a characteristic of a
reasonable person. 406 Meanwhile, feminists have seen this sympathy as
another example of the law bowing to male concerns about virility. 407 Based
on my theory of the defense, the Bedder jury should have been instructed that
it could not return a manslaughter verdict because the defendant's virility was
a matter of particular sensitivity to him. 408 There is a possible claim for
compassion in Bedder, but it is not one that can be seen by focusing on
impotence as an attribute, a characteristic, or a reflection of character. That
claim lies in an unstated analogy between Bedder and those who are victimized
for their attributes; that is, because of their handicap, race, or sex. Society has,
for some time, recognized that violence motivated by hatred of immutable
characteristics is a grievous wrong that should inspire outrage, an outrage
reflected in hate crime laws. I believe that sympathy for Bedder comes from
this unstated analogy: The argument is that the prostitute attacked Bedder
precisely because he failed to meet stereotypical sexual performance standards
for adult males. As a juror, I would not accept this. 409 Indeed, it seems far
more likely that the "biased judgment" here was one Bedder himself
perpetrated by blaming the victim for his own handicap. 410 Nevertheless,
404. Bedder v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, 2 All E.R. 801 (H.L. 1954).
405. See id. at 802-03. For an American case involving similar facts in which the appellate court
ordered a new trial for failure to instruct on EED, see People v. Moye, 489 N.E.2d 736, 738 (N.Y. 1985),
which states that the defendant was jeered at by a woman for his impotence and told, "go on little boy. I
don't need you."
406. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 260, at 993-95 (noting traditional difficulties with case).
407. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 63, at 1689-92 (arguing that passion has been understood from
reasonable "male" standard, often reflecting male understandings of sexuality).
408. The jury should also have been instructed that it could consider whether Bedder intentionally
created the conditions of his own defense either by refusing to allow the victim to leave (her "striking" him
in this scenario is an act of self-defense) or by soliciting the prostitute knowing he was impotent.
409. Others appear to agree with this intuition. In Professor Finkel's study of mock jurors, a fact
pattern similar to that in Bedder produced "significantly more" second degree murder verdicts than did a
fact pattern based on the decision in State v. Gounagias, 153 P. 9 (Wash. 1915). See Finkel, supra note
149, at 783. Professor Finkel stressed the triggering event: "[T]he sodomy makes a difference: when there
is no sodomy but only a taunt [as in Bedder], the voluntary manslaughter verdicts are the lowest." ld. at
784.
410. Professor Finkel's study again supports this intuition: He found that sentences "are higher in the
impotence than in the no impotence condition," because jurors believed Bedder "chose to put himself in
a situation where failure and provocation were all but inevitable." !d. at 785; see also id. at 789 (elaborating
on this point). Moreover, when Professor Finkel posited that the victim "feared" the provoker (as in the
case of a bias-motivated attack), the jurors returned lower sentences than when the Bedder-figure exhibited

1997]

Passion's Progress

1403

posing the issue to the jury in this way does not require us to ask whether
impotence is a characteristic of a reasonable person, 411 nor does it ignore the
potential for biased generalizations (of men or women). 412 It exposes the
judgments so that a choice may be made.
B. The Twin Shadows of Bias and Fear
Two shadows must be addressed if we are to speak of "real-world"
solutions. One we have already seen; it is the capacity of older norms
governing relationships to transform themselves into less controversial guises.
The other is no less real; it is the tendency of "quick fix" legislative solutions
to embrace any proposal that will increase punishment, no matter how this
might dislocate the relationships among murder verdicts and resulting
sentences.
Given these shadows, abolition poses serious risks. It offers a very neat
solution but one likely to invite a heated legislative rush to punishment.
Indeed, in the name of eradicating bias, it may simply reinvent it. There is no
guarantee, for example, that abolition will not rid us of one hierarchy only to
create another. It is easy to imagine a world in which departure or infidelity
takes on a new life at the sentencing stage, during plea bargains, or even
within the context of other defenses. If courts have managed to tolerate the
kinds of conflicts we have seen thus far, there is no reason to believe that they
will not simply transfer these conflicts into new and less controversial guises.
Indeed, if there is anything this Article has tried to show, it is that the "veil of
relationship" is extraordinarily resistant to change and will reassert itself unless
consciously exposed.
Real "reform" of the passion defense must not only reconstruct the
defense, but also address the position of manslaughter within a particular
jurisdiction's law of murder. It is not enough to redraft the passion defense;
such an effort might cause major distortions in murder law. 413 Many years
"anger." /d. at 784; see also id. at 789 ("[A] one word change from 'anger' to 'fear' produced a significant
reduction in the sentences handed out.").
4 I I. Professor Finkel's study suggests that the question of impotence makes no difference in jurors'
determinations. See id. at 784 (finding that jurors' mock verdicts in Bedder case do not change when
defendant's impotence is included or excluded from fact scenario).
4 I 2. This explains why some cases involving verbal insults should reach juries. For example, the
defendant who kills because of racial epithets may well be evincing the kind of emotion that the community
believes responds to a "grave wrong," a wrong that the Jaw itself recognizes and punishes in "civil rights"
or "hate crimes" statutes. Of course, if the insults themselves are accompanied by an implicit threat of
injury, an emotional response to the implicit threat would be an independent reason to send the case to the
jury. See, e.g., State v. Ott, 686 P.2d 1001, 1013 (Or. 1984) (citing hypothetical of racial slurs against
Asian defendant interned in relocation camp). This obviously leaves some difficult decisions (e.g., whether
the insult was sufficiently evocative of sincere emotion or whether the response was disproportionate to
the verbal assault), but it places these cases on firmer normative ground than does current law.
4 I 3. This is particularly true in jurisdictions in which the "defense" mitigates from first to second
degree murder, rather than manslaughter. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 939.44(2), 940.01(2)(a) (West
1996).
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ago, the provocation defense amounted to a unified concept, both negating a
finding of malice murder and, at the same time, yielding a manslaughter
verdict. The idea, at the time, was that the defendant who killed with malice
had a "bad" character, while the one who killed in spontaneous rage evidenced
a momentary lapse of an otherwise sound constitution. Modern developments
have done much to change this picture. Today, we have dropped the idea of
malice in favor of a mentalist approach: Purpose or premeditation now
substitute for malice. Perhaps more importantly, emotion no longer negates a
finding of the deliberation typically associated with first degree murder. The
Model Penal Code, for example, assumes that one who acts with passion has
the intent to kill. 414
In theory, this development was intended to grant more power to emotion
to excuse. The hope was that juries would find even greater reasons in emotion
for sympathy and return many more manslaughter verdicts. 415 In fact,
criminal defense lawyers will tell you that this strategy was, on the whole, a
failure. To the extent juries did return such verdicts, legislatures promptly
increased the penalties, transforming the effect of a manslaughter verdict into
second degree murder. At the same time, where juries were hesitant to return
manslaughter verdicts, they often found themselves committed to a first degree
murder conviction because "purpose" or "intent" could be created in the blink
of an eye. 416
When the law rejected the older malice formulation in favor of something
more "psychological" in nature, it repeated the very same intellectual moves
we have seen in the context of the provocation defense. In the name of ridding
the law of the normative concept of "malice," it embraced an attributional
logic. This simply shifted the normative judgments into a different rhetorical
formulation, into questions about mental events. The underlying question was
still the same: Do the defendant's acts clearly demonstrate that he has placed
himself outside the human community? The method for answering those
questions, however, now turned on whether one could form an "intent" in the
blink of an eye or whether sixty stab wounds necessarily entailed
premeditation. 417
Juries should be free to find that sincere claims of emotion are relevant to
the question of second, rather than first, degree murder even if those emotions
reflect poor judgments. This is not because the emotions are reasonable under
the circumstances, not because the law needs to protect these emotions. It is

414. See supra note 267.
415. See Tentative Draft, supra note 49, at 46.
416. See Commonwealth v. Carroll, 194 A.2d 911, 916 (Pa. 1963) (expressing agreement with
proposition that '"[t]he law fixes no length of time as necessary to form the intent to kill, but leaves the
existence of a fully formed intent as a fact to be determined by the jury"') (citation omitted).
417. See. e.g., People v. Anderson, 447 P.2d 942, 945, 953 (Cal. 1968) (finding of premeditation
unsustainable even though victim sustained over 60 wounds).
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because sincere, spontaneous emotion may be probative on the question of
whether the defendant has deliberately chosen a course of action that places
him outside the human community. This position recognizes that emotions
often reflect poor judgments uncharacteristic of the individual and clouded by
the needs of the moment. When sincere emotion becomes relevant to the
question of second, rather than first, degree murder, we do not condone, but
tolerate the emotion. We acknowledge that there is a middle ground between
emotions society cannot tolerate and those it must embrace. Such tolerance
does not mean that we call the homicide by any other name than murder; it
does not "understand" the defendant's emotions in ways that a provoked
manslaughter verdict does. Sincerity and tolerance is the measure of such an
emotion, not rationality or reasonableness in the situation.
Critics may argue that this approach will simply recreate the hierarchy of
offenses that we have already seen: Men who kill women who leave will claim
sincere emotion that, if believed, will create a second class of homicide cases
wrapped up in second degree rather than first degree murder. The dangers of
recreating this kind of hierarchy are obvious and should concern us enough to
realize that they are as likely here as in other guises. 418 I have no illusion
that the same stories of betrayal and departure will not find new doctrinal
homes. There is no way to restrict this kind of reasoning other than to expose
it with a conscious attempt to measure the defendant's story against the "voice
of ... conscience"419 embodied in the law's commitments. All one can do
is make it clear to juries, in this and other contexts, that they cannot find the
defendant guilty of a lesser crime (whether that crime is second degree murder,
passion manslaughter, or reckless homicide) simply because of the decedent's
departure or moving out or dancing; that they cannot do this lest they
contradict the law's own commitments to such freedoms for all. There is no
assurance of justice here, only hopes that we may, at least, see some
partialities in law's own mirror.
Current law, in the name of sympathy, asks defendants to play a terrible
seesaw game in which they either "win big" with a manslaughter result or,
more likely, are forced to "roll the dice" on a first degree murder verdict. In
this sense, I do not believe that behaviorism has been a particular friend of
defendants, no matter how sympathetic to the circumstances it has appeared to
be. When the law conceives of emotion as either "intent" (no questions asked)
or "no intent" (no questions asked), it permits juries to reach unsavory results
on both ends of the spectrum-to return manslaughter verdicts for killings of
revenge and, at the same time, to return first degree murder verdicts in cases
of spontaneous but poor judgment. In the end, this will change only if we
418. See, e.g., Elizabeth Rapaport, Capital Murder and the Domestic Discount: A Study of Capital
Domestic Murder in the Post-Furman Era, 49 SMU L. REv. 1507, 1508 (1996) (arguing that courts apply
domestic discount in death penalty cases).
419. Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 38, at 374.
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understand that judgments do not describe us, along with our qualities, but
commit us to each other. Only then will we be able to create a law of murder
that neither punishes tragedy nor embraces revenge.
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APPENDIX A: METHODOLOGY

I. Scope of Sample

The MPC data set includes EED claims reported420 in all421 appellate or trial opinions published
during 1980 to 1995, in which defendant alleged that a person with whom he was intimate provoked the
killing or attempted killing. 422 The data set for "traditional" and "mixed" jurisdictions was limited to
all such provocation claims reported in appellate or trial opinions during the same time period within
selected jurisdictions. 423 The total number of claims included in the final MPC, mixed, and traditional
data sets was 267 .< 24
II. Search Methodology

For the initial search, I employed standard computerized databases (LEXIS and Westlaw) to obtain
a broad set of homicide cases (over 1000) that my research assistants and I would later cull individually.
The computer search sought to uncover any homicide or attempted homicide case in which the defendant
claimed EED or provocation at trial. In MPC jurisdictions, the search request was constructed to reflect
the defense's reference to "extreme emotional distress or disturbance." Because these are terms of art,
a different search request was used in "traditional" or "mixed" jurisdictions, where the search sought to
uncover any claim of "provocation" or "heat of passion." 425
After conducting the initial search, my research assistants and I reviewed the cases individually to
determine whether they met the following criteria: (I) the case involved adult intimate provocation; and
(2) the defendant asserted an EED or provocation claim at trial. We excluded many cases because they
did not involve an "intimate homicide." We excluded other cases because they were "false hits" -{;ases
in which the words "provocation" or "emotion" appeared in otherwise irrelevant contexts. Finally, we
excluded cases if they failed to provide sufficient factual material to code the nature of the EED or
provocation claim.
Intimate homicide defined: I defined intimacy broadly to include any claim in which the relevant
parties are or were married; are or were cohabiting; have or had a child in common; have dated, are
dating, or sought to date; or have or are engaged in consensual sexual intercourse_4 26 The relevant
420. A "reported" case means any case that appears in the LEXIS or Westlaw computer databases.
This includes cases that may be "unreported" for judicial purposes.
421. The MPC research represents an attempt to retrieve all relevant provocation claims, not simply
a sample of those claims. It is possible, of course, that some claims were missed despite efforts to achieve
an MPC universe. Without a showing of systematic bias that resulted in missed claims, however, there is
no reason to believe that this substantially undermines the viability of the MPC data set.
422. The sample does not include cases in which an EED or provocation claim was made solely to
an assault charge.
423. For a discussion of how the "mixed" and "traditional" jurisdiction data sets were constructed, see
infra text accompanying notes 446-51.
424. This is not the total number of cases, but the total number of claims. See infra text accompanying
notes 428-29 (explaining that cases were counted by claim, rather than case, to account for multiple
provocation claims).
425. The search in MPC jurisdictions was: "Date(aft 1979) and (extreme w/3 emotion! w/3 (distress
or disturbance)) and (homicide or murder or manslaughter)." The search in "traditional" or "mixed"
jurisdictions was: "Date(aft 1979) and (provok! or provoc! or (heat w/2 passion)) and (homicide or murder
or manslaughter)." The search was first performed during the middle of 1995 and was later updated to
include all claims reported through the end of 1995.
426. These determinations were made based on the defendant's allegations. For example, if the
defendant alleged that he was engaged in consensual sexual intercourse, this claim would be accepted for
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relationship is the relationship between the provoking party and the killer. If a stranger provoked the
killing of an intimate (say, for example, a stranger raped the defendant's wife and the defendant killed
the stranger), I did not include the resulting EED claim in the data set. However, if an intimate provoked
the defendant to kill a stranger (for instance, a defendant enraged by his wife killed the stranger helping
her move), that claim was included.
Trial "claim" defined: To be included in the data set, an opinion must have reported that the

defense had been raised at trial, whether it reached a jury or not. If a defendant argued EED or
provocation for the first time on appeal or never sought a jury instruction, I excluded the case from the
data set as barred by an independent procedural ground. If a defendant argued EED or provocation only
as a mitigating factor at the penalty phase of a death penalty case, I also excluded the case. 427
Multiple murder charges: In a number of cases, the defendants raised the provocation defense with

respect to more than one charge of murder or attempted murder. In others, the defendant raised the
provocation defense with respect to only one victim in a multiple victim case. I counted each provocation
claim rather than each case in which a provocation claim occurred. Thus, if a defendant made a
provocation claim with respect to one of two murder charges, I considered it a single provocation
claim.<2' If, however, there were two charges and two provocation claims made, I counted the case as
two claims.<29 I typically resolved doubts against multiple claims.
III. Substantive Coding

A. Initial Coding: My first-round analysis coded claims for three substantive factors: "separation,"

"infidelity," and "physical violence," and left a residual "other" category for claims in which the three
substantive factors were absent.
Separation: I defined separation to include cases in which the provoking party sought to separate

from the relationship, by stating an intention to leave, moving out, filing for divorce, changing the locks,
etc. The separation category also includes cases in which the parties are divorced, separated, or
estranged, or in which the "separation" was by force of law. For example, it includes cases reporting that
the parties were temporarily separated under an order the provoking party sought (e.g., the victim
obtained a protective order shortly before the killing). It also includes cases of "separation" from a casual
relationship, commonly termed "rejection." If the case made clear that the defendant initiated the
separation, I did not classify the case as a "separation." In such cases, there is no evidence suggesting
that the defendant is claiming that the loss of intimacy prompted the killing in whole or in part, even
if the parties are in fact separated at the time of the killing (e.g., a post-divorce physical attack on a

purposes of categorization. Claims in which the defendant admits to a rape/killing are not included in the
data set as these are cases of coerced intimacy.
427. Death penalty cases were included if the defendant argued at the guilt phase of the trial that he
or she was entitled to an EED instruction, yielding a manslaughter verdict.
428. For an example of a multiple victim case classified as one claim, see, e.g., People v. Berk, 629
N.Y.S.2d 588 (App. Div. 1995), aff'd, 667 N.E.2d 308 (N.Y. 1996) (stating that defendant killed estranged
wife and new lover, but clearly asserted EED claim only with respect to wife).
429. For an example of a multiple murder case classified as two claims, see, e.g., State v. Falvey, 1993
Minn. App. LEXIS 737 (Ct. App. July 27, 1993) (stating that defendant killed estranged wife and person
helping her move to California).
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battered woman who never argued that the "separation" had anything to do with her EED claim). 430
Finally, I did not consider it a "separation" case if there was only evidence of a struggle for control (e.g.,
the victim would not return home with the defendant), without evidence that this reflected a deliberate
desire to end the relationship .. 31
Infidelity: I defined infidelity broadly, to include not only sexual intercourse but also claims of

dancing with another, phoning another, or dining with another. Infidelity includes cases in which the
defendant actually witnessed the infidelity as well as allegations, rumors, imagined infidelities, or
pathological jealousy. The mere presence of "another" at the scene of the crime, however, was not
sufficient (without defendant reliance on that fact for a claim of infidelity) to classify a claim within this
category. As with "separation," the infidelity must be on the part of the provoking party/victim. If the
defendant was unfaithful, this does not make the claim one of "infidelity."
Physical violence: I defined physical violence broadly to cover any physical (nonverbal) violence

by the provoking party prior to the killing. This includes minor acts (slapping and scratching) as well
as threats to kill. It also includes a pattern of physically violent acts (e.g., battering) that occurred before
the killing if this was the nature of the defendant's claim. As in the cases of infidelity and separation,
the physical violence must have been on the part of the provoking party/victim. The defendant's own
use of physical violence did not yield a physical violence categorization.
Other: I defined other to include any claim that did not include any of the other three substantive

factors. It includes cases in which the claim was based on a nonphysical verbal argument or "marital
dispute," claims based on a mental disorder, and cases in which the defendant brought together a variety
of stress-causing events (e.g., death in the family, Joss of job, early childhood abuse).
B. Classifying Claims in Exclusive Categories: The coding process revealed that there were a substantial
number of claims in MPC and mixed jurisdictions that involved separation alone, without the presence
of infidelity or physical violence. It also yielded evidence that there were a substantial number of
infidelity claims in MPC and mixed jurisdictions in which the relationship was over or ending. To further
isolate the role of separation, I classified claims into the following categories.
I. Departure: I classified a claim as "departure" if it involved the "separation" factor as defined
above and did not involve either physical violence or sexual infidelity.
Exclusivity: I resolved doubts against a finding of departure alone. Mention of a romantic rival was

sufficient to place a claim in the next category, "separation and infidelity,"432 unless it was absolutely
clear that the claimed infidelity was irrelevant to the defendant's provocation claim. If, for example, the
defendant came upon his ex-wife with another man (no matter whether that happened immediately after
the divorce or three years later), I classified that claim as "separation and infidelity," even if the case

430. This means, of course, that there are some cases that involved "separated couples" that I did not
count in my definition of "separation."
431. See, e.g., People v. Birreuta, 208 Cal. Rptr. 635 (Ct. App. 1984) (reporting that wife left home
after argument and that defendant tried to persuade her to come home); State v. Werman, 388 N.W.2d 748
(Minn. 1986) (reporting argument because earlier in evening victim had refused to come home with
defendant from social occasion). I classified neither case as a "separation."
432. See, e.g., Hull v. State, 556 A.2d 154 (Conn. 1989) (stating that defendant pursued wife who was
trying to exit relationship and referring to evidence submitted at trial that victim told defendant during
argument that he could believe what he wanted about rumors that she had returned to her former husband).
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looked, in all other respects, like a "departure" claim. Finally, mention of physical violence triggered by
the departure placed the claim in the "physical violence" category unless it was clear that the defendant's
provocation claim did not rely on the physical violence.
Victim/Provoking Party Initiation: To be classified as a "departure" claim, there must have been

some evidence433 that the provoking party/victim (as opposed to the defendant) sought the
departure/separation. If the defendant sought the divorce or the separation against the victim's wishes,
I did not classify the claim as a "departure" because the victim's interest in leaving was not at stake.
Evidence that the victim was leaving or sought to leave was sufficient in most cases to classify the claim
in this category. References to the parties' divorce, legal separation, or the filing of a protective order
was only sufficient if it was clear from the circumstances that the victim/provoking party sought the
divorce, separation, or protective order:'• I occasionally found victim-initiated separation in a case in
which the defendant, rather than the victim, moved if the circumstances indicated that the victim sought
to end the relationship.
Related Issues: I classified a claim as "departure" despite claims characterizing the departure or

separation in terms of other issues or as the victim's fault. My key purpose here was to isolate claims
of departure from claims involving infidelity or physical violence. To be classified as a "departure" claim
it was only necessary that the defendant's claim could not have been made without the departure. For
example, in cases in which there was evidence that the victim sought to leave or the relationship had
ended, it was not sufficient to oust the claim from this category for the opinion to report that an
unwarranted sexuar abuse charge led to the divorce prompting the killing, or that the defendant explained
that he was upset because the victim would not let him see his children:"
2. "Separation and infidelity": I classified a claim as "separation and infidelity" if it included both
the "infidelity" and "separation" factors, as defined above, and the provocation claim was not based on
physical violence.
Exclusivity: As indicated above, if there was evidence of a physical altercation before the killing,

I classified the claim as "physical violence" unless it was clear that the provocation claim was not based
on physical violence.
Infidelity: As indicated above, I defined infidelity broadly, including claims in which the primary

433. This "some evidence" standard is similar to the standard used to decide whether there is sufficient
evidence to instruct a jury on a particular verdict. The evidence may be documentary or testimonial. It may
have been introduced by the prosecution as well as the defendant. Often, defendants in these cases present
several theories of defense or they present no affirmative case at all. That the evidence is placed in the
record by the prosecution does not mean that it cannot be relied upon by the defendant to assert his or her
EED claim. Defendants often make precisely such a claim on appeal.
434. It was sufficient, for example, for the opinion to report that the defendant "was under court order
to stay away from his estranged wife's home." Matthews v. Commonwealth, 709 S.W.2d 414, 417 (Ky.
1985).
435. See, e.g., State v. Hinckley, 502 A.2d 388 (Conn. 1985) (reporting that defendant grew
despondent and angry about continuing financial negotiations and child support stemming from divorce);
State v. Fair, 496 A.2d 461 (Conn. 1985) (reporting that defendant claimed he was upset about his wife's
taking of their child in case where she was killed shortly after defendant was told she was moving to
Boston); Matthews v. Commonwealth, 709 S.W.2d 414 (Ky. 1985) (reporting that defendant's EED claim
was based on allegedly unjustified filing of warrant claiming that he had sexually abused his daughter,
which resulted in protective order).
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relationship to which the defendant claimed allegiance had ended in divorce or separation. I included
claims in which the claimed "infidelity" involved dating, dancing, or being in the company of another.
Victim/Provoking Party Initiation: In most claims in this category, it was clear that the victim

sought to separate from the relationship. Evidence sufficient to establish "departure," as defined above,
was sufficient to show that the victim sought to separate (e.g., divorce, filing for divorce, a protective
order, moving out). In addition, in this category evidence that a victim sought to continue a new
relationship and that he or she was "estranged" from an earlier relationship was considered sufficient
evidence of victim-initiated separation. 436
3. "Simple Infidelity": Simple infidelity claims were those that involved infidelity in a relationship
assumed to be ongoing or continuing. Unless the criteria for separation were met, I classified a claim
involving infidelity as "simple infidelity." Any claim that involved infidelity in an ongoing relationship
that also involved physical violence was categorized as "physical violence." The definition of "infidelity"
was the same for "simple infidelity" claims as it was for "separation and infidelity" claims.
4. "Physical Violence": Without regard either to infidelity or departure, a claim that physical
violence prompted a killing may itself be sufficient to reach a jury on a provocation or EED theory.
Therefore, the purpose of this category was to include any claim, however clear the presence of other
factors, in which physical violence might have constituted an independent basis for an EED or
provocation instruction.
Nonexclusivity: I included in this category any case in which the provoking party's physical

violence appeared to trigger the homicide, whether or not there were other factors present, such as
infidelity or separation.
Physical Violence: To satisfy this category, the claim must have been based on actual or threatened

physical violence. If a case reported simply that there was an "argument," it was assumed that the claim
involved only verbal behavior and was coded as "other."
Victim-initiated: To be classified as physical violence, the claim had to include violence by the

victim or provoking party against the defendant. In some cases, this physical violence may have been
defensive in nature. Unless it was clear that the defendant's own violence promoted the claimed struggle,
I included such claims in the physical violence category.
Overlap: In order to acknowledge the presence of separation and infidelity in physical violence

claims, this category was divided into four subcategories: (a) claims based on physical violence alone;
(b) claims based on physical violence where separation was a factor; (c) claims based on physical
violence where separation and infidelity were also factors; and (d) claims based on physical violence
where infidelity was also a factor.

5. "Other": Other claims were claims that failed the criteria set forth for the other four categories.
These claims typically involved EED or provocation claims based on factors unrelated to the parties'
relationship (e.g., failing businesses), verbal arguments unrelated to separation or departure (e.g.,

436. See, e.g., State v. Chicano, 584 A.2d 425,428 (Conn. 1990) (reporting that defendant and victim
"had been involved in a romantic relationship that had deteriorated by the end of 1986" and that in early
1987, defendant found victim with another man).
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insulting a partner, vague claims of problems in a relationship unrelated to separation, departure, or
infidelity), or claims based on psychological evidence437 not falling within any of the other categories.
Nonoverlap with physical violence: I included any case that involved physical violence, even if it

also included claims about life stresses or taunts, in the physical violence rather than in the "other"
category. Again, I did this because physical violence might be a sufficient basis to reach the jury.
Nonoverlap with infidelity: I classified any claim based in part on infidelity in the "infidelity" or

"separation and infidelity" categories, rather than in the "other" category. However, a claim based on
"trouble" or "fighting" in an intimate relationship was not sufficient to show departure or infidelity and
was classified as "other. " 43 '
Nonoverlap with separation: For a few claims, there was evidence of factual separation or rejection

but there was insufficient evidence to place the case within the "separation" or "departure" categories.
For example, in People v. Glaser:39 the defendant based his EED claim on the division of the proceeds
from sale of the marital residence, but it was unclear whether the dispute was about money or the
divorce itself. 440 I classified it, instead, as "other."
C. Instructional Coding: The purpose of my research was to determine whether particular kinds of claims
did or did not reach juries. A claim was coded as a "yes" instruction in the following circumstances: (a)
the court reported that an instruction was given or that the jury heard such a claim; (b) the opinion was
ambiguous, but the briefs confirmed that an instruction was given; (c) the defendant clearly relied on
a provocation claim, introduced evidence in support thereof, and did not appeal for failure to instruct on
provocation; or (d) the verdict was premised on EED, provocation, or heat of passion. 441 In bench
trials, claims were not coded as a "yes" instruction except in two circumstances: (a) the court made an
independent ruling on EED that was the equivalent of what would have been necessary to send a claim
to a jury; or (b) the trial court returned a manslaughter verdict based on EED or provocation.
I based my instructional coding on proper trial procedure. Thus, for example, if the trial court gave
a provocation instruction but on appeal, the appellate court concluded (by holding or so stating) that the
giving of the provocation instruction was incorrect, the claim was not coded as "yes" on the instruction
issue. A similar rule applied in the opposite direction: If the trial court did not give an instruction and
the appellate court reversed for failure to grant an instruction, the claim was coded as "yes"
instruction. 442 It should be noted in this context that by far the vast majority of MPC cases coded, 83%
(1121133), were not appealed on the ground that the trial court failed to instruct on provocation, although
such appeals were far more frequent in traditional jurisdictions.443

437. See, e.g., State v. Counts, 816 P.2d I 157 (Or. 1991) (reporting defendant's claim that he was
suffering from delusions that his wife was poisoning him and his dogs).
438. See, e.g., State v. Skjonsby, 319 N.W.2d 764 (N.D. 1982) (reporting that defendant based his
EED claim on various life stresses such as business failure and "problems with his relationship").
439. 564 N.Y.S.2d 893 (App. Div. 1990).
440. See id. at 894.
44 I. It was not sufficient that a manslaughter verdict alone was returned because manslaughter may
be based on a variety of theories, including recklessness or imperfect self-defense. It was sufficient, of
course, if there was independent evidence of a provocation instruction, even if the ultimate manslaughter
verdict was based on a different theory.
442. Legal rulings on provocation might not necessarily take the form of a question about the
instruction itself.
443. See Appendix C (listing traditional claims and noting appeals).
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IV. Data Set Creation
A. MPC Jurisdictions: I included as MPC jurisdictions eleven states and two territories that have adopted

the MPC in whole or part. 444 I included states without regard to differing judicial interpretation of the
statutes and without regard to differences in statutory forrnulation.44 ~
B. Traditional Jurisdictions: Traditional jurisdictions include those retaining common law rules for both
including and excluding provocation claims. 446 The object of my search was to identify two

jurisdictions that generated a significant number of intimate homicide claims and tracked as closely as
possible the traditional rules for including and excluding provocation claims. I chose the jurisdictions
as follows: Out of the states estimated to follow traditional rules,447 I considered the state producing
the greatest number of search hits the "anchor" state. I chose the "supporting" jurisdiction to mirror, as
closely as possible, the law in the "anchor" jurisdiction. In my data set, Illinois produced the greatest
number of hits out of the jurisdictions I estimated to follow traditional rules. I chose Alabama for two
reasons: (a) it produced a significant number of hits; and (b) it provided a close "legal" fit both with
Illinois's provocation rules and with the definition of a "traditional" jurisdiction.448
C. Mixed Jurisdictions: 449 I defined mixed jurisdictions to include jurisdictions that have: (a) rejected
the traditional view that there are only some categories of legally adequate and inadequate provocation;
and (b) adopted some, but not all, features of provocation law associated with the MPC's reforms. As
with the traditional jurisdictions, I chose two mixed jurisdictions: the "anchor" state based on the greatest
number of intimate homicide search "hits" for jurisdictions estimated to be "mixed," and the
"supporting" state because it closely followed the legal rules of the "anchor" state. California was the
anchor state and I chose Minnesota to complete the sample because it appeared to follow the mixture
of rules adopted in California very closely and it produced a significant number of intimate homicide
claims. 450 In both California and Minnesota, courts have rejected the categories and adopted a
"reasonable person" rule for assessing provocation. Both jurisdictions have yielded cases in which courts
have embraced the possibility of cumulative provocation, rejecting rigid application of a cooling period
standard, a feature associated with "reform" of the defense. At the same time, each jurisdiction includes
holdings that accept some rules associated with more traditional approaches such as the "third party rule"

444. See supra note 88.
445. See id. (listing these jurisdictions).
446. See supra text accompanying notes 58-61 (describing common law categorical rules).
447. This was based on an estimate gleaned from treatise references of jurisdictions likely to continue
to hold to traditional rules.
448. I make no claim that the "traditional" jurisdictions sampled here are representative of any
jurisdiction other than one that adopts both the traditional criteria for excluding and including provocation
claims. I estimate this to be a minority of jurisdictions in the United States.
449. In theory, almost every jurisdiction might be termed "mixed." It was important, however, to find
jurisdictions that followed similar legal rules, otherwise the point of the comparison might be lost. See
supra text accompanying notes I 07-08 & note I 08.
450. It was important to achieve this kind of legal symmetry because "mixed" jurisdictions could in
theory include quite disparate sets of provocation rules.
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barring defendants from claiming provocation with respect to any person other than the provoking
party:sl

V. Statistical Notes Regarding Cross-Jurisdictional Comparisons
The data presented in Tables A and B were statistically tested to determine whether the estimated
proportions of "separation" and "departure" were significantly different across jurisdictions. (The
proportions were not the product of random differentiation.) A chi-square test on the difference of the
proportions was conducted.4l 2 The results of this test indicate that the proportions are different. A chisquare test statistic of 9.01 for the separation figures and 12.57 for the departure figures was calculated
(as compared to a chi-square statistic of 7.38 for a .025 significance level or 10.60 for a .005
significance level and two degrees of freedom). Thus we can be at least 97.5% confident that the
proportions are not equal or the product of random differentiation.

TABLE F. FACfUAL SCENARIOS IN MPC DATA SET'"

ELEMENT IN CASE

Separated Couples454

% OF ALL CLAIMS

% OF CLAIMS WITH

% OF CLAIMS WITH

(100%); n=l33

MALE DEFENDANTS

FEMALE DEFENDANTS

(92%); n=l22

(8%); n=ll

65% (86/133)

67% (821122)

36% (4/11)

47% (63/133)

49% (60/122)

27% (3/11)

17% (231133)

12% (151122)

73% (8/11)

15% (20/133)

16% (20/122)

0% (0/0)

65% (86/133)
Infidelity
47% (63/133)
Physical Violence
17% (231133)
Other
15% (20/133)

45 I. As I indicate above, I make no claim that the "mixed" jurisdiction data set is representative of
jurisdictions adopting a "reasonable person" rule or jurisdictions that follow some "mixture" of common
law and more modern rules.
452. See WILLIAM F. MATLACK, STATISTICS FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND MANAGEMENT 294-96 (1980)
(setting forth chi-square test used in this analysis).
453. This table is based on the total number of cases in my MPC research, whether or not claims were
ever heard by a jury. These figures do not add up to I 00% because some cases involve more than a single
factor.
454. This figure includes all of the claims classified as "separation," (80) plus the claims in which we
know that the couple was separated at the time of the killing (9), with minor adjustments for one case in
which there were multiple defendants and two refused-sex claims that were not properly classified as a
"separated couple" (3). This number is actually greater than the number of "separation" claims because,
in some cases, "separation" excludes cases of "separated couples." For example, if we do not know whether
the "departure" was victim-initiated or if the "separation" was killer-initiated, the case will not be classified
as "separation" but could involve a "separated couple."
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APPENDIX B: LiST

OF

CASES INCLUDED

IN

MPC DATA SET

The cases listed below form the basis of my research. Cases designated "I" are cases in which the
trial jury received an EED instruction, as defined in Appendix A. Cases with no "I" designation are cases
in which the trial jury was not instructed or in which the instruction remains "unknown." Cases
designated "A" were appealed for failure to instruct on EED. Cases designated "P' involve female
defendants. After the case citation appears the verdict reached in that trial, designated either as "murder"
or "manslaughter.''455 The descriptions do not represent a summary of the courts' holdings in the cases
cited, but summarize the information leading toward classification of the cases within my data set.
Italicized material represents a summary of the "separation" evidence indicating that the relationship had

ended, was ending, or the victim sought to leave.'56
I. DEPARTURE (33 Total; 26 I's)

!.I

State v. Forrest, 578 A.2d 1066 (Conn. 1990); Murder
EED defense asserted and evidence presented in support. See id. at 1067. The victim sought to

"terminate her relationship with the defendant, who had a history of psychological problems." !d. at
1067 (emphasis added). According to the defendant's testimony, the victim attended a party with the
defendant and thereafter "told the defendant not to believe that they would get back together." !d.
(emphasis added). As they were driving home, the defendant got angry, pulled a shotgun from the trunk,
and killed. See id.

2.A

State v. Thomas, 53.3 A.2d 553 (Conn. 1987); Murder
EED instruction denied. "Because of her deteriorating relationship with the defendant, the victim

moved out of that apartment," and moved in with her parents. !d. at 555. There was evidence that the
victim left because the defendant had threatened her with a knife. "On several occasions the defendant

attempted to effect a reconciliation, but the victim rejected his efforts." !d. (emphasis added). The court
found that defendant's "distraught" condition after the victim's appearance constituted insufficient
evidence for defendant's EED claim. See id.

3.!

State v. Utz, 513 A.2d 1191 (Conn. 1986); Murder, Attempted Murder (victim: wife's father)
EED instruction received with respect to both the murder of his father-in-law as well as the

attempted murder of his brother-in-law.' 57 Defendant's wife had left him and moved into her brother's

home. See id. at 1192 (emphasis added). The defendant continued to pursue and call the victim,
threatening to kill her if she contacted the police. See id. A week after the wife instituted divorce
proceedings, the state police were notified of the defendant's actions. See id. A few days later, the

455. No effort has been made to distinguish between levels of murder verdicts. Effort has been made
to identify the basis for manslaughter verdicts (whether EED or recklessness or some other basis). This
information will appear in the case description or in the footnotes.
456. As indicated in Appendix A, the departure category includes cases in which the victim rejects
an inchoate or casual relationship.
457. See Appendix to Brief for Defendant-Appellant at B-44, State v. Utz, 513 A.2d 1191 (Conn.
1986) (No. 12322) (quoting jury charge in which judge noted that EED was important to attempted murder
charge as well as murder charge).
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defendant arrived from Vermont, cut the telephone lines to the brother's home, pointed a rifle at the
defendant's brother, who went to obtain a gun, and shot and killed the wife's father. See id. at 1192-93.

4.I

State v. Utz, 513 A.2d 1191 (Conn. 1986); Murder, Attempted Murder (same case, different
victim: brother-in-law)

5.I

State v. Hinckley, 502 A.2d 388 (Conn. 1985); Manslaughter
Defendant convicted of EED manslaughter. Defendant drove to his former wife's place of

employment and shot her. See id. at 389. At trial, defendant claimed insanity; evidence was presented
showing that, since the victim had obtained a divorce in 1976 (three years before the homicide), he had
become despondent, angry, and obsessed about continuing financial negotiations relating to the divorce
and child support. 4 "
6.1

State v. Fair, 496 A.2d 461 (Conn. 1985); Murder
EED instruction received. 459 "The defendant and the victim lived together from June 1979 until

December 1980," id. at 462, when the victim moved in with her mother.460 She told the defendant that
"she was moving to Boston" and that "he would never see their son again." /d. (emphasis added). The
next day, the defendant went to the victim's place of employment and shot her in the head. See id.
7.1

Newell v. State, No. CR. A. IN 89-09-0419, 1990 WL 74310 (Del. Super. Ct. May II, 1990),
aff'd, No. 269, 1992 WL 53433 (Del. Mar. 4, 1992); Murder
EED instruction received. 461 The defendant had a history of domestic violence. See id. at *I. On

July 8, 1989, defendant was arrested and was "ordered to have no further contact with his wife." /d.
(emphasis added). "Notwithstanding the foregoing order, Newell admitted that on August 30, 1989, he
returned to his wife's home armed with a semi-automatic handgun," and killed his wife. /d. Defendant's
EED theory depended in part upon a claim that his denial of the incident in the face of overwhelming
evidence of his guilt suggested EED; hence, defendant stipulated to prior bad acts (battering) "to use that
same evidence to buttress his defense of extreme emotional distress." /d. at *3 & n.l.
8.1

McGee v. State, No. 45, 1990 WL 254349 (Del. Dec. II, 1990); Murder
EED instruction received.<62 "By 1988, due to the husband's drug use and his propensity to abuse

his wife, the marriage deteriorated. As a result, Mrs. McGee was forced to leave the family home on
several occasions." /d. at *I. The parties attempted a reconciliation but defendant continued his abuse
and, on the night of her death "Mrs. McGee confided to a friend that she was afraid of McGee and was
planning to leave him." /d. (emphasis added). The parties argued about the defendant's drug use and

458. See Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 11, State v. Hinckley, 502 A.2d 388 (Conn. 1985) (No.
11351).
459. See Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 4, State v. Fair, 496 A.2d 461 (Conn. 1985) (No. 11457).
460. See Brief and Appendix of Appellee at 3, State v. Fair, 496 A.2d 461 (Conn. 1985) (No. 28186).
461. The opinion states that this instruction related to a second degree murder instruction, not
manslaughter, although it is unclear why this should be so. See Newell v. State, No. 269, 1992 WL 53433,
at **2 (Del. Mar. 4, 1992).
462. The prosecution clearly argued the point to the jury. See McGee v. State, No. 45, 1990 WL
254349, at *4 (Del. Dec. 11, 1990).
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defendant killed his wife. See id. At trial, defendant claimed that "his wife's complaints about his drug
use and his irresponsible behavior caused him stress" that resulted in the homicide. !d.
9.1

Dickens v. State, 437 A.2d 159 (Del. 1981), post-conviction relief denied by 602 A.2d 95
(Del. Super. Ct. 1989), aff'd, 577 A.2d 752 (Del. 1990); Murder; Attempted Murder% 3
EED instruction received. See 602 A.2d at 97. On the day of the homicide, defendant entered the

Wilmington bus station looking for his girlfriend who was trying to leave him. See 437 A.2d at 161.
"Spotting Elmira and Myrti Handy ... at the ticket window, the defendant approached the pair and
requested to speak with Elmira alone in order to dissuade her from leaving him." 602 A.2d at 95
(emphasis added). When her mother approached, the defendant fired the gun fatally wounding Elmira
and injuring a bystander. See id. at 97.
10.

Jones v. State, 902 P.2d 965 (Haw. 1995); Murder
EED claim denied at bench trial. See id. at 967. The defendant and victim had lived together for

a number of years and had two children. See id. at 966. He claimed at bench trial that he was upset
because the victim refused to speak to him about child visitation. See id. at 967. The prosecution put on
evidence showing that the victim was seeking to end the relationship and that Jones sought to reconcile
with the victim, calling and writing letters and talking to people about how he was going to get her back.
See id.< 64
II.

State v. Castro, 756 P.2d 1033 (Haw. 1988); Attempted Murder
Male defendant mounted an EED defense, see id. at I040, and the jury was instructed on attempted

manslaughter, see id. at 1038 n.l.%5 The defendant stabbed his estranged girlfriend, a dancer in a bar.
See id. at 1038-39. When the defendant entered the bar, the victim apprised her employer of her fear
of the defendant. The employer told the defendant not to bother the victim. See id. The defendant paid
no heed and returned, leaped from his seat, grabbed her and said "let's go," stabbing her in the back and
neck. !d. at 1039. The defendant testified that he could not stop, although he knew what was happening.
See id. The victim testified to prior bad acts (the defendant's battering of her) which, on appeal, were
found to be grounds for vacating the conviction and remanding for a new trial. See id. at I 041.
12.

Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 892 S.W.2d 542 (Ky. 1995); Murder
EED instruction denied. See id. at 551. At his second trial, defendant conceded that he killed the

victim and performed sex acts upon her but argued that he acted under "an extreme emotional
disturbance." /d. at 546. The defendant's claim was based on what the appellate court dubbed "his own
uncorroborated statements to [the expert witness] that the victim refused his romantic advances and
mocked his stuttering." !d. at 551 (emphasis added). The trial court refused to allow the expert to testify

463. It appears that EED was interposed only with respect to the first degree murder charge. See
Dickens v. State, 602 A.2d 95, 97 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989), ajf'd, 577 A.2d 752 (Del. 1990).
464. The defendant's claim here (child visitation) depends upon the parties' separation. The
prosecution's evidence shows that the victim sought to end the relationship. Hence, this case is classified
as "departure." There was no claim of infidelity or physical violence.
465. Since it is unclear whether the attempted manslaughter instruction was based on EED (as opposed
to recklessness or some other basis), the case is not classified as a "yes" instruction.
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to this "triggering factor" because it was hearsay, a ruling affirmed on appeal. /d.

13.A

Bowling v. Commonwealth, 873 S.W.2d 175 (Ky. 1994); Murder
EED instruction denied. See id. at 179. Defendant shot and killed two adults and wounded a child

sitting in a parked car. See id. at 176. The evidence presented indicated that he was suffering because
his "wife had left him," he could not get a job, and had considered suicide. /d. at 177 (emphasis added).
He argued that his bizarre behavior of the prior weekend (depression brought on because "Dottie Sue
done left him again"), id. at 183 (Leibson, J., dissenting), and his striking of the victim's car caused him
to act uncontrollably, see id. at 179. 466
14.

Smith v. Commonwealth, 845 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1993); Murder
EED instruction unkown. See id. at 538. 467 Defendant was charged with murdering Pamela Wren

by setting her apartment on fire. See id. at 535. Evidence at trial showed that Wren rejected and
"spurned" defendant numerous times, that he had recently divorced for the third time, that his son had
died, and that he had "turned to liquor and Wren for consolation when he realized his attempts at
reconciliation with his third wife were futile." !d. at 539 (emphasis added).
15.1

Perry v. Commonwealth, 839 S.W.2d 268 (Ky. 1992); Attempted Murder (two counts)
(victim: police officer)
EED instruction received in attempted murder prosecution with respect to both the police officer

and defendant's step-grandson. See id. at 271. Defendant had a restraining order issued against him at
his marital residence, requiring him to vacate his home. See id. at 269. A deputy sheriff sought to
execute the order. See id. Upon leaving the house, the defendant fired five shots at the officer and then
tried to run him over with his car. See id. at 269-70. The defendant claimed at trial that he was upset
by the service of the order and having to leave his home. 468 After he attacked the sheriff executing the
order he sought out his wife and, in the process, attacked his step-grandson. See id. at 270.469
16.1

Perry v. Commonwealth, 839 S.W.2d 268 (Ky. 1992); Attempted Murder (same case, different
victim: step-grandson)

17.1

Smith v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 437 (Ky. 1987); Murder (victim: girlfriend)
EED instruction received with respect to all four victims. See id. at 449. "Smith grew despondent

over news that his girlfriend was leaving him." /d. at 440 (emphasis added). The girlfriend left with their
child "to live with her mother" in Ohio. /d. She returned to Kentucky for her belongings and defendant

466. That the defendant asserted other reasons, along with the departure or separation, does not
eliminate the case from this category. Only if the reasons include "infidelity" or "physical violence" would
these "other reasons" cause a shift to another category.
467. The defendant presented this evidence at the guilt stage of the trial. The case is not designated
as an "I" instruction because it is unclear whether the defendant obtained an instruction at that phase, as
opposed to the penalty phase of his death penalty trial.
468. See Brief for Appellant at 9-10, Perry v. Commonwealth, 839 S.W.2d 268 (Ky. 1992) (No. 91SC-93-MR).
469. The brief for the appellants indicates that the stepdaughter obtained the protective order because
the defendant refused to leave the house and because his wife, who was dying of cancer, feared him. See
id. app. at A-7.
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arrived at her family's home. See id. After a brief argument with the girlfriend, he retrieved a gun from
the hedge and killed the girlfriend, her infant daughter, her half-sister, and her mother. See id.'70
18.!

Smith v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 437 (Ky. 1987); Murder (same case, different victim:
infant daughter)

19.!

Smith v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 437 (Ky. 1987); Murder (same case, different victim:
half-sister)

20.!

Smith v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 437 (Ky. 1987); Murder (same case, different victim:
mother)

21.1

Matthews v. Commonwealth, 709 S.W.2d 414 (Ky. 1985); Murder (two counts) (victim: wife)
EED instruction received with respect to killing both wife and mother-in-law.471 Defendant and

his wife had undergone repeated separations. See id. at 417. "These separations were marked by extreme
hostility, and Marlene often swore out criminal warrants against her husband for harassment." /d. At the
time of the killing, he was under court order to stay away from his estranged wife s home. See id. To

establish EED, "appellant relied on ... testimony ... about the long history of significant marital strife,"
id., including "the supposedly unjustified bringing of warrants to explain his emotional state," id. at 418.

On the night of the homicide, he broke into his wife's home, and killed his mother-in-law and his wife.
22.1

Matthews v. Commonwealth, 709 S.W.2d 414 (Ky. 1985); Murder (same case, different
victim: mother-in-law).

23.1

State v. Little, 462 A.2d 117 (N.H. 1983); Murder
EED instruction received. See id. at 118 Defendant and his wife had been living apart for several

weeks. "During this period, the defendant visited his estranged wife nearly every day in an attempt to
effect a reconciliation. " !d. (emphasis added). There was evidence that he had made threats to kill her

and said to a friend that, "If I can't have her nobody's going to have her." /d. The defendant testified
that he "awakened with the intent of killing his wife," went to her house, went to look for his wedding
band, and when his wife said, "You think you can go into any room in my house," his mind snapped
and he stabbed her to death. /d.
24.1

People v. Fardan, 592 N.Y.S.2d 162 (App. Div. 1992), ajf'd, 628 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1993);
Murder

EED instruction received. See 628 N.E.2d at 42.472 "Defendant testified that early in the afternoon

470. The defendant argued that he killed his wife and the three others because of EED; he was
convicted of killing the other three persons by transferred intent. See Smith v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d
437, 446 (Ky. 1987).
471. See Brief for Appellant at 31, Matthews v. Commonwealth, 709 S.W.2d 414 (Ky. 1985) (No. 83SC-348-MR).
472. On appeal, defendant argued that EED was a defense to depraved heart murder, an argument the
appellate court rejected. See People v. Fardan, 628 N.E.2d 41, 43-44 (N.Y. 1993).
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Ms. Cox promised to have sex with him but when defendant later pressed his demand ... Ms. Cox
refused." /d. (emphasis added). An argument ensued and in a fit of anger, defendant stabbed her to death.
See id.
25.

People v. Casassa, 404 N.E.2d 1310 (N.Y. 1980); Murder
EED claim denied at bench trial. See id. at 1313. The victim "informed defendant that she was not

'falling in love' with him.... Miss Lo Consolo's rejection of defendant's advances . .. precipitated a
bizarre series of actions on the part of defendant which, he asserts, demonstrate" EED. !d. at 1312
(emphasis added). On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals decided against the defendant's EED
claim. See id. at 1313-17.
26.I

People v. Benedict, 609 N.Y.S.2d 100 (App. Div. 1994); Murder
EED instruction received. See id. at 101. The defendant explained at trial "that he had been arguing

with his wife over her suggestion that they separate. He maintained that her remark that he 'made her
skin crawl' made him so angry and caused such emotional hurt that he lost control of himself." !d.
(emphasis added).

27.I

People v. Wood, 568 N.Y.S.2d 651 (App. Div. 1991), aff'd, 591 N.E.2d 1178 (N.Y. 1992);
Murder
EED instruction received. See id. at 653. "At his second trial, the defendant's defense was that he

had 'snapped' and was 'totally out of control' at the time of the killing because of an [EED] triggered
by his dissatisfaction with the victim who reportedly turned her back on him and went to sleep after they
engaged in sexual intercourse." ld. at 652 (emphasis added). Defendant sought to explain this action by
reference to various psychological disorders. See id.'73
28.IF

People v. Ambrose, 553 N.Y.S.2d 896 (App. Div. 1990); Manslaughter
EED instruction received. See id. at 897. The victim argued that she killed in self-defense because

the defendant had physically abused her in the past, had threatened her baby, and she was afraid he
would hurt the baby. See id. at 896. 474 Based on evidence submitted by the prosecution, the jury found
that she killed the defendant in his sleep "because she was upset over his plans to leave her." Jd. at 897
(emphasis added).
29.I

People v. Guevara, 521 N.Y.S.2d 292 (App. Div. 1987); Murder
EED instruction received. See id. at 294. "[1lhe defendant and his wife argued . .. about her intent

to institute a divorce proceeding. During the argument, the defendant left the room, obtained a two-footlong wooden board and returned to beat his wife about the face and neck." Jd. at 293 (emphasis added).
"The defendant then searched the room for the divorce papers, found them, fled through the bedroom
window, and returned to his girlfriend's apartment .... " ld. Defendant testified at trial that he "lost

473. Note that the "departure" category includes acts of "rejection." See Appendix A.
474. The case reports that the jury's finding was based on leaving alone. See People v. Ambrose, 553
N.Y.S.2d 896, 897 (App. Div. 1990). Hence, the case is classified as "departure," despite the victim's own
claims of physical violence. If classifying the case as such is an error, it is one that operates against my
thesis since this is a female defendant.
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control because he was confused about the divorce." !d. On appeal, the court expressed skepticism that
defendant's claim of "stress" was severe and indicated that the defendant's excuse was not "reasonable
under the circumstances."475 /d. at 294.
30.!

State v. Dilger, 338 N.W.2d 87 (N.D. 1983); Murder
EED instruction received. See id. at 93 n.2. The defendant and victim shared an apartment next to

a bar. See id. at 88. "After an argument occurred between [the defendant] and [the victim], [the victim]
left and returned a few minutes later with clothing and other items belonging to Dilger. After making
two trips carrying items belonging to [the defendant], [the victim] left the bar." !d. (emphasis added).
"Persons in the bar began teasing [the defendant] about having to sleep in the bar's kitchen." !d.
Defendant left and returned fifteen minutes later, having killed the victim. See id.
3l.I

State v. Wille, 858 P.2d 128 (Or. 1993), a.ff'g 839 P.2d 712 (Or. Ct. App. 1992); Murder
EED instruction received. See id. at 130-31. "Defendant was very upset that his wife had filed for

a dissolution. She was living with her mother and had obtained a temporary restraining order preventing
him from entering her residence. After she filed the dissolution action, defendant told a number of people
that he wanted to kill her." 839 P.2d at 713 (emphasis added). On the day of the homicide, the defendant
kicked the door in, saying '"this is it,"' and stabbed his wife. !d. at 714. Defendant's expert testified at
trial that his "impending divorce" and financial problems presented an extremely stressful situation. 858
P.2d at 134.
32.!

State v. Reams, 636 P.2d 913 (Or. 1981), a.ff'g 616 P.2d 498 (Or. Ct. App. 1980); Murder,
Attempted Murder476
EED instruction received.477 "The defendant and his wife had a stormy marriage." !d. at 914. One

day, "defendant returned from work to find that the furniture of the house had been 'cleaned out.'
Without telling the defendant, his wife had secretly rented another house and had arranged with a
'mover' to move the furniture there." ld. (emphasis added). Defendant appeared at his in-laws' home
intending to scare his wife. See id. He shot and killed his father-in-law and wounded his mother-in-law.
See id.
33.!

State v. Price, 909 P.2d 256 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), cert. denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996);
Murder
EED instruction received. See id. at 262. The defendant and victim had lived together for two years

and had a child. See id. at 258. "However, their relationship ended when [the victim] moved to Ogden

475. This ruling was made in the context of deciding defendant's claim of insufficient evidence of
intentional homicide. See People v. Guevara, 521 N.Y.S.2d 292,294 (App. Div. 1987). The appellate court
did not hold that the jury should not have been instructed on EED. See id.
476. Defendant pled guilty to the attempted murder charge and therefore EED was not an issue with
respect to that count. See State v. Reams, 636 P.2d 913, 914 n.l (Or. 1981).
477. Excerpts from the trial transcript indicate that the EED instruction was given, albeit only with
respect to the intentional murder, rather than the felony murder, charge. See Appellant's Brief at 20, State
v. Reams, 636 P.2d 913 (Or. 1981) (No. 16280) (quoting jury charge: "In this case, the issue of extreme
emotional disturbance applies only to the charge of intentional murder, or of manslaughter in the first
degree."). Defendant argued unsuccessfully on appeal that EED was also a defense to felony murder. See
Reams, 636 P.2d at 920-21.
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about two months before her murder." /d. (emphasis added). 478 Defendant drove to the victim's
apartment, started yelling at her and killed her. See id. 479 Defendant claimed that he was frustrated and
"tired of her hurting me." /d. at 263.
II. SEPARATION AND INFIDELITY (42 Total; 37 I's)
34.

Starling v. State, 786 S.W.2d 114 (Ark. 1990); Murder
Defendant sought to rely upon an EED defense. See id. at 116.'80 "[O]n July 5, 1988, his wife

and daughter, Christina, left the marital home. Appellant had a neighbor deliver a letter to his wife
hoping she would either return home or meet with him to discuss their problems. She refused." /d. at
115 (emphasis added). Three days later, defendant shot his wife after a heated conversation. See id. The
wife's friend testified that the defendant had claimed that his wife was unfaithful. See id. at 117.
35.1

State v. Rivera, 612 A.2d 749 (Conn. 1992); Murder
EED instruction received. See id. at 751. Three years after he moved out of the home he shared

with his common law wife, the defendant returned to her apartment because he believed that she was
seeing someone else, see id. at 750, and had been told that the new man was "more man" than him.' 81
Defendant broke into the apartment and stabbed the rival. See id. at 750-51.
36.I

State v. Traficonda, 612 A.2d 45 (Conn. 1992), post-conviction relief denied sub nom.
Traficonda v. Warden, No. 1543S, 1996 WL 753879 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 26, 1996);

Murder
EED instruction received. See id. at 46 & n.2. Defendant claimed he killed his wife accidentally,

see id. at 46, but argued EED, see id. at 48-49, based on evidence at trial showing that the parties had
argued the night of the shooting and that there was a history of "marital strife," including documented
"mental and physical abuse of the victim," id. at 47. Two days before the shooting, the victim consulted
an attorney about the abuse and how to retain custody of her child if she sought a divorce. See id. On
the evening of the shooting, the victim left her home and went to a neighbor's telling her that she could

not take it anymore and had to leave. 482 The briefs indicate that the defendant had accused the victim
of "cheating on him" in the past.'83

478. There was evidence presented at trial that the victim was physically abused by the defendant. One
witness stated that defendant had kicked the victim "Ninja style" when pregnant. See State v. Price, 909
P.2d 256, 265 n.l3 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), cert. denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996).
479. The victim had gone to the movies with "Tony Hairston," who was outside waiting in the car
when the shooting occurred. There is no indication whether the victim had a romantic relationship with
Hairston or that defendant's EED claim was based on a romantic rivalry. See id. at 258.
480. It is unclear whether an EED instruction was given. See Starling v. State, 786 S.W.2d 114, 116
(Ark. 1990).
481. See Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 16, State v. Rivera, 612 A.2d 749 (Conn. 1992) (No.
14532).
482. See Brief for State of Connecticut-Appellee at 6, State v. Traficonda, 612 A.2d 45 (Conn. 1992)
(No. 14310).
483. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 6, State v. Traficonda, 612 A.2d 45 (Conn. 1992) (No. 14310).
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State v. Chicano, 584 A.2d 425 (Conn. 1990);484 Manslaughter, Murder485 (victim: rival)
Defendant convicted at bench trial of three counts of felony murder and three counts of EED

manslaughter. See id. at 427. "The defendant and Ellen Babbit had been involved in a romantic
relationship that had deteriorated by the end of 1986." Jd. at 428 (emphasis added). Defendant went to
see Babbit at her home. While outside, he overheard the sounds of sexual activity. See id. He then hid,
eventually moving to the bedroom where he hit his rival on the head with a crowbar. See id. When the
victim sought to protect her boyfriend, the defendant became enraged and killed his rival, his exgirlfriend's son, and his girlfriend. See id.
38.1

State v. Chicano, 584 A.2d 425 (Conn. 1990); Manslaughter, Murder (same case, different
victim: ex-girlfriend's son)

39.1

State v. Chicano, 584 A.2d 425 (Conn. 1990); Manslaughter, Murder (same case, different
victim: ex-girlfriend)

40.1

State v. Wood, 545 A.2d 1026 (Conn. 1988); Murder (four counts) (victim: former wife)
EED instruction received with respect to all four victims. 486 "[D]efendant's claim of extreme

emotional disturbance centered principally on his relationship with his former wife and the mental and
emotional turmoil that grew out of the breakdown of that relationship." ld. at 1030. His former wife had
dissolved the marriage largely because she believed that the defendant was sexually abusing their
daughter. See id. He admitted that he made one advance that he claimed was rebuffed. See id. On the
day of the homicide, the defendant killed his former wife and her new boyfriend and then murdered his
ex-mother-in-law and his daughter. See id. at 1028. His psychiatrist testified that he had an "extreme
emotional reaction" to the loss of his ex-wife Rosa, 487 and that "[d]efendant's rage at Rosa was the
key to all of the homicides." /d.' 88
4l.I

State v. Wood, 545 A.2d 1026 (Conn. 1988); Murder (same case, different victim: new
boyfriend)

42.1

State v. Wood, 545 A.2d 1026 (Conn. 1988); Murder (same case, different victim: daughter)

484. This case is classified as "instruction" because the trial court returned manslaughter verdicts with
respect to all three victims. See State v. Chicano, 584 A.2d 425, 427 (Conn. 1990).
485. The three-judge panel convicted the defendant of murder and EED manslaughter for the same
crimes, which created a double jeopardy issue. See id.
486. See Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 33, State v. Wood, 545 A.2d 1026 (Conn. 1988) (No.
12734); see also Brief for State of Connecticut at B-1, State v. Wood, 545 A.2d 1026 (Conn. 1988) (No.
12734) (quoting jury charge as providing that "the ultimate determination of the presence or absence of
extreme emotional disturbance is one of fact for the members of the jury").
487. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 15, Wood (No. 12734).
488. There is some indication that the defendant claimed that he struggled with the boyfriend before
he shot. However, this does not appear to be the basis for the EED claim. The EED argument was based
on defendant's belief that his "ex-wife" had "betrayed" him "when she followed through with the divorce."
See Brief for State of Connecticut at 19, Wood (No. 12734); accord Brief for Defendant-Appellant at
14-15, Wood (No. 12734).
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State v. Wood, 545 A.2d 1026 (Conn. 1988); Murder (same case, different victim: former
mother-in-law)
State v. Hull, 556 A.2d 154 (Conn. 1989); Murder

44.I

EED instruction received. See id. at 157. "In May, 1985, the victim filed for divorce and a
restraining order was issued against the defendant." !d. (emphasis added). After leaving a suicide note,

the defendant pursued his estranged wife and called her. See id. She reiterated that she wanted to end
their relationship. See id. The defendant traveled to her new home, the victim emphasized her desire to
leave, and defendant stabbed her after a scuffle. See id. At trial, some evidence indicated that the
defendant believed that the victim had returned to her ex-husband, an allegation the victim appeared to
deny. 489
45.

State v. Ricketts, 659 A.2d 188 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995); Murder
EED claim denied at bench trial. See id. at 190. The defendant lived with the victim for three years

and they had a child together. See id. at 189. "In early 1991, the defendant's relationship with the victim
began to deteriorate as a result of the defendant's drug use, and the defendant moved into an apartment
across the street." /d. (emphasis added). In July, the victim began a friendship with another man. See
id. He arrived to visit and the defendant burst through the door, stabbing the victim and the other man

because he believed they had just engaged in sexual intercourse. See id. at 190.
46.I

State v. Burgos, 656 A.2d 238 (Conn. App. Ct.), cert. denied, 659 A.2d 186 (Conn. 1995);
Murder

EED instruction received. See id. at 242. During the summer of 1991, the defendant discovered that
the victim was having an affair, they argued, she asked him to leave, and he moved into his mother's
apartment. See id. at 239. In September, the parties attempted to reconcile but they argued about the
victim's infidelity and the victim allegedly insulted the defendant. See id. Defendant became angry, left
the house, returned later that night and asked the victim to sleep with him; the victim refused and told
him she was leaving him. See id. at 240. The defendant replied that he would kill her "before he let her

go anywhere." !d. She died of severe blows to the head and stab wounds. See id.
47.I

State v. Martinez, 591 A.2d 155 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991); Manslaughter
Defendant presented evidence to establish an EED defense, but manslaughter verdict was based on

"intent to cause serious physical injury to another person," rather than EED. /d. at 156. "Two weeks
before the victim's death, the defendant, the victim's former boyfriend, had seen the victim dancing with
another man." /d. (emphasis added). The defendant lingered in the area of her apartment for two days

prior to the incident, and then "accosted the victim at the door of her apartment" and shot her. /d.
48.A

Jones v. State, No. 253, 1992 WL 115150 (Del. May 7, 1992); Murder
EED claim denied at bench trial. See id. at **2. Victoria Bell was in a romantic relationship with

489. An oblique reference to this aspect of the case appears at State v. Hull, 556 A.2d 154, 165 (Conn.
1989). The briefs indicate that defendant's jealousy about the alleged ex-husband was part of the EED
claim. See Brief for State of Connecticut at 34, State v. Hull, 556 A.2d 154 (Conn. 1989) (No. 13189).
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the defendant that lasted "nearly eleven years .... In 1989, however, Bell moved out of the residence
she had shared with Jones, and moved, along with her three children, into her mother's house .... "
/d. at **I (emphasis added). "Bell subsequently became romantically involved with Jerry Roberts ... .

Bell testified that when Jones became aware of her new relationship with Roberts, Jones became very
angry, told Bell that he did not want Roberts near his children, and threatened to harm both Bell and
Roberts." /d. The court found insufficient evidence to send the case to the jury on EED. See id. at **2.
49.1

State v. Rodebaugh, No. 436, 1990 WL 254365 (Del. Nov. 27, 1990); Murder
EED instruction received. See id. at **I. "At the time of the killing, the victim had been dating a

woman whom defendant had dated for a short time a year and a half earlier, and whom defendant had
continued to pursue, against her wishes." !d. (emphasis added). Defendant confronted his rival outside

his apartment, an argument ensued, and the defendant shot the victim four times. See id. at **2.
50.1

Rev. State, 540 A.2d 423 (Del. 1988), post-conviction relief denied by Crim. A. Nos. IN7607-00I6, -0017, -0019, 1994 WL 89020 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 2, 1994), aff'd, No. 104, 1995
WL 67087 (Del. Feb. 10, 1995); Murder
EED instruction received. See id. at 427. Defendant's marriage to the victim "had been both short

and bitter. On the night he killed his wife Re went to the house where she was staying and waited for

her to return. Eventually, she arrived accompanied by an off-duty police officer as her date." /d. at 425
(emphasis added). An argument ensued, which ended with defendant killing his wife. See id.
51.1

Davis v. State, 522 A.2d 342 (Del. 1987); Murder
EED instruction received. See id. at 346. Defendant and his wife "had a tempestuous marriage with

the parties often separating and reconciling. On Apri/1, 1985, Davis, who was then separated from his
wife, called his wife and threatened to kill her and her boyfriend Baird, with a gun." !d. at 342 (emphasis

added). Defendant claimed at trial that he killed her "because of his history of jealousy, 'runaways,' and
rejection." /d. at 343.
52.1

Casalvera v. State, 410 A.2d 1369 (Del. 1980); Murder
Defendant relied upon EED defense at trial and court found that evidence was admitted properly

under an EED theory. See id. at 1373.490 The defendant had gone to Georgia but, upon his return,
found that "[t]he victim was beginning to lose her feelings for the defendant. She made it clear that she
did not want him to return from Georgia for her sake alone. She had begun to go out with other men,
and she told the defendant that things were different." !d. at 1371 (emphasis added). He nevertheless

returned hoping to continue the relationship. See id. Eventually, she told him that things had changed
and she had slept with another man. See id. at 1372. This enraged the defendant and he killed her. See
id.

490. The case is classified as a "yes" instruction because evidence could not have been properly
admitted if the defendant's theory did not reach the jury.
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Delaware v. Steedley, No. IK90-06-0183Rl, 1994 WL 750302 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 8, 1994),
aff'd, 670 A.2d 1340 (Del. 1995); Murder, Attempted Murder491
EED instruction received. See id. at * 10. Six months after filing for divorce, the defendant and his

wife "made an attempt to reconcile," but the defendant became abusive, eventually pouring boiling grits
on his wife. !d. at *2. She decided to have no further dealings with him and the divorce was finalized.
!d. Defendant based his EED claim for the killing of his wife on "his discovery of his wife's affair with
his best friend." !d. at * 10.
54.1

State v. Maelega, 907 P.2d 758 (Haw. 1995); Murder492
EED instruction received. See id. at 762. Evidence at trial showed that the defendant had abused

his wife, who had recently had a baby. 493 Defendant claimed that he was suffering from EED because
he believed that his wife was having "sexual relations with her stepfather." !d. at 761. The victim had
earlier claimed that she had been raped by her stepfather, but recanted upon the stepfather's denial,
admitting that "she had made up the story because she was afraid and tired of being beaten up by her
husband." /d. at 760. On the evening before the homicide, the victim and defendant refused to sleep in
separate apartments but the victim told defendant "that he should return to American Samoa." /d.
(emphasis added).'94 Defendant awoke the next morning, decided his wife had just had sex with his
stepfather because she was "sweaty," and strangled her. See id. at 761.
55.1

State v. Matias, 840 P.2d 374 (Haw. 1992); Murder
EED instruction received. See id. at 377. According to evidence the defendant introduced, he and

the victim had been lovers for several years prior to the killing. See id. at 376. The defendant claimed
EED based on the fact that, "[i]n the months immediately preceding the killing, [the victim] had been
in the process of breaking off the relationship, and she had also started a separate relationship with
another man, a fact known to [defendant]." !d. (emphasis added).
56.FI

State v. Samuel, 838 P.2d 1374 (Haw. 1992); Murder
EED instruction received. See id. at 1382. "[Defendant and victim] were lovers for two years while

they were inmates" at a Hawaii correctional institution. /d. at 1376. "Their relationship terminated after
[the victim] was released from incarceration. In 1989, [the victim] returned to prison and [defendant]
attempted to renew the relationship, but [the victim] refused." /d. (emphasis added). On the day before
the stabbing, the defendant asked the victim to spend the evening and the victim refused. See id. The
next day, the defendant fatally stabbed the victim. See id. at 1377.

491. There is conflicting evidence in the opinion as to whether EED was raised with respect to the
attempted murder charge. See State v. Steedley, No. IK90-06-0183RI, 1994 WL 750302 at 10 (Del. Super.
Ct. Dec. 8, 1994). The case is therefore classified as a single claim.
492. The case was reversed and remanded for a new trial because the EED instruction given may have
impermissibly shifted the burden of proof, in the jurors' minds, to the defendant. See State v. Maelega, 907
P.2d 758, 762~5. 770 (Haw. 1995).
493. The evidence included testimony by a nurse that defendant had "beat up Eyvette in the Labor
& Delivery Room of the hospital." Jd. at 761 n.3. When asked "why," he responded "'that in Samoa it's
okay for them to beat up their wives and their children for obedience."' Jd.
494. The prosecution introduced testimony suggesting that the violence occurred when the victim
"attempted to either leave the relationship or enlist the aid of others in dealing with her abusive husband."
/d. The precise nature of the efforts to leave is unclear, however, from the face of the opinion.
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Hunter v. Commonwealth, 869 S.W.2d 719 (Ky. 1994); Murder
EED instruction denied at guilt phase of trial. 495 The victim, the defendant's wife, died in a fire.

See id. at 720. "[T]here was evidence of the couple's turbulent relationship, accounts of infidelities, the
victims plans to seek an annulment, and a volatile argument the night of the fire." !d. (emphasis added).
"Testimony at trial portrayed a disturbed young man involved in a five-week marriage that suffered from
numerous separations and regular infidelities on the victim's part." /d. at 726.

58.1

McClellan v. Commonwealth, 715 S.W.2d 464 (Ky. 1986); Murder
EED instruction received. See id. at 467, 469. Defendant was the fifth husband of Bernadette

McClellan. See id. at 466. She separated from defendant when he threatened her with a knife and moved
back in with her third husband. See id. The defendant tried to persuade Bernadette to return. See id. One
day, he forced his way into her apartment. See id. When Bernadette emerged unclothed, he killed her
third husband and kidnapped her. See id.
59.1

People v. Berk, 629 N.Y.S.2d 588 (App. Div. 1995), aff'd, 667 N.E.2d 308 (N.Y. 1996);
Murder
EED instruction received. See id. at 590. The defendant and his wife were no longer living together,

and she had filed for divorce. See 667 N.E.2d at 309!96 When he came upon her and her lover
engaged in sexual activity, he shot the man and claimed at trial that the rival had attacked him. See id.
A taped 911 call indicated that the wife had fled the bedroom to call for help. See id. The defendant
followed and shot her while she pleaded for her life. See id. The jury rejected the EED defense,
convicting the defendant of manslaughter for the killing of his estranged wife's lover and second degree
murder for the killing of his wife. See 629 N.Y.S.2d at 590.
60.1

People v. Checo, 599 N.Y.S.2d 244 (App. Div. 1993); Murder
EED instruction received. See id. at 244!97 "Defendant's own testimony indicated that while at

the time in question he had been estranged from the victim, his former wife ,for some time, and had been
experiencing business difficulties, these circumstances were not unusual." /d. (emphasis added). The
court therefore found that defendant's "explanation that he experienced 'emotion' and 'jealousy' at the
mere sight of his former wife in the company of another man, did not provide a 'reasonable explanation
or excuse."' /d. (emphasis added).

495. This case reversed defendant's conviction because the trial court failed to provide EED as a
mitigating factor in the death penalty phase of defendant's murder trial, but makes clear that the trial court
was right to refuse an EED instruction at the guilt phase. See Hunter v. Commonwealth, 869 S.W.2d 719,
726 (Ky. 1994) ("[W]e agree with the trial judge that the evidence did not warrant a guilt-phase instruction
on extreme mental or emotional disturbance under KRS 507.020(l)(a).").
496. Apparently, the defendant testified that immediately prior to the killing and sometime after
midnight he had talked to his wife and "[d]uring the conversation, his wife assured him that she was not
having an affair with Valvo," that "she needed some time to think about their marriage," and they arranged
to meet on the weekend. People v. Berk, 667 N.E.2d 308, 309 (N.Y. 1996). This does not negate the
separation classification since there is also evidence that the victim had filed for divorce and the parties
were living apart. See Appendix A (noting that "some" evidence is standard for classification as separation).
497. The jury rejected the defense and on appeal the court concluded that "[d]efendant failed to prove,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that he acted herein under" EED. People v. Checo, 599 N.Y.S.2d 244,
244 (App. Div. 1993).
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People v. Hartsock, 592 N.Y.S.2d 511 (App. Div. 1993); Attempted Murder
EED instruction received. See id. at 511-12. 498 "In the course of an argument, during which the

victim refused to reconcile with defendant and insisted that it was over between them, defendant shouted
'[l)f I can't have you nobody else [will],"' fired three shots, and shot himself in the stomach. /d. at 511
(emphasis added) (second alteration in the original). Defendant claimed that he was "hurt and upset
because his wife would not reconcile with him, and because she told him that she was sleeping with
other men." /d. Both survived and defendant was convicted of attempted murder. See id.
62.1

People v. Fisher, 576 N.Y.S.2d 603 (App. Div. 1991); Murder
EED instruction received. See id. at 604. The defendant "attempted to establish that he acted under

the influence of extreme emotional disturbance at the time he killed his ex-wife, [but] the People
presented evidence, corroborated by the defendant's own testimony, that the defendant was an angry and
jealous exhusband who had previously threatened to kill the victim." !d. (emphasis added).
People v. White, 564 N.Y.S.2d 314 (App. Div. 1991), aff'd, 590 N.E.2d 236 (N.Y. 1992);

63.A

Murder
EED instruction denied. See 590 N.E.2d at 237. Shortly before the homicide, the victim, the
defendant's wife, had the defendant arrested for breaking her leg. See 564 N. Y.S.2d at 315. The
defendant claimed that he had acted in self-defense and that she had him arrested because he had refused
to buy her drugs. See id. "Released the following day, defendant returned to the home in violation of
an order of protection." !d. (emphasis added). 499 He killed the victim later and based his EED claim
on her taunts about infidelities made three weeks earlier. See id. at 317. On appeal, the court found that
"defendant may have met his burden with respect to the first element of the ... defense by evidence
of a violent and tumultuous relationship with his wife," 590 N.E.2d at 238, but that the evidence of
provocative acts were too remote in time, see id.

64.1

People v. Olmstead, 521 N.Y.S.2d 192 (App. Div. 1987); Attempted Manslaughter
EED manslaughter verdict returned. See id. at 193. "Defendant and the victim ... were married

in December 1984 and separated in March 1985. At that time, defendant was upset because [the victim]
apparently wanted an annulment and because defendant believed she was having an affair with another
man." /d. (emphasis added). The jury found defendant guilty only of attempted first degree manslaughter.
See id.
65.1

People v. Maggio, 494 N.Y.S.2d 424 (App. Div. 1985); Manslaughter
Defendant pled guilty to first degree manslaughter based on EED. See id. at 425. The defendant

and his wife had a "history of separations and reconciliations." /d. (emphasis added). While attempting
another reconciliation, defendant learned from his wife that she had spent "the previous five nights with
another man," and she laughed when defendant expressed doubt about the paternity of his second child.
/d. (emphasis added). Enraged, he repeatedly stabbed his estranged wife with a knife. See id.

498. The defendant appealed the "jury's rejection of his affirmative [EED] defense." People v.
Hartsock, 592 N.Y.S.2d 511, 511 (App. Div. 1993).
499. This factor puts the case in the "separation and infidelity" category.
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People v. Fediuk, 480 N.Y.S.2d 913 (App. Div. 1984), aff'd, 489 N.E.2d 732 (N.Y. 1985);
Murder

Defendant argued EED and the issue was "closely contested" at trial. /d. at 913.soo "Five months
after separating from his wife and their two children, during which time she lived in a battered women's

shelter and told defendant that she no longer loved him, defendant learned that his wife had been seeing
another man .... " 489 N.E.2d at 733 (emphasis added). "Prior to the shooting, defendant's wife had
obtained an order of protection .... At the time of their separation, Mrs. Fediuk made it clear to
defendant that she no longer loved him and that there was no possibility of reconciliation." 480

N.Y.S.2d at 915 (Weinstein, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Defendant threatened his wife and killed
her boyfriend. See id. at 914-15 (Weinstein, J., dissenting). On appeal, one justice concluded that the
defendant's verdict should be reduced to EED manslaughter based on the "long-term overwhelming stress
caused by the rejection and unfaithfulness of his wife." /d. at 914 (Weinstein, J., dissenting).

67.1

State v. Huber, 361 N.W.2d 236 (N.D. 1985); Murder, Attempted Murder' 01 (victim:
estranged wife)
EED instruction received with respect to estranged wife, estranged wife's alleged lover, wife of

lover, and wife's sister-in-law. See id. at 239 & n.l. Defendant was upset about an "impending divorce"
between defendant and his wife. /d. at 241 (emphasis added). He "believed that his wife, Gladys, was

having an affair with ... her boss at the bank where she worked." /d. Evidence was presented showing
that the defendant believed that the boss's wife knew about the affair and because of that knowledge had
to be "terminated." /d. He was also angry with his brother-in-law and his wife, blaming his sister-in-law
for the divorce. See id.

68.1

State v. Huber, 361 N.W.2d 236 (N.D. 1985); Murder (same case, different victim: estranged
wife's alleged lover)

69.1

State v. Huber, 361 N.W.2d 236 (N.D. 1985); Murder (same case, different victim: wife of
lover)

70.1

State v. Huber, 361 N.W.2d 236 (N.D. 1985); Murder (same case, different victim: wife's
sister-in-law)

71.1

State v. Ott, 686 P.2d 1001 (Or. 1984); Murder
EED instruction received. See id. at 1003. Defendant and victim were separated on and off over

a period of years.s 02 During the last separation, the victim "began to live with another man." /d. at

500. This case is classified as a "yes" instruction because the defendant clearly argued the defense and
because, if a dissenting judge could reduce the verdict to manslaughter based on the record, see People v.
Fediuk, 480 N.Y.S.2d 913,914 (App. Div. 1984), there must have been sufficient evidence to reach a jury.
50 I. Defendant was convicted of four counts of murder and one of attempted murder. The opinion
makes clear that the EED instruction applied to all four murder counts; indeed, one of the issues in the case
was whether the defendant could argue EED when he killed third parties. The court ruled definitively "yes."
State v. Huber, 361 N.W.2d 236, 241 (N.D. 1985).
502. The court described this relationship as follows:
[Defendant] had been warned by the "authorities" to stay away from Stephanie. She apparently
caused him to be placed under a judicial restraining order; however, despite her obtaining the
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1004 (emphasis added). The defendant reacted with extreme stress and threatened to kill her. See id.
When the defendant's stepson was hurt and in the hospital, the defendant and the victim saw each other
three times and the defendant believed that "the relationship was improving." /d. "He was thus angered
an disappointed when his wife's new lover appeared at the hospital ... ."/d. "Defendant left the hospital
.... retrieved a .22 rifle ... caught up with his wife and her lover, ran their truck off the road and shot
his wife three times." /d.
72.IA

State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39 (Utah 1990); Murder

EED instructions received. See id. at 42, 44. Defendant and victim, Cindy, lived together with her
three children. See id. at 40. "Early in the morning, Cindy arrived home accompanied by a man, whom
she introduced to appellant as her new boyfriend." /d. at 41 (emphasis added). The defendant refused
to allow him to enter and the victim "became angry and ordered" the defendant to leave. /d. (emphasis

added). The defendant and victim argued and she told him to leave again. See id. "Appellant refused.
Cindy again ordered appellant to leave and threw a piece of pottery at him, smashing it against the wall."
/d. 503 He stabbed her and attempted to choke her oldest child. See id. At trial, defendant argued that

he was "enraged and upset by being replaced as Cindy's boyfriend and being ordered out of the
household after having diligently cared for Cindy's children." /d. at 44.

73.I

State v. Florez, 777 P.2d 452 (Utah 1989); Murder
EED instruction received. See id. at 458. Defendant and his girlfriend, Dana Montes, had argued

and he had packed his belongings, moving out of her home. See id. at 453. That night she started "a
new relationship with Steve Meyers, the victim." !d. (emphasis added). Four days later, the defendant

returned, entered through a window, and found Dana naked and sleeping with her new lover. See id. The
defendant became enraged and killed the rival. See id.
74.1

State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981 (Utah 1989); Murder
EED instruction received. See id. at 981. Defendant was engaged to a woman, Janet, who had

decided to "break off their relationship and began to move defendant's clothing out of the bedroom."

/d. at 982 (emphasis added). The victim wanted to date another man, Mike Bickley, a close friend of
the defendant's, who was present at the time. See id. Defendant asked Bickley whether he felt guilty.
See id. Bickley said "yes," and told defendant that he had difficulty having sexual relations with Janet.

Defendant became enraged, grabbed a knife and stabbed Janet in the back. See id.
75.I

State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750 (Utah 1986); Murder
EED instruction received. See id. at 755. The defendant believed that Johnson, the victim, had been

order, Stephanie telephoned him regarding their divorce. They engaged in an apparently
protracted series of arguments on the telephone over child custody, which eventuated in the
defendant's arrest and jailing for harassment. Even though they engaged in arguments and
fights, they continued to associate. Defendant could not stay away from Stephanie and Stephanie
did not always discourage his attentions.
State v. Ott, 686 P.2d 1001, 1004 (Or. 1984).
503. Since defendant's own theory of the case does not depend upon physical violence, but instead
upon infidelity and "being forced to leave," State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39, 44 (Utah 1990), the case has not
been classified as a physical violence case, see Appendix A.
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seeing someone else. 504 "The homicide apparently occurred after a lengt~y argument between Johnson
and Cloud, in which Johnson told Cloud that she intended to break their engagement. Cloud .... later
admitted killing her." /d. at 751 (emphasis added). Defendant argued in his defense that his alcoholism,
"coupled with his distress over a prior divorce and the traumatic prospect of another failed relationship"
created an EED. /d.
III. SIMPLE INFIDELITY (16 Total; 12 l's)
76.1

Lovelace v. Lopes, 632 F. Supp. 306 (D. Conn. 1986), aff'd mem., 802 F.2d 443 (2d Cir.
1986);505 Murder
EED instruction received. See id. at 308-09. The defendant's wife had confessed her infidelity to

him and they subsequently argued when defendant sought to discover the identity of his rival. See id.
at 308. The defendant then shot her in the leg and chest with a 12-gauge shotgun. See id. At trial,
defendant "called two psychiatrists in support of his claim that he had acted under the influence of an
extreme emotional disturbance." /d.
77.1

Dixon v. State, 597 S.W.2d 77 (Ark. 1980); Manslaughter
Defendant received manslaughter jury verdict. 506 The defendant and the victim had decided to

marry and went to celebrate at a local bar. See id. at 78. When the victim asked an acquaintance to
dance with her, defendant "became jealous and went home." /d. When he returned, he saw his fiancee
dancing with another man, and knocked her down. See id. Later that evening he beat her and she was
taken to a hospital. See id. She died twelve days later. See id.
78.1F

Worring v. State, 638 S.W.2d 678 (Ark. Ct. App. 1982), on appeal after remand from 616
S.W.2d 23 (Ark. Ct. App. 1981); Manslaughter
Defendant was convicted by a jury of manslaughter. See id. at 679. 507 The defendant had

"followed her husband's truck to a darkened area behind a truck terminal .... [D]efendent found her
husband seated in a parked automobile with [another woman] .... The confrontation ended with
[defendant's] husband being shot." /d.
79.1

State v. Valera, 848 P.2d 376 (Haw. 1993); Manslaughter (victim: wife)
Defendant "was found guilty by a jury of two counts of manslaughter" based on EED. /d. at 377;

see also id. at 382 & n.9. Suspecting his wife of adultery, he followed her and another man. See id. at

504. See Brief for Appellant at 4-5, State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750 (Utah 1986) (No. 19884).
505. This is a post-conviction ruling based on the Connecticut decision in State v. Lovelace, 469 A.2d
391 (Conn. 1983).
506. The appellate court found sufficient evidence to support the manslaughter verdict under either
an EED or a recklessness theory. See Dixon v. State, 597 S.W.2d 77, 80 (Ark. 1980) ("We think the
evidence was more than sufficient to support a conviction for manslaughter under either § 41-1504(1 )(a)
[EED] or§ 41-1504(l)(c) [recklessness].").
507. "There was ample evidence from which the jury could find that appellant either recklessly caused
her husband's death, or that she caused his death under [EED]." Worring v. State, 638 S.W.2d 678, 682
(Ark. Ct. App. 1982).
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378 n.2. When he saw the man's pants undone, he fired shots into the car, and as she fled he shot her.
See id. The defendant killed both his wife and her "alleged lover." /d.

80.1

State v. Valera, 848 P.2d 376 (Haw. 1993); Manslaughter (same case, different victim:
alleged lover)

81.1

Grooms v. Commonwealth, 756 S.W.2d 131 (Ky. 1988); Murder
EED instruction received. See id. at 141. Defendant, an inmate at a Kentucky penitentiary, killed

a female prison employee. See id. at 133. The defense argued that the defendant, "somewhat mentally
retarded, fantasized about a relationship with the victim and was taunted into an uncontrollable rage,"
id. at 138, when fellow inmates, who had once teased him that the victim was the defendant's girlfriend,

now teased him that "she was having a relationship with another man," id. ~ 08 The jury was instructed
on EED and the appeals court stated that, upon retrial, "'extreme emotional disturbance' should be
defined in the instructions." /d. at 141.
82.A

Smith v. Commonwealth, 737 S.W.2d 683 (Ky. 1987); Murder
EED instruction denied. See id. at 686. The defendant stated that he was "tired of [the victim) ...

trying to ... get [his girlfriend] to go to bed with him," apparently in exchange for drugs. /d. at 685-86.
He argued, on appeal, that he should have received an EED instruction because he came upon his
girlfriend with the victim in a car with his pants down. See id. at 686. Evidence presented at trial
suggested that the girlfriend and the defendant had actually set up the murder. See id. at 685.
83.1

Estes v. Commonwealth, 744 S.W.2d 421 (Ky. 1987); Manslaughter
Defendant "was convicted of first degree manslaughter in the shooting death of his wife's lover."

/d. at 422. "On the night in question, at the [defendant's] insistence, [the wife, Cindy] telephoned [her
lover] in the [defendant's] presence, and arranged to meet him." !d. at 423. The defendant "then got a
gun, cut the telephone cord to prevent [the wife] from calling [her lover] back to warn him, and departed
in his truck to keep the appointment." /d. Although the wife's statement was improperly not excluded
and the court therefore reversed and remanded, see id. at 425, the court found that, "[t)here was ample
evidence that at the time of the shooting the [defendant] was enraged with jealousy, justifying an
instruction on Manslaughter," id. at 426.
84.1

People v. Aphaylath, 502 N.E.2d 998 (N.Y. 1986); Murder
Defendant relied upon an EED defense.~ 09 Defendant, a Laotian refugee, was convicted of murder

in the second degree after killing his wife of one month because of his jealousy over his wife's apparent
preference for an ex-boyfriend, suspicions he based on telephone calls between his wife and her ex-

508. That the defendant in this case apparently fantasized about the relationship and the affair does
not distinguish it materially from a variety of other so-called "infidelity" cases in which the allegations are
demonstrably false or simply ungrounded fears. Nor does it distinguish it in law because the EED defense
depends upon the defendant's perception.
509. The issue on appeal was whether evidence related to EED had been improperly excluded from
the jury's consideration. See People v. Aphaylath, 502 N.E.2d 998 (N.Y. 1986). This would not have been
an issue if the EED defense was not properly before the jury; hence the case is classified as a "yes"
instruction.
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boyfriend. See id. at 999. The defendant attempted to convince the jury that under Laotian norms this
brought overwhelming embarrassment and shame to him. See id.
85.1

People v. Dansa, 569 N.Y.S.2d 535 (App. Div. 1991); Murder
EED instruction received: "Defendant ... offered an affirmative defense of extreme emotional

disturbance ... which, if accepted by the jury, would have pennitted it to reduce the murder count to
manslaughter in the first degree." !d. at 537. Defendant claimed he shot his girlfriend because "she had
been unfaithful." /d. at 537-38.
86.1

People v. Rowe, 568 N.Y.S.2d 648 {App. Div. 1991); Murder
Defendant argued "[a]t trial ... that he was laboring under [EED] at the time of the killing," id.

at 649, and expert testimony was received "concerning the defendant's emotional state," id. at 650. 510
Defendant killed the victim with a hammer, after finding him in bed with the defendant's long-time
girlfriend. See id. at 649. He was picked up by the police while driving the victim's car. See id.
87.A

People v. Shegog, 547 N.Y.S.2d 725 (App. Div. 1989); Murder, Attempted Murder (victim:
wife)
EED instruction denied with regard to both victims. See id. at 726. The defendant shot his wife and

sister at close range, killing his wife and wounding his sister. See id. The defendant "did testify to some
marital discord and jealousy, but minimized its effect on him emotionally." !d. The court found this
insufficiently "indicative" of the "loss of self-control associated" with EED. /d.
88.A

People v. Shegog, 547 N.Y.S.2d 725 (App. Div. 1989); Murder, Attempted Murder (same
case, different victim: sister)

89.1

People v. David, 533 N.Y.S.2d 627 (App. Div. 1988); Murder
EED instruction received. 511 After finding that his twenty-two-year-old wife had been involved

with another man, defendant slashed her throat in front of their two children. See id. at 628. The
defendant confessed to the murder, "explaining that they argued when he found a letter in her purse
alluding to her relationship with another man." /d. at 629. According to the defendant, "[a]lthough he
was very angry, they attempted a reconciliation only to realize that their relationship would never be the
same because 'she wasn't pure anymore.' ... [S]he wanted him to kill her and he complied." /d.
90.A

People v. Lyness, 495 N.Y.S.2d 848 (App. Div. 1985); Attempted Murder
EED instruction denied. See id. at 849. After consuming large quantities of alcohol and drugs,

defendant armed himself with a shotgun and went in pursuit of wife's lover, intending to shoot him. See
id. While attempting to elude capture for car theft, defendant shot a police officer. See id. On appeal,

510. This case is classified as a "yes" instruction because the defendant relied upon the defense and
presented evidence for it, and the appeals court indicated that the issue of intent relating to the emotional
state was left to the jury. See People v. Rowe, 568 N.Y.S.2d 648, 650 (App. Div. 1991).
511. See People v. David, 533 N.Y.S.2d 627, 629 (App. Div. 1988) ("[E]ven if the jury did accept
that the defendant murdered his wife while under the influence of 'extreme emotional disturbance' .... ").
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the court found that defendant's rage about the infidelity did not prompt the shooting of the officer. See
id.

91.1

State v. Davis, 606 P.2d 671 (Or. Ct. App. 1980); Murder
EED instruction received. See id. at 673. Defendant claimed that he beat his female roommate to

death with the barrel of a shotgun because of "an alleged sexual affair she had with a neighbor." !d. at
672. The defendant also told police that the devil was in the victim and that he had to kill her. See id.
At trial, the jury could have either found that he suffered from a "mental disease or defect" or found
"that he was suffering from an extreme emotional disturbance and thus guilty of manslaughter." !d. at
673.
IV. PHYSICAL VIOLENCE (22 Total; 17 I's)

A.

92.

Physical Violence and Separation
State v. Blades, 626 A.2d 273 (Conn. 1993); Murder

Defendant urged EED defense to a three-judge panel, which rejected it. See id. at 275. Defendant
based his claim on the fact that he had a "marriage beset by troubles," prompted by the burning of his
child in a fire. /d. After the fire, the defendant left the marital home but returned. See id. "The victim
did not want the defendant back in the house . ... [S]he was afraid of the defendant and . .. she wanted
a divorce and a restraining order barring him from the house." /d. (emphasis added). 512 Defendant
claimed that on the day of the homicide, they argued and his wife picked up a knife, cut him with it,
and he then stabbed her. See id. at 282.
93.1

State v. Robinson, 903 P.2d 1289 (Haw. 1995); Murder
EED instruction received. See id. at 1290. Defendant alleged that he and the victim had been

arguing and that she went into a rage, told him to leave, and physically attacked him. See id. at 1290-91.
Defendant tried to walk away but the victim punched him in the back at which point he "snapped." !d.
at 1291. She died of asphyxiation. See id. Evidence was admitted at trial that the victim "wanted to get
out of the relationship," id. (emphasis added), that she mentioned that her family lived in Las Vegas and
she might make a good living there, see id., and that on the night of the killing the defendant awakened
the victim "wanting to make love to her, but that she did not want to be bothered," id. at 1290 n.3.
B.
94.1

Physical Violence, Separation, and Infidelity
Crook v. State, No. CACR92-1114, 1993 Ark. App. LEXIS 537 (Ct. App. Sept. 29, 1993);
Murder

Defendant claimed an EED defense and the appeals court found reasonably that the jury could have
rejected a manslaughter verdict. See id. at *4. Defendant "testified that he and his wife had been having
512. Briefs in this case indicate that the parties were still living together at the time of the killing and
that both parties sought a divorce. The victim had scheduled a meeting with a lawyer on the day of the
homicide to discuss a variety of matters, including a divorce. See Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 2, State
v. Blades, 626 A.2d 273 (Conn. 1993) (No. 14383).
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problems, they had been separated for several weeks and his wife was having an affair." /d. at *3
(emphasis added). The day of the shooting, he returned to their apartment to find the locks had been
changed. See id. at *4. As he was leaving, he ran into her, they argued, and she jabbed a pen into his
arm, telling him she was going to kill him. See id.
95.

State v. Gaynor, 880 P.2d 947 (Or. Ct. App. 1994); Murder
Defendant presented EED defense at a bench trial and argued on appeal that the court should have

granted a motion for acquittal based on EED. See id. at 950-51. The defendant claimed that he "had
been suffering from confusion and depression for many months, perhaps even years, prior to this incident
as a result of his separation and divorce." /d. at 950 (emphasis added). His ex-wife's "dating Robert
Cross was too much for defendant to handle." /d. Defendant also claimed that, before he killed Cross,
Cross attacked him physically. See id. at 949.
96.1

State v. Lyon, 672 P.2d 1358 (Or. Ct. App. 1983); Murder
Defendant asserted an EED defense. See id. at 1359. 513 The defendant and his wife were divorced.

See id. "His ex-wife had been seeing the victim, Briggs, on a regular basis. Defendant was also a
frequent visitor at his ex-wife's house, and friction developed between Briggs and him. On the night in
question, defendant went, unannounced, to his ex-wife's house to pick up some important papers." /d.
(emphasis added). Defendant "arrived there armed with a rifle and a pistol, ... went to his ex-wife's
bedroom, where he found her in bed with Briggs. Briggs had concealed a revolver under the covers and
fired through them, wounding defendant. Defendant fired back, killing Briggs." /d.
C.
97.1AF

Physical Violence and Infidelity
State v. Bryan, 641 A.2d 443 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994), overruled by State v. Person, 673 A.2d
463 (Conn. 1996); Murder

EED instruction denied at trial and conviction was reversed on appeal for failure to instruct. See
id. at 444. The victim and a man named Dawes were involved for several years and had a child together.
See id. During a period in which Dawes and the victim were separated, Dawes started dating the
defendant. See id. Eventually, the victim and Dawes resumed dating, but the defendant and Dawes
remained friends. See id. The defendant claimed she killed the victim at Dawes's home after the victim
demanded that she leave and they engaged in a fist fight. See id. at 447. 514
98.AI

State v. Dumlao, 715 P.2d 822 (Haw. Ct. App. 1986); Murder

EED instruction denied at trial but conviction was reversed for failure to instruct. See id. at 831-32.
A psychiatrist testified that defendant suffered from "pathological jealousy," "harbor[ing] the belief that
other males, including his wife's relatives, were somehow sexually involved with her." /d. at 831. "For

513. Defendant's argument on appeal that the jury's instructions unconstitutionally shifted the burden
of proof to him presumes that such instructions were given. See State v. Lyon, 672 P.2d 1358, 1359 (Or.
Ct. App. 1983).
514. This case is classified as "physical violence and infidelity" rather than "physical violence,
infidelity, and separation" because the primary relationship between Dawes and the victim was back "on,"
when the victim told the defendant (her rival) to leave.
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example, when somebody glanced or gazed at his wife, he would consider it a personal affront and could
well believe that a sexual overture had been made to her." /d. This extreme jealousy had caused
defendant to beat and threaten to kill his wife. See id. On the night of the killing, the defendant testified
that he believed one of his brothers-in-law was sleeping with his wife, that his brother-in-law rushed at
him with a knife saying, '"[m]y sister suffer ten years. You going to pay,"' and that the gun went off
killing his mother-in-law. /d. at 832.
D.

99.1A

Physical Violence

Rainey v. State, 837 S.W.2d 453 (Ark. 1992); Murder

EED instruction denied. See id. at 454. Defendant's conviction was reversed on appeal for failure
to instruct. See id. at 457. The defendant and the victim had engaged in sexual intercourse and had a
fight afterwards. See id. at 454. The victim picked up the gun that the defendant had left in the kitchen
and threatened to tell his wife about their affair. See id. m She then tried to fire the. gun at him and
after a struggle defendant shot the victim in the head four times. See id.

IOO.IF

McDonald v. State, 852 S.W.2d 833 (Ark. Ct. App. 1993); Manslaughter

Defendant was charged with second degree murder, "but was instead convicted of manslaughter,
which is committed by one who 'causes ... death ... under the influence of [EED]."' /d. at 836
(citation omitted). The defendant admitted that she shot and killed her live-in boyfriend, but claimed that
he had a history of violent behavior toward her and that he had precipitated the killing by violent acts.
See id.

101.1

Donovan v. State, 764 S.W.2d 47 (Ark. Ct. App. 1989); Manslaughter
EED instruction received and jury convicted defendant of manslaughter. See id. at 50. 516 The

defendant claimed that when he and his girlfriend arrived home, she became agitated and began throwing
things at him. See id. at 47. When she attempted to throw the television set, he claims to have pushed
her aside and taken the television away from her, at which time she fell and died. See id. Expert medical
testimony at trial showed belt bruises on her neck, fist marks on her face, and a footprint on her back.
See id. at 48.

102.1

State v. Manfredi, 569 A.2d 506 (Conn. 1990); Manslaughter
Defendant was convicted of EED manslaughter. See id. at 507. The defendant testified that he and

his wife argued and that she slapped and punched him, along with hitting him with a baseball bat. See
id. at 509 n.6. The defendant argued at trial that this caused a "catathymic crisis," reviving his "feelings

of humiliation, degradation and rage over being hit with a yardstick as a child." /d. at 509-10. The
defendant then struck and killed his wife with the bat, before placing her in a car and staging an
automobile accident. See id. at 509 n.9.

515. Since this is the defendant's, rather than the provoking party's affair, this case is not classified
as "physical violence and infidelity." See Appendix A.
516. It is unclear whether the verdict was based on EED or recklessness. See Donovan v. State, 764
S.W.2d 47, 50 (Ark. Ct. App. 1989).
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State v. D'Antuono, 441 A.2d 846 (Conn. 1982); Murder
EED defense rejected by three-judge panel, which convicted defendant of murder. See id. at 847.

The defendant claimed that he and victim had engaged in sexual intercourse after a date and then had
an argument. See id. at 848. The defendant alleged that the victim had attempted to stab him. See id. The
victim was stabbed to death. See id. at 509 n.6
104.1

Ross v. State, 482 A.2d 727 (Del. 1984); Murder
EED instruction received. See id. at 737. The defendant rented a room in a woman's trailer home.

See id. at 731. She told him "lurid tales charging [her estranged husbandf 17 with wife-beating and
sexual abuse as well as cruel and inhuman treatment of their handicapped child. She asked Ross if he
would be willing to kill her husband; and Ross answered, 'Yes."' /d. The jury was instructed on EED
based on defendant's claim that he killed the estranged husband believing the abuse of the wife and child
was wrong. See id. at 737.
105.F

McBride v. State, 477 A.2d 174 (Del. 1984); Murder

EED instruction unknown. Defendant was convicted of first degree murder for the death of her
husband. See id. at 177. Defendant was alleged to have conspired with Ross (see above) to kill her
estranged spouse. See id. at 178-79. The defendant had been separated from the victim for three months
and "had also filed for divorce." /d. at 178. 518 The defendant alleged that the victim had physically
abused her and their handicapped son. See id. The defendant appears to have raised an EED defense at
trial, but it is unclear whether the jury was instructed on EED. 519
106.1

Hale v. Commonwealth, No. 85-SC-818-MR, available in LEXIS, State Library, Kycts File
(Ky. Dec. 18, 1986); Murder
EED instruction received. 520 The defendant was the new boyfriend of a woman who had recently

divorced her husband, the victim. See slip op. at I. The defendant testified "that the victim pulled his
truck off the road, struck him in the stomach, grabbed him by the hair and said that he was going to die
because he was a wife-stealer." /d. The defendant claimed EED based on "acts and words" (i.e., physical
violence and "wife-stealer") and argued that he was susceptible to EED "when faced with threat of
physical injury due to a gunshot wound he suffered in 1976." /d. 521
517. This is not classified as a "separation and physical violence" case because the claim is not that
the provoking party/victim left a defendant who sought to continue the relationship; the wife, McBride,
sought to leave.
518. Since we know that the defendant, rather than the provoking party, caused this separation, the
case is not classified as "physical violence and separation." There was also evidence that she had been
unfaithful, dating another man, while she and the defendant were still living together. See McBride v. State,
477 A.2d 174, 178 (Del. 1984).
519. "In anticipation of her defense that she killed under extreme emotional distress and acted in
justification due to physical, sexual and emotional abuse inflicted upon her and her children, defendant
submitted the following questions to be asked of the array during jury selection .... " /d. at 190.
520. The appellate court stated at one point that "[t]he trial judge refused to give any instruction
relative to extreme emotional disturbance." Hale v. Commonwealth, No. 85-SC-1818-MR, slip op. at 2 (Ky.
Dec. 18, 1986). Later, however, the court described the jury instructions that were given on EED and
concluded: "We believe the trial judge instructed on the mitigating defense of extreme emotional
disturbance sufficiently under the circumstances." /d.
521. This case is not classified as a "physical violence, infidelity, and departure" because it was the
defendant's own claimed "infidelity" that led to the fight.
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People v. Cutting, 621 N.Y.S.2d 149 (App. Div. 1994); Murder

EED instruction received. See id. at 150. Defendant "claimed that she went to the scene to discuss
repayment of the loans decedent had made to her. She also stated that decedent threatened to tell her
husband about the loans and that she shot decedent when he tried to force himself upon her." /d.
Defendant's EED claim was based on "her husband's abuse and fear of her husband's reaction" if he
found out about the loans. /d.
108.A

People v. Murden, 593 N.Y.S.2d 837 (App. Div. 1993); Murder

EED instruction denied. See id. at 838. Defendant testified that he and his girlfriend were arguing
over "his living arrangements" when the argument became violent. /d. According to the defendant, he
wrested a knife from his girlfriend's grasp and then blacked out and did not recall stabbing her nineteen
times. See id.
109.1F

People v. Ciervo, 506 N.Y.S.2d 462 (App. Div. 1986); Manslaughter' 22

EED instruction received, see id. at 463, and defendant was convicted of manslaughter, see id. at
462. Defendant claimed complete justification "alleging that she acted in the defense of herself and her
children, as her son was being beaten by the decedent on the morning of the shooting." /d. at 463.
Evidence was admitted in the case that the defendant was a "drug user, a neglectful mother, an
adulteress, and an inadequate housekeeper," on the theory "that the jury was entitled to know whether
the defendant's actions provoked her husband into beating her"-evidence found "properly admitted"
but necessitating a limiting instruction. /d. at 464-65.
110.1F

People v. Emick, 481 N.Y.S.2d 552 (App. Div. 1984); Manslaughte,J 21

Defendant indicted for and convicted of EED manslaughter. See id. at 553, 560. Defendant shot
her husband in the head while he was sleeping. See id. at 553. When police arrived at the scene, she told
them that "decedent had been physically abusing her for the past year and a half and that, on the evening
before the shooting, [the decedent] told her that he wanted her to commit suicide or he would kill her."
/d. at 554. 524
11l.IF

People v. Powell, 424 N.Y.S.2d 626 (Tompkins County Ct. 1980), ajf'd, 442 N.Y.S.2d 645
(App. Div. 1981); Murder

EED instruction received. See id. at 631. Defendant testified that the victim had '"beat her up' on
the average of twice a week and she had been confined in several hospitals as a result; that she had
divorced [the victim] as she could not take any more beatings." /d. at 628. A year after the divorce,
defendant dropped off her son for visitation, found the decedent smoking marijuana, and reported it to
the police. See 442 N.Y.S.2d at 646. When the defendant returned for her son several days later, the

522. Based on other errors in the trial, the murder count was dismissed with leave to reapply for an
indictment to the grand jury. See People v. Ciervo, 506 N.Y.S.2d 462, 463 (App. Div. 1986).
523. At trial, the jury was instructed to "presuppose the existence of extreme emotional disturbance,"
an instruction that the defendant claimed prejudiced her justification claim. Lack of explanation of the limits
of the presumption was held to be error. People v. Emick, 481 N.Y.S.2d 552, 562 (App. Div. 1984).
524. During the argument, defendant "repeatedly asked her if she had ever had sex" with another man,
id. at 554, which the victim denied. If true, this would be the defendant's, not the victim's, infidelity, and
therefore the case is not classified as "physical violence and infidelity." See Appendix A.

1997]

Passion's Progress

1439

victim insisted on driving the defendant and her son back to their home. See id. During the drive, he
pulled a gun, "menacing defendant with it, and further, he angrily expressed his disapproval" of
defendant's call to the police. /d. Instead of returning home, the victim searched for a hotel room. See
id. When he fell asleep after stopping at a motel, the defendant removed the gun from his pants. See id.

As she did so, he awoke and the gun went off, shooting him in the heart. See 424 N.Y.S.2d at 629.
Other evidence suggested that the defendant had purchased the gun and intended to harm the victim. See
442 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
State v. Hessel, 844 P.2d 209 (Or. Ct. App. 1992); Murde~ 25

112.!

EED instruction received. See id. at 211 n.2. After meeting the victim, she and the defendant
parked in his car, where they engaged in oral sex. See id. at 210. After the victim bit defendant's penis,
he proceeded to strangle her. See id. On appeal, defendant argued that it was improper for the jury to
be instructed "that EED is available as a partial defense to intentional murder but not to aggravated
murder." /d. at 211.
113.IF

State v. Strieby, 790 P.2d 98 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Manslaughter

EED verdict received after a bench trial. See id. at 99. She claimed that she acted in self-defense.
See id. While defendant and victim were drinking, a struggle ensued during which the victim tried to

slap the defendant and pinned her to the floor by the throat. See id. The defendant left and later another
struggle ensued between the defendant and the victim. See id. This time, defendant shot the victim as
he ascended the stairs after her, refusing to leave at her request. See id. Defendant appealed the decision
on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to convict her of manslaughter. See id. 526
IV. OTHER (20 Total; 7 I's)
114.!

State v. Watlington, 579 A.2d 490 (Conn. 1990); Murder (victim: brother-in-law), Assault
(victim: wife) 527
EED instruction received. See id. at 495. The defendant's brother-in-law, the victim, had moved

into the defendant's house. See id. at 496. Subsequently, the defendant's wife had stopped drug treatment
and returned to alcohol and crack use. See id. The defendant ordered the victim to leave the house. See
id. When he refused several times, the defendant shot him. See id. Upon hearing the shot, the defendant's

wife entered the room and was shot and injured. See id. The defendant then shot and killed the victim.
See id.

115.!

State v. Marino, 462 A.2d 1021 (Conn. 1983); Manslaughter
On appeal, defendant argued, inter alia, that there was insufficient evidence to support a

manslaughter verdict. See id. at 1023. He claimed that he and the victim had been arguing about a skiing

525. Defendant was charged with several counts of aggravated and intentional murder, although there
appears to be only a single victim. See State v. Hessel, 844 P.2d 209 (Or. Ct. App. 1992).
526. On appeal, the court found that the state had failed to prove the elements of manslaughter beyond
a reasonable doubt. See State v. Strieby, 790 P.2d 98, 101 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
527. It is unclear whether the defendant received an EED charge with respect to both victims; hence
the case is only counted as a "single victim" case.
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trip and that she had said she would kill herself if he did not let her go, which she then did. See id. at
I 027. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to convict under all versions of
manslaughter, 528 including EED manslaughter based on "the evidence of the relationship of the
defendant to the victim, the quarrel which preceded the shooting and his distraught appearance at the
time the police arrived." /d. at 1028.
116.

State v. Zdanis, 438 A.2d 696 (Conn. 1980); Murder
EED defense rejected at trial by three-judge panel. See id. at 698. The defendant arrived home late

one evening and argued with his wife. See id. at 699. He testified that his wife complained that he was
never at home and threatened to commit suicide. See id. He further testified that in a struggle with her
over the gun, 529 two shots hit his stepdaughter. See id. The defendant then followed his wife outside
the apartment, shot her, and himself. 530 At trial, he claimed that he "was upset about the impending
death of his niece, his marriage problem and the possible suicide by his wife." /d. at 700. 531
117.1

State v. Holbron, 904 P.2d 912 (Haw. 1995); Attempted Murder
Defendant "requested-and the circuit court agreed to give-instructions regarding the mitigating

defense of attempted manslaughter by virtue of 'extreme mental or emotional disturbance."' /d. at 916.
The defendant became violent after his girlfriend arrived at his home with dinner, which he rejected. See
id. at 915. He poured gasoline on her and threw two lit matches at her, the second of which caused the

gasoline to ignite. See id. The victim suffered severe bums as the house burned down. See id. The issue
on appeal was whether the defendant could be convicted of attempted reckless homicide. See id. at 916.
118.A

Whitaker v. Commonwealth, 895 S.W.2d 953 (Ky. 1995); Murder

EED instruction denied at trial and appellate court found no error. See id. at 954. The defendant
went to his estranged wife's place of employment, supposedly to sign some tax documents. See id. He
proceeded to shoot her in the head at close range. See id. 532
119.A

Morgan v. Commonwealth, 878 S.W.2d 18 (Ky. 1994); Murder

EED instruction denied. See id. at 19. On his thirtieth birthday, the defendant met with his wife
and had a brief celebration before he picked up his mistress and went to a party. See id. Bills and papers
were found strewn about when police found the wife dead. See id. at 20. Apparently, the defendant
claimed an instruction based on the theory that the couple had argued about the "other woman." See id.
The appellate court found any such inference speculative. See id.

528. If the evidence was legally sufficient to convict, it was obviously legally sufficient to send the
case to a jury had it been tried to a jury. Hence, the case is coded as a "yes" instruction.
529. Defendant claimed EED in the alternative; he did not argue that the physical violence of the
struggle enraged him and caused him to shoot the victim. See State v. Zdanis, 438 A.2d 696, 698, 700
(Conn. 1980).
530. On appeal, the court suggested that the defendant's claim that the daughter's death was accidental
was inconsistent with an EED claim, but appeared to consider the defense with respect to his killing of his
wife. See id. at 700. Because of ambiguities about whether the claim was asserted with respect to both
victims, the case is counted as a "single victim" case.
531. The only murder count here was for the death of the stepdaughter. See id. at 698.
532. This case appears similar to the "departure" cases but there are insufficient facts to confidently
place it in that category. Hence, it was placed in "other."
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People v. Moye, 489 N.E.2d 736 (N.Y. 1985); Murder

EED instruction denied at trial but appellate court ruled that an EED instruction should have been
granted. See id. at 739. The defendant and victim attempted intercourse and after the defendant was
unable to maintain an erection, she began laughing at him, "poking at him, saying, 'go on little boy. I
don't need you."'ld. at 738. The defendant then decapitated and eviscerated her. See id. The court found
that there was sufficient evidence for submission to the jury of an "explanation or excuse for defendant's
emotional state, in his recounting of the victim's continued ridicule and taunting about his impotence."
/d. at 739.m

12l.A

People v. Matthews, 632 N.Y.S.2d 298 (App. Div. 1995); Murder

EED instruction denied. See id. at 300. The victim and the defendant, who was in a relationship
with someone else, engaged in sexual intercourse. See id. The defendant testified that he became
emotionally disturbed afterwards upon being told by the victim that she had given him "a present,"
referring to a sexually transmitted disease. /d.
122.I

People v. Liebman, 583 N.Y.S.2d 234 (App. Div. 1992); Manslaughter
Defendant convicted of second degree murder, but the appellate court reduced the verdict to

manslaughter based on EED. See id. at 242-43. The defendant's relationship with the victim was very
turbulent and both were under the care of a psychiatrist. See id. at 236-38. Enraged by his wife's refusal
to provide him the funds for psychiatric care, the defendant argued with the victim. See id. at 238. The
defendant reported that his wife taunted him to take "90 seconals" and kill himself, whereupon he lost
control and stabbed her fifty-one times. See id. In reducing the verdict to manslaughter, the appellate
court found that "the defendant's apparently long-harboured feelings of being hated and rejected by his
wife, would have seemed tragically confirmed by his wife's suggestion ... that he could solve his
problems" by committing suicide. /d. at 239.
123. People v. Glaser, 564 N.Y.S.2d 893 (App. Div. 1990); Murder (victim: estranged wife)
EED instruction denied with respect to all three victims. See id. at 894. The defendant fatally shot
his estranged wife and her parents as a result of "his dissatisfaction with divorce negotiations,
particularly the division of the proceeds of the marital residence." /d. The appellate court found that,
even if the defendant were subjectively upset, that was no "reasonable explanation or excuse" for his
emotional disturbance. See id. 534
124.

People v. Glaser, 564 N.Y.S.2d 893 (App. Div. 1990); Murder (same case, different victim:
estranged wife's mother)

533. Given the court's explicit focus on the taunting as sufficient, without regard to the "poking," the
case is classified as "other," without regard to whether "poking" should be considered "physical violence."
534. It is unclear whether the case was tried to a jury or a court and therefore is classified as a "no"
instruction case. This case is classified as "other," rather than "departure" because there is no indication
that the estranged wife sought to leave and the court's emphasis on the "proceeds of the marital residence"
suggests that the emotionally upsetting factor related to money rather than loss of the relationship.
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People v. Glaser, 564 N.Y.S.2d 893 (App. Div. 1990); Murder (same case, different victim:
estranged wife's father)

126.A

People v. Deresky, 525 N.Y.S.2d 49 (App. Div. 1988); Attempted Murder (victim: first police
officer)

EED instruction denied with respect to both police officers. See id. at 51. Two police officers
responded to a distress call from two women the defendant was harassing with a gun. See id. at 50.
Upon opening the door, the defendant pointed a shotgun at the officers and pulled the trigger. See id.
The gun, however, failed to fire. See id. On appeal, the court affirmed the trial court's refusal to charge
on EED based on the "fact that the defendant and his female companion argued prior to the arrival of
the police." /d. at 51.
127.A

People v. Deresky, 525 N.Y.S.2d 49 (App. Div. 1988); Attempted Murder (same case,
different victim: second police officer)

128.

People v. Rivera, 507 N.Y.S.2d 266 (App. Div. 1986); Murder
EED defense rejected at bench trial. See id. at 267. The defendant fatally shot his estranged wife.

See id. at 266. The court found that the record "reflects that the defendant's relationship with his

estranged wife was plagued by constant strife, as evidenced by their periodic separations, and was
punctuated by sporadic instances of physical abuse by the defendant." /d. at 267. The court concluded
that "defendant's reaction to his rather tortured marital situation" did not support an EED defense. /d.
129.A

People v. Knights, 486 N.Y.S.2d 377 (App. Div. 1985); Murder

EED instruction denied. See id. at 379. "On the evening of July 9, 1982, defendant engaged in a
vehement argument with his wife, Louise Knights, regarding her whereabouts earlier that evening."
/d. 535 The court found that the argument and the fact that defendant "had notified the police of his

irritation regarding her immoral behavior [were] insufficient to give substance to the defense." /d.
130.1

People v. Morrison, 464 N.Y.S.2d 245 (App. Div. 1983); Murder
Male defendant argued that "proof at trial established, as a matter of law, an affirmative defense"

of EED. /d. at 246. After forcing his wife to take an overdose of phenobarbital, defendant proceeded to
suffocate her with a pillow. See id. The defendant claimed that he killed his wife because her repeated
suicide attempts caused him extreme emotional disturbance. See id. On appeal, the court found "nothing
in the record to warrant our disturbance of the jury's finding that the defense was not proven in this
instance." /d.
13l.A

People v. Adams, 423 N.Y.S.2d 936 (App. Div. 1980), aff'd, 422 N.E.2d 537 (N.Y. 1981);
Attempted Murder

EED instruction denied and defendant convicted of attempted murder of a police officer. See id.

535. There is a suggestion that the question about the whereabouts involved allegations of an affair.
See, e.g., People v. Knights, 486 N.Y.S.2d 377, 379 (App. Div. 1985) (suggesting he believed her behavior
immoral). Without further elaboration of this claim, however, the case has been classified as "other."
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at 940--41. The defendant was holding a gun to a woman's head when a police officer approached him.
See id. at 937. The defendant fired two shots at the officer, who shot back, wounding the defendant. See
id. The defendant fired two more shots at the officer and fled. See id. Testimony at trial indicated that
prior to the shooting of the officer, the defendant was arguing with his girlfriend. See id. at 938. On
appeal, the court rejected his argument that he should have received an EED instruction because the
defendant's own testimony did not raise EED as a defense. See id. at 940.

132.A

State v. Skjonsby, 319 N.W.2d 764 (N.D. 1982); Murder, Attempted Murder 36

Defendant asserted on appeal that an EED instruction "should have been given." /d. at 778. The
defendant "asserted ... the following ... factors ... which establish 'extreme emotional disturbance':
(I) failing businesses and several lawsuits concerning those businesses; (2) problems with his relationship
with [his girlfriend]; (3) putting his grandmother in a nursing home; (4) [a threatening telephone call];
and (5) his fear that [his girlfriend] was in trouble." /d. at 779.
133.1

State v. Counts, 816 P.2d 1157 (Or. 1991); Murder 37
In a bench trial, the court "expressly noted that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding

of [EED]." /d. at 1166. The defendant shot his wife in the head, then placed the gun in her hand and
dialed 911 to report that she had committed suicide. See id. at 1158. He claimed that she was trying to
fatally poison him and his dogs, and that he thought she had taken out an insurance policy on him. See
id. at 1158-59. The trial court held that the defendant was precluded from an EED defense if he also
raised an insanity claim, see id. at 1159, a legal ruling reversed on appeal, see id. at 1164-66.

536. It is unclear whether the defendant was permitted to assert an EED defense with respect to both
charges. See State v. Skjonsby, 319 N.W.2d 764, 778-79 (N.D. 1982). Hence, the case is classified as a
single claim.
537. The trial court found the defendant guilty of murder but not responsible because of insanity. See
Statev.Counts,816P.2d 1157,1159(0r.l991).
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APPENDIX C: TRADITIONAL AND MIXED CASES

The cases listed below represent a sample from traditional and mixed jurisdictions.538 Cases
designated "I" are cases in which the trial jury received an "extreme emotional disturbance" (EED)
instruction, as defined in Appendix A. Cases with no "I'' designation are cases in which the trial jury
was not instructed or in which the instruction remains "unknown." Cases designated "A" were appealed
for failure to instruct on EED. Cases designated "F'' involve female defendants.

TRADITIONAL STATES (ILLINOIS AND ALABAMA)

I. DEPARTURE (7 Total; 0 I's)

!.A

Gholston v. State, 494 So. 2d 876 (Ala. 1986)

2.A

Fisher v. State, 587 So. 2d 1027 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991)

3.A

Fisher v. State, 587 So. 2d 1027 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (same case, different victim)

4.A

Fisher v. State, 587 So. 2d 1027 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (same case, different victim)

5.A

Pennell v. State, 429 So. 2d 679 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983)

6.

People v. Davis, 583 N.E.2d 64 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)

?.A

People v. Neal, 446 N.E.2d 270 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)

II. SEPARATION AND INFIDELITY (18 Total; 7 l's)

8.A

Speake v. State, 610 So. 2d 1238 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992)

9.A

Purser v. State, 607 So. 2d 298 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 607 So.2d

lO.I

Purser v. State, 607 So. 2d 298 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 607 So.2d

301 (Ala. 1992)

301 (Ala. 1992) (same case, different victim)
ll.A

Harrison v. State, 580 So. 2d 73 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991)

12.

White v. State, 587 So. 2d 1218 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990), aff'd, 587 So.2d 1236 (Ala. 1991)

13.A

People v. Lopez, 655 N.E.2d 864 (Ill. 1995)

14.A

People v. McCarthy, 547 N.E.2d 459 (Ill. 1989), remanded, 559 N.E.2d 996 (Ill. App. Ct.

15.A

People v. Flores, 544 N.E.2d 942 (Ill. 1989)

16.A

People v. Hightower, 629 N.E.2d 1197 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)

17.1

People v. Campos, 592 N.E.2d 85 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)

18.1

People v. Campos, 592 N.E.2d 85 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (same case, different victim)

1990)

19.A

People v. Elder, 579 N.E.2d 420 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)

20.1

People v. Taylor, 536 N.E.2d 1312 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)

2l.IA

People v. Ambro, 505 N.E.2d 381 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)

22.A

People v. Simpson, 473 N.E.2d 350, (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)

538. See Appendix A (describing selection methodology).
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23.I

People v. Middleswart, 463 N.E.2d 1050 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)

24.A.

People v. Harris, 463 N.E.2d 1030 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)

25 .I

People v. Carr, 4 I 4 N .E.2d I I 08 (Ill. App. Ct. I 980) 539
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III. SIMPLE INFIDELITY (9 Total; 4 I's)

26.IF

Martin v. State, 610 So. 2d I I 95 (Ala. Crim. App. I 992)

27.IA

Anderson v. State, 507 So.2d 580 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987)

28.

People v. Chevalier, 544 N.E.2d 942 (Ill. 1989), rev'g 521 N.E.2d 1256 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)

29.

People v. Falls, 601 N.E.2d 1276 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)

30.

People v. Schorle, 565 N.E.2d 84 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)

3l.I

People v. Buckner, 561 N.E.2d 335 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)

32.

People v. Duncan, 553 N.E.2d 774 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)

33.

People v. Wiley, 541 N.E.2d 1345 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)

34.I

People v. Pruitt, 506 N .E.2d 696 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)

IV. PHYSICAL VIOLENCE (43 Total; 26 I's)

A.

Physical Violence and Separation

35.I

McLaughlin v. State, 586 So. 2d 267 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991)

36.I

People v. Green, 599 N.E.2d 39 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)

37.

People v. Stephenson, 57 I N .E.2d 943 (Ill. App. Ct. I 99 I)

38.IA

People v. Robinson, 545 N.E.2d 268 (III. App. Ct. 1989)

39.F

People v. Hood, 547 N.E.2d 637 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)

40.F

People v. Crum, 539 N.E.2d 196 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)

4l.I

People v. Nelson, 474 N.E.2d 23 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)

B.

Physical Violence, Separation, and Infidelity

42.A

Carey v. State, 560 So. 2d I 103 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989)

43.I

Biggs v. State, 441 So.2d 989 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983)

44.I

Brown v. State, 401 So.2d 213 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981)

45.A

People v. Cedeno, 635 N.E.2d 1047 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)

46.

People v. Santiago, 582 N.E.2d 1304 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)

47.I

People v. Heredia, 550 N.E.2d 1023 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)

48.FA

People v. Cox, 459 N.E.2d 269 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)

49.A

People v. Peery, 439 N.E.2d 1087 (III. App. Ct. 1982)

50.

People v. Miller, 421 N.E.2d 406 (III. App. Ct. 1981)

539. To the extent that Carr depended upon verbal communications of adultery rather than actually
"witnessing" the act, it was overruled in People v. Chevalier, 544 N.E.2d 942 (Ill. 1989); see also People
v. Hightower, 629 N.E.2d 1197 (III. App. Ct. 1994).
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51.1

The Yale Law Journal

[Vol. 106: 1331

People v. Evans, 405 N.E.2d 503 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)

C.

Physical Violence and Infidelity

52.1F

Shiflett v. State, 507 So.2d 1056 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987)

53.

People v. Burts, 628 N.E.2d 515 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993), vacated and remanded, 630 N.E.2d 845
(Ill. 1994)

54.

People v. Dower, 578 N.E.2d 1153 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)

55.F

People v. Williams, 576 N.E.2d 68 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)

56.1F

People v. Moore, 562 N.E.2d 215 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)

D.
57.1

Physical Violence

Gentry v. State, No. CR-92-0409, 1994 WL 529410 (Ala. Crim. App. Sept. 30, 1994), rev'd
and remanded on other grounds, No. 1940471, 1996 WL 390618 (Ala. July 12, 1996)

58.1

Hill v. State, 516 So.2d 876 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987)

59.1F

Hill v. State, 507 So.2d 554 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986)

60.1AF

Freeman v. State, 505 So.2d 1079 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986)

61.1

Cox v. State, 500 So.2d 1296 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986)

62.1AF

Wyllie v. State, 445 So.2d 958 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983)

63.1F

Scott v. State, 414 So.2d 177 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982)

64.1F

People v. Garcia, 651 N.E.2d 100 (Ill. 1995)

65.1

People v. Taylor, 600 N.E.2d 9 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)

66.FA

People v. Lewis, 594 N.E.2d 414 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)

67.

People v. Smalley, 621 N.E.2d 7 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)

68.1

People v. Lindsay, 550 N.E.2d 719 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)

69.1

People v. Berry, 529 N.E.2d 1001 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)

70.1

People v. McVay, 524 N.E.2d 635 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)

7l.IF

People v. Falconer, 522 N.E.2d 903 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)

72.1

People v. Hall, 513 N.E.2d 429 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)

73.1

People v. Dare, 488 N.E.2d 1304 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)

74.A

People v. Holloway, 475 N.E.2d 915 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)

75.1

People v. Lynom, 423 N.E.2d 1281 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981), rev'd in part on other grounds, 440
N.E.2d 126 (Ill. 1982)

76.A

People v. Purazzo, 420 N.E.2d 461 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)

77.A

People v. Bacon, 415 N.E.2d 678 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)
V. OTHER (4 Total; 1 l's)

78.FA

Breckenridge v. State, 628 So.2d 1012 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993)

79.A

Barnett v. State, 540 So. 2d 810 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988)

80.1

People v. Ishmael, 466 N.E.2d 1334 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)
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MIXED STATES: CALIFORNIA AND MINNESOTA
I. Departure (7 Total; 6 I's)
!.I

People v. Rupe, 256 Cal. Rptr. 126 (Ct. App. 1988)

2.1

People v. McCowan, 227 Cal. Rptr. 23 (Ct. App. 1986)

3.1

People v. Ogen, 227 Cal. Rptr. 16 (Ct. App. 1985)

4.1

People v. Morrall, 192 Cal. Rptr. 601 (Ct. App. 1983)

5.1

State v. Shannon, 514 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. 1994)

6.A

State v. Koop, 380 N.W.2d 493 (Minn. 1986), rev'g 375 N.W.2d 491 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)

7.1

State v. Falvey, 1993 Minn. App. LEXIS 737 (Minn. Ct. App. July 27, 1993)
II. SEPARATION AND INFIDELITY (20 Total; 12 I's)

8.1

People v. Arcega, 651 P.2d 338 (Cal. 1982)

9.A

People v. Neasman, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 452 (Ct. App. 1993)

10.

People v. Morales, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358 (Ct. App. 1992)

II.

People v. Huynh, 281 Cal. Rptr. 785 (Ct. App. 1991)

12.A

People v. Marmaduke, 280 Cal. Rptr. 594 (Ct. App. 1991), review granted and opinion
superseded by 813 P.2d 652 (Cal. 1991), review dismissed by 824 P.2d 568 (Cal. 1992)

13.1

People v. Walsh, 245 Cal. Rptr. 862 (Ct. App. 1988)

14.1

People v. Thompkins, 240 Cal. Rptr. 516 (Ct. App. 1987)

15.1

People v. Thompkins, 240 Cal. Rptr. 516 (Ct. App. 1987) (same case, different victim)

16.1

People v. Campbell, 239 Cal. Rptr. 214 (Ct. App. 1987)

17.A

People v. Hyde, 212 Cal. Rptr. 440 (Ct. App. 1985)

18.1

People v. Pickett, 210 Cal. Rptr. 440 (Ct. App. 1985)

19.1

People v. Levitt, 203 Cal. Rptr. 276 (Ct. App. 1984)

20.1

People v. Levitt, 203 Cal. Rptr. 276 (Ct. App.l984) (same case, different victim)

2l.I

People v. Spurlin, 202 Cal. Rptr. 663 (Ct. App. 1984)

22.A

People v. Spurlin, 202 Cal. Rptr. 663 (Ct. App. 1984) (same case, different victim)

23.1

State v. Thunberg, 492 N.W.2d 534 (Minn. 1992)

24.A

State v. Gore, 451 N.W.2d 313 (Minn. 1990)

25.A

State v. Christianson, 361 N.W.2d 30 (Minn. 1985) (en bane)

26.1

State v. Larsen, 413 N.W.2d 584 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)

27.1

State v. Johnsen, 364 N.W.2d 494 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
III. SIMPLE INFIDELITY (I Total; I I)

28.1

State v. Bettin, 1995 Minn. App. LEX IS 931 (Ct. App. July II, 1995)
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The Yale Law Journal

[Vol. 106: 1331

IV. PHYSICAL VIOLENCE (19 Total; 14 l's)

A.

Physical Violence and Separation (5 Total; I I's)

29.1

People v. Aguilar, 267 Cal. Rptr. 879 (Ct. App. 1990)

30.A

State v. Merrill, 428 N.W.2d 361 (Minn. 1988) (en bane)

3l.A

State v. Edge, 422 N.W.2d 315 (Minn. 1988)

32.A

State v. Falvey, 1993 Minn. App. LEXIS 737 (Minn. Ct. App. July 27, 1993)

33.A

State v. Taylor, 1991 Minn. App. LEXIS 1227 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 1991)

B.

34.AF

Physical Violence, Separation, and Infidelity (5 Total; 4 I's)

People v. Wickersham, 650 P.2d 311 (Cal. 1982)

35.IF

People v. Adams, 192 Cal. Rptr. 290 (Ct. App. 1983)

36.1

State v. Moore, 458 N.W.2d 90 (Minn. 1990), appeal after remand, 481 N.W.2d 355 (Minn.

37.1

State v. Hanson, 405 N.W.2d 467 (Minn. 1987)

38.1

State v. Gurske, 424 N.W.2d 300 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)

1992)

C.

Physical Violence (9 Total; 9 I's)

39.1

People v. Wharton, 809 P.2d 290 (Cal. 1991)

40.1

People v. Bloyd, 729 P.2d 802 (Cal. 1987)

4l.IF

People v. Webb, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 582 (Ct. App. 1994)

42.IF

People v. Day, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916 (Ct. App. 1992)

43.IF

People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (Ct. App. 1989)

44.1

People v. Henderson, 223 Cal. Rptr. 741 (Ct. App. 1986)

45.IF

People v. Day, 220 Cal. Rptr. 330 (Ct. App. 1985)

46.1

People v. Birreuta, 208 Cal. Rptr. 635 (Ct. App. 1984)

47.1

State v. Lindberg, 408 N.W.2d 589 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)

IV. OTHER (6 Total; 2 l's)

48.A

State v. Cuypers, 481 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. 1992)

49.

State v. Hale, 453 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1990)

50.1

State v. Werman, 388 N.W.2d 748 (Minn. 1986)

51.1

State v. Schmit, 329 N.W.2d 56 (Minn. 1983)

52.A

State v. Hoffman, 328 N.W.2d 709 (Minn. 1982)

53.A

State v. Phelps, 328 N.W.2d 136 (Minn. 1982)

